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Abstract 
 
This thesis is primarily focussed on developing a novel characterisation of the 
distinction between a priori and a posteriori justification.  My working hypothesis is 
that we can make a surprising amount of progress in this field by paying attention 
to the structure of epistemic norms.  
I argue that direct a priori beliefs are governed by a structurally different 
kind of epistemic norm to the one that governs perceptual beliefs. That, I argue, is 
where the fundamental epistemological difference between the two categories lies. 
I call this view ‘Seeming-Independence’.  
Seeming-Independence holds that while a posteriori beliefs depend 
epistemically on how it perceptually seems to us, there is no corresponding 
dependence relation between a priori beliefs and how it intellectually seems to us. 
Intellectual seemings, or intuitions, simply do not play the kind of epistemological 
role that perceptual experiences play.   
The central contention of this thesis is that Seeming-Independence is a 
theoretically fruitful view of the a priori. The arguments I marshal in favour of 
Seeming-Independence are in this way primarily focussed on the explanatory power 
and flexibility of the view.  
In effect, what I suggest is that Seeming-Independence, unlike some of its 
rivals, is a particularly clear way of dividing the a priori from the a posteriori, and it 
allows us to neatly bypass some of influential criticisms of a priority.  
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Introduction 
 
What is the difference between a priori justification or warrant and a posteriori 
warrant? Can we plausibly construe this distinction such that it is both genuinely 
epistemological and philosophically important? What does it mean to say that a 
priori warrant is independent of experience? What sort of mental state counts as 
experience in this sense? What kinds of propositions can we know a priori? 
These are the sort of questions that this thesis is devoted to exploring. My 
working hypothesis is that we can make a surprising amount of progress on 
questions like these by paying attention to the structure of epistemic norms.  
In essence, the view I defend is that direct a priori beliefs are governed by a 
structurally different kind of epistemic norm to the one that governs perceptual 
beliefs. That, I argue, is where the fundamental epistemological difference between 
the two categories lies. 
This project as a whole is very firmly grounded in a particular understanding 
of epistemic norms. I begin by drawing attention to the fact that, amongst those 
that take a normative approach to epistemology, questions of whether a believer is 
rational in holding her beliefs are often settled by considering whether it would be 
appropriate to epistemically reproach, or criticise, or in any sense blame her for 
how she went about forming and maintaining her beliefs.  If there is nothing to 
criticise or find fault with in her epistemic behaviour then this establishes that her 
belief is rational.  
A key contention of this thesis is that this is a mistake. What I take to be the 
central error here is that discussions of epistemic normativity tend to uncritically 
model epistemic norms on moral norms. There is a strong tradition in moral 
philosophy to take normative moral judgements to be closely connected to 
‘reactive attitudes’ like praise and blame. The assumption being made in normative 
epistemology is that there is a similarly close connection between analogous 
epistemic judgements and analogous epistemic sentiments.  
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The presumption that epistemic norms have much in common with moral 
norms is a long-standing one, dating all the back to Clifford’s classic The Ethics of 
Belief (1877).  
However, in my view, it is an assumption that should be challenged. Of late 
there has been considerable and increasing discussion of non-moral norms. 
Philosophers frequently debate about what the norms of assertion are, or whether 
mental content and beliefs are things that properly have their own distinct norms. 
Now the picture of normativity that emerges from these debates is importantly 
different from moral normativity in that there is nothing like the close connection 
between normative judgements and blame-like sentiments.  
This is because exactly what these non-moral norms require from us is not 
always transparent to us. For example, consider the norm of assertion. The two 
most influential accounts of the norms of assertion, are the Knowledge Account 
(‘assert only what you know’) and the Truth Account (‘assert only what is true’).  
Now since it is not always transparent to us whether some proposition p is 
true or known, it follows for both accounts that the fundamental norm of assertion 
is structured such that it is possible to misunderstand, through no fault of our own, 
what it is that we may and may not assert. If we are fooled into thinking we know p 
when p is false, then we will have violated the norm of assertion if we assert that p, 
even if we had excellent reasons for thinking we knew that p (and hence that p was 
true).   
I claim that some epistemic norms are non-transparent in exactly this way: 
we may, through no fault of our own, be mistaken about what epistemic norms 
require from us in some specific context.  As such, we may also blamelessly fail to 
comply with those norms. The resulting beliefs, I argue, are both irrational and 
blameless.  
Now the use I put this account of epistemic norms to, as I have mentioned, 
is to develop and defend a new characterisation of the a priori. I call the account 
‘Seeming-Independence’.  
Seeming-Independence might be described as follows: while a posteriori 
beliefs depend epistemically on how it perceptually seems to us, there is no 
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corresponding dependence relation between a priori beliefs and how it 
intellectually seems to us. Intellectual seemings, or intuitions, simply do not play 
the kind of epistemic role that perceptual experiences play.   
The fact that a priori beliefs are not epistemically dependent on intuitions, I 
argue, indicates that the norms governing non-inferential a priori beliefs are—
unlike those governing perceptual belief—truth guaranteeing. Insofar as one really 
does correctly follow those particular epistemic norms, one is guaranteed to arrive 
at true belief. 
Now the major contention of this thesis is that Seeming-Independence is a 
theoretically fruitful view of the a priori. The arguments I marshal in favour of 
Seeming-Independence are in this way primarily focussed on the explanatory power 
and flexibility of the view.  
In effect, what I suggest is that Seeming-Independence, unlike some of its 
rivals, is a particularly clear way of dividing the a priori from the a posteriori, and it 
allows us to neatly bypass some of influential criticisms of a priority.  
Since Seeming-Independence is fundamentally a claim about epistemic 
norms, one advantage it has is that it uses a clearly epistemological criterion in 
dividing the a priori from the a posteriori. It is well positioned to respond to 
criticisms that the a priori/a posteriori distinction is ad hoc or incoherent.  
Another advantage of Seeming-Independence is that it does not wed itself 
to an implausible philosophy of mind. Seeming-Independence does not commit us 
to the existence of any kind of strange, perception-like faculty of priori insight. 
Seeming-Independence is also perfectly consistent with the thought that humans 
are limited and fallible reasoners.  
The plausibility of Seeming-Independence, however, depends crucially on 
whether the idea of a truth-guaranteeing norm is intelligible. The latter part of the 
thesis is devoted to exploring whether it is. 
This exploration leads us relatively far afield: into discussions of analyticity 
and discussions of self-knowledge.  
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Essentially, the plausibility of Seeming-Independence depends crucially on 
whether or not we can make sense of an unusual property; a property that I call 
self-evidence. Seeming-Independence ultimately presupposes that self-evidence is 
actually a property that some propositions have. And this presupposition would be 
illegitimate without any explanation of what self-evidence is. 
I suggest that there are two readily available, paradigmatic examples of self-
evident propositions: those propositions that are analytic and those propositions 
that we can know introspectively.  
Now neither suggestion is entirely unproblematic. While Paul Boghossian 
has developed a new account of analyticity that appears capable of avoiding the 
problems that Quine famously raises, this version of analyticity—epistemic 
analyticity—has recently encountered a major set-back. Timothy Williamson has 
developed a recipe for generating decisive-looking counter-examples to it.  
The account of analyticity Boghossian advocates depends crucially on the 
claim that there are links between understanding analytic propositions, and 
assenting to them. Failures to assent entail failures of understanding.  
Williamson offers several very plausible-looking counter-examples to this 
suggestion: examples of highly competent language users who, as a result of 
suitably bizarre background beliefs, steadfastly refuse to assent to a number of 
paradigmatically analytic propositions.  
The claim that our own beliefs, desires, intentions, and so forth are self-
evident to us likewise faces challenges. While it is widely agreed that self-
knowledge of the sort I am interested in seems to have many of the same 
epistemological characteristics that self-evident beliefs do, there is decidedly less 
agreement over whether it really does have those characteristics. There are a 
number of prima facie plausible construals of self-knowledge that deny that it 
genuinely does have any special epistemic qualities.  
Moreover, the suggestion that self-knowledge is self-evident would imply 
that Seeming-Independence is committed also to the view that our knowledge of 
our own contingent intentions, beliefs, etc., counts as genuinely and substantively a 
priori, a view which some might find unacceptably implausible.  
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I think that both sets of challenges can be overcome.  I argue that the 
account of normativity developed here allows us to legitimately limit, in a non-ad 
hoc way, the proposed links between understanding and assent so that they do not 
apply to examples like those that Williamson develops. This allows us to 
acknowledge that Williamson’s examples are indeed examples of people who 
understand analytic propositions without assenting to them, but yet nonetheless 
insist that they are not counter-examples to a more plausible conception of the 
links between understanding analytic propositions and assenting to them.  
I also claim that attention to the way in which our higher-order judgements 
about our own present-tense attitudes interact with the attitudes themselves 
provides us with excellent reasons to think that the attitudes in question are most 
plausibly understood as self-evident when viewed (so to speak) from the first-
person perspective.  
 I further suggest that the idea that self-knowledge of this sort is a priori is 
not nearly as unacceptable a conclusion as we might think. On the contrary, being 
able to appeal to the a priori provides us with an especially clear solution to what I 
call the Problem of Self-Knowledge. The Problem of Self-Knowledge arises from the 
fact we seem to treat people as if they know what they think in a special way, 
without any clear idea of how they could have this special kind of knowledge.  
I argue that the claim that this special kind of knowledge is a priori 
knowledge is a surprisingly satisfactory answer to this kind of ‘how’-question.  
Ultimately, then, there is nothing untoward in Seeming-Independence’s 
reliance on the notion of self-evidence. It remains a plausible-looking and 
potentially fruitful theoretical model.  
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1: Epistemic Normativity  
 
Any epistemological theory might be taken to fall into one of two camps—
normative and non-normative. A normative epistemological theory holds that 
whether one knows that p, or is epistemically warranted in believing that p, 
depends in part on whether one ought to believe it. A non-normative theory is any 
theory that dispenses with talk of ‘oughts’. Typically, a non-normative theory holds 
that whether a belief is warranted depends exclusively on whether particular kinds 
of causal conditions obtain.  
Amongst those who take a normative approach to epistemology, one’s 
epistemic standing, or warrant, depends crucially on whether one has formed the 
belief in question in a manner that is ‘epistemically rational or responsible’ 
(BonJour 1985, p. 42) or ‘reasonable’ (Cohen 1984, p. 283).  
The intuition behind this thought is most clearly captured by the well-known 
series of thought experiments Laurence BonJour runs in The Structure of Empirical 
Knowledge (1985). BonJour puts forward a series of scenarios designed to suggest 
that the reliability of a cognitive faculty cannot by itself justify the beliefs that 
faculty produces. The most compelling of these cases is as follows: 
Norman, under certain conditions which usually obtain, is a 
completely reliable clairvoyant with respect to certain kinds of 
subject matter. He possesses no evidence or reasons of any kind for 
or against the general possibility of such a cognitive power or for or 
against the thesis that he possesses it. One day Norman comes to 
believe that the President is in New York City, though he has no 
evidence for or against this belief. In fact the belief is true and results 
from his clairvoyant power under which it is completely reliable. 
(BonJour, 1985, p. 41)  
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It is intuitively clear that Norman is unjustified in uncritically accepting this belief, 
despite the fact that his belief is formed via a reliable faculty. BonJour argues, 
persuasively, that this is because Norman was not properly rational in the manner 
in which he acquired his belief. Given his background beliefs, he is not rationally 
entitled to rely upon his faculty of clairvoyance in the way he has.  
 A great many philosophers have taken this to conclusively demonstrate that 
necessarily, if one is warranted (justified) in believing that p, then one has formed 
and maintained the belief that p in a way that is fully rational or epistemically 
responsible.  
 What I want to call attention to in this chapter is how the nebulous terms 
‘epistemically rational’, ‘responsible’, and ‘reasonable’ are understood in this 
context. Interestingly, philosophers within this normative tradition frequently seem 
to understand being epistemically rational as equivalent to being epistemically 
blameless.  In this chapter I will argue that this is a mistake: there is good reason to 
keep epistemic blamelessness distinct from epistemic rationality.  
 Let me make one final terminological point. Careful readers may have 
already noticed that I sometimes use the terms ‘warrant’ and ‘justification’ 
interchangeably. However, I do not take them to mean exactly the same thing: I 
loosely follow Burge (1993) in understanding justification to be a subspecies of 
epistemic warrant. In my view a belief is warranted if it possesses the sort of 
positive epistemic status that is usually sufficient for knowledge.1  
A justification is the kind of epistemic warrant that is cognitively accessible 
to us. A person has a justification for believing that p if she believes that p on the 
basis of some articulable reasons: a paradigmatic example of a justification for the 
belief that p would be an argument of some sort for p. I mark the distinction 
between warrant and justification because I leave open the possibility that 
sometimes a believer may be epistemically entitled to hold some belief even if she 
cannot think of a justification for it. A belief that we were entitled to in this sense 
would count as a warranted belief.  
                                                        
1
 The unusual cases where warrant is not sufficient for knowledge I take to be the kind of cases 
Gettier famously called attention to: cases where the belief in question is warranted but is only 
accidentally or luckily true.  
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1.1 Epistemic rationality and epistemic blame 
Let us begin by setting up what is meant by ‘epistemically rational’ (or ‘responsible’) 
and ‘epistemically blameless’.  Epistemologists who use expressions like ‘rational’ 
‘responsible’ or ‘reasonable’ tend to use them interchangeably, and seldom seem 
to take there to be any important distinctions between the terms. Stewart Cohen, 
for instance, explains that he thinks ‘rational’ and ‘reasonable’ are both virtually 
synonymous with ‘justified’ (Cohen 1984, p. 283). In the context of this normative 
tradition, then, both ‘rational’ and ‘reasonable’ are used to pick out a person who 
has fully complied with the relevant epistemic norms.  
‘Epistemically responsible’ is likewise seldom used in a way that indicates it 
means anything other than this. I take it that the key idea  is that being properly 
responsible in this epistemic sense is much like being properly responsible in the 
everyday, conversational sense of being a responsible person. When we describe a 
person as being a responsible person, what we mean to indicate is that she is 
someone who reliably meets her responsibilities. If she is entrusted with certain 
duties, she will typically discharge those duties.  
Someone behaving in an epistemically responsible way, then, is someone 
who is successfully meeting, or complying with, the relevant epistemic norms.  
Before moving on to discuss epistemic blamelessness, let me properly 
articulate what it is to comply with an epistemic norm. I take the notion of an 
epistemic norm to be a fundamentally deontological notion. When believing 
rationally, we: 
[R]ely on a set of epistemic rules that tell us in some general way 
what it would be most rational to believe under various epistemic 
conditions. We reason about what to believe, and we do so by 
relying on a set of epistemic rules. (Boghossian 2008, p. 1) 
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An epistemically rational belief, then, is fundamentally a belief we arrived via 
reasoning that (in some sense) relies on a special set of rules. This is what it is for a 
belief to be in compliance with an epistemic norm.  
Now, my use of the term ‘epistemically blameless’ originates from Paul 
Boghossian. Boghossian explicitly takes epistemic blamelessness to be equivalent to 
being epistemically responsible. He says: 
Our robust response to *BonJour’s thought experiment+ is that 
Norman is not justified. And a plausible and widely-accepted 
diagnosis of our response is that we are reluctant to regard someone 
as justified in holding a given belief if they are being epistemically 
irresponsible in holding that belief. Being justified is, at least in part, 
a matter of being epistemically blameless. (Boghossian, 2003a: p. 228. 
Emphasis mine) 
 
Here Boghossian treats ‘epistemically irresponsible’ and ‘epistemically blameless’ as 
antonyms. In the very next paragraph, Boghossian indicates that the lesson he 
draws from BonJour’s example is that ‘being justified excludes being epistemically 
blameworthy’ (Emphasis mine). So Boghossian, it seems, does not take there to be 
an important distinction between being epistemically rational and being 
epistemically blameless.  
 But how are we to understand epistemic blame? Boghossian does not offer 
much elaboration on this. He sets up epistemic blamelessness simply as follows: ‘If 
someone is epistemically blameless in believing something, then it makes no sense 
to criticize him for believing it’ (Boghossian, 2001, p. 18). When we talk of blaming 
people, then, we are talking about adopting— or being disposed to adopt— a kind 
of critical attitude or sentiment towards them.  
 Yet I take it that the notion of blame Boghossian has in mind is a little more 
sophisticated than that brief analysis suggests. I take it that if we blame a person 
for ϕ-ing, then it follows that we think—or are disposed to think— that she ought 
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not to have ϕ-ed. That is certainly the sense of blame that the above quotation 
generates.  
But not all criticism has that normative implication. Consider an art critic 
who criticises the artist for having produced an ugly painting. This sort of evaluative 
criticism might have some sort of normative implication; for instance, it seems to 
follow from the painting being ugly that it is a bad work art.  
However, it does not obviously follow from a painting’s being ugly (or bad) 
to it being a painting that the artist ought not to have painted. This is because it is 
not obvious that the painter is under any obligation to produce only good art. And 
without that obligation, it is difficult to understand how it could be that she ought 
not to have painted what she did. ‘Ought’ is a fundamentally deontic notion, while 
‘bad’ is fundamentally evaluative. Deontic and evaluative notions might well both 
be normative notions, but it is not obvious that there are any straightforward 
logical implications between them.  
Blame, we can conclude, involves only a specific type of criticism: what we 
might call deontic criticism as opposed to evaluative criticism. So a charitable 
reading of Boghossian would be to understand him as claiming that to blame a 
person for ϕ-ing just is being disposed to deontically criticise her for doing so: 
taking her to have done something that she ought not to do.  
And I consider taking someone to have done something that she ought not 
to have done to be fundamentally a matter of taking her action to reflect on the 
person in a particular sense.  That is to say, deontically criticising a person for ϕ-ing 
is more than simply considering her having done so to be unfortunate: it involves 
taking her to be what we might call deeply responsible for the unfortunate result. 
The clearest, most discussed, example of deep responsibility of this sort is moral 
responsibility. Consider the following quote from R. Jay Wallace: 
People who are morally responsible are not seen as acting in ways 
that happen to be good or bad; they are not just causally responsible 
for certain welcome or unwelcome happenings... Rather, the actions 
of morally responsible people are thought to reflect specially on 
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them as agents, opening them to a kind of moral appraisal that does 
more than record a causal connection between them and the 
consequences of their actions. (Wallace 1994 p. 52) 
 
To morally blame a person for something, then, is to hold her responsible for it in 
this deep sense: it is to consider what she did, or brought about, to reflect poorly on 
her as a moral agent.  
 Epistemic blame is the epistemic equivalent of this stance. To epistemically 
blame a person is to hold her responsible for her beliefs: to take these beliefs to 
reflect poorly on her as an epistemic agent in this ‘deep’ way.    
Above I indicated that Boghossian—quite rightly—takes being epistemically 
blameworthy in this sense to entail that one has failed to comply with the relevant 
epistemic norms: the norms germane to one’s epistemic situation. However, given 
his treatment of ‘epistemically blameless’ and ‘epistemically irresponsible’ as 
antonyms, we might also read him as committed to a stronger view. This would be 
the view that being epistemically blameless likewise entails that one is epistemically 
rational: that one really has complied with the relevant epistemic norms.  
Now while Boghossian is unusual in framing this point in terms of blame, I 
take the idea here to be not uncommon. For instance, consider Cohen’s ‘New Evil 
Problem’ for reliabilism. Cohen (1984) argues that it is deeply implausible to 
suppose that a victim of a Cartesian evil demon, who goes about forming his beliefs 
in a perfectly sensible manner, is not justified in holding his perceptual beliefs. 
While it is clear that such a person would not have perceptual knowledge, Cohen 
insists that the manner in which he forms his beliefs is sufficient for his being fully 
justified, despite the fact that his perceptual faculties are—thanks to the demon’s 
interference—entirely unreliable. Cohen sets up the argument for this conclusion as 
follows: 
My argument hinges on viewing justification as a normative notion. 
Intuitively, if S’s belief is appropriate to the available evidence, he is 
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not to be held responsible for circumstances beyond his ken. (Cohen 
1984, p. 282, my emphasis) 
 
The intuition Cohen is trying to exploit here is the intuition that there is a 
connection between not being able to hold a believer responsible for his (false) 
belief, and his being justified.  Given we cannot hold S in any way responsible for his 
belief being false, Cohen urges, he cannot plausibly be said to lack justification.  
Now how should we understand the relevant notion of ‘holding 
responsible’? I take it that this is clearly to be understood in exactly the way I have 
suggested we understand Boghossian’s notion of epistemic blame. I characterised 
epistemic blame as involving holding a believer ‘deeply responsible’ for her beliefs. 
It is difficult to see what other idea Cohen could have in mind here if not that.  
 So I suggest that Cohen is claiming the same thing that Boghossian is 
claiming: that if believers go about forming and maintaining their beliefs in a 
manner for which they cannot be blamed, criticised or held responsible, then they 
cannot plausibly be thought to be unwarranted. It is only epistemically 
blameworthy believers, then, that are epistemically irrational or irresponsible. If a 
believer cannot be blamed, then she has not formed her belief in a way that can be 
considered epistemically irrational or irresponsible.  
The thought that there is no significant distinction to be drawn between 
epistemic irresponsibility and epistemic blameworthiness runs parallel to a 
venerable tradition in moral philosophy, and it is this parallel, I suggest, that 
provides the support for the view that to be epistemically blameless just is to be 
epistemically responsible. Now, according to this tradition, moral judgements are 
grounded in ‘reactive attitudes’ like praise and blame. All it is to judge a person to 
be guilty of moral wrong-doing, for example, is to be disposed to blame them for 
their actions. Blame, in this way, is a constitutively moral sentiment.  
So I take it that the assumption at play here is simply that the same sort of 
relationship holds between epistemic blame and epistemic rationality: such that to 
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judge someone epistemically irrational just is to epistemically blame them for those 
beliefs.  
 However, whatever the merits of this view as a thesis about moral 
responsibility, there is no reason to think it holds as a thesis about epistemic 
rationality. On the contrary, as I shall argue, there are strong reasons for thinking 
that it does not hold. That is to say, there are strong reasons to suppose that it is 
logically possible for one to be simultaneously epistemically irrational, and 
epistemically blameless. 
 
1.2 Non-moral norms and blame 
Epistemic rationality, we have seen, is a matter of complying with epistemic norms. 
One believes in an epistemically rational manner when one is fully in keeping with 
the relevant epistemic norms or demands. Being epistemically blameless is a matter 
of being epistemically unimpeachable or uncriticisable. You are blameless in this 
sense when you cannot appropriately be faulted for having the beliefs that you 
have: when your belief does not reflect poorly upon you as an epistemic agent. But 
there is no reason to suppose that people are always blameworthy in this sense for 
failing to meet a normative demand.  
 In the past decade, there has been an increasing amount of discussion of 
non-moral norms: for example the norms governing assertion, or the norms 
generated by linguistic meaning, by mental content or by the nature of belief itself. 
One of the most interesting developments in these debates is that it has become 
quite clear that many of the most influential of the theories proposed explicitly 
allow that a person may, in a variety of ways, fail to meet a normative demand and 
yet still be entirely faultless for this failure. In other words, a person’s failure to 
meet a normative requirement does not entail that she deserves to be blamed for 
her failure.  
So if it is indeed true that judging someone to have failed to meet a moral 
norm entails blaming that person, that entailment is to be most plausibly 
understood as arising from features specific to moral judgements, or moral blame. 
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There is no incoherence in judging someone has failed to meet some other 
normative requirement and yet not adopting anything resembling a blame-like 
stance towards that person.  
This is especially clear in the debate surrounding the norms of assertion. The 
most discussed view in this field is Timothy Williamson’s Knowledge Account of 
Assertion.2 This is the view that all assertions are governed by the norm ‘assert only 
what you know’.3 A prominent competitor to this view—indeed the one it sets itself 
up as an alternative to—is what we might call the Truth Account: the view that 
assertions are governed by the norm ‘assert only what is true’.4 While the debate is 
primarily conducted between the Knowledge and Truth Accounts, a third option in 
the literature is what we might call the Reason To Believe Account: which holds that 
the norm governing assertion is ‘assert only what you have reason to believe’.5 All 
three of these accounts maintain that a person might well make an assertion that 
fails to meet to the fundamental norm of assertion without deserving of any sort of 
blame, reproach or criticism.  
The Knowledge and Truth Accounts both allow that this may occur in the 
following way. Suppose a speaker asserts that p when she has excellent reasons to 
think that p is true, but p is in fact false. To return to a familiar thought experiment, 
we may suppose that the speaker’s perceptual faculties are being manipulated by 
an evil demon in such a way that nothing she seems to perceive actually exists. 
Since almost all her beliefs are false, almost everything she asserts will also be false 
(and not known). Hence, for both Knowledge and Truth Accounts, she will almost 
always be in violation of the norms of assertion.  Yet, nonetheless, as Cohen 
pointed out, it is strongly intuitive that the speaker does not deserve any blame for 
this. We can imagine her being an extremely honest and epistemically careful 
person, making sure to only make assertions after close attendance to the 
                                                        
2 See Williamson (2000).  
3 Other notable defenders of this view are Keith DeRose (2002) and John Hawthorne (2004).  
4
 Williamson attributes this view to Grice (1989). For a more recent defender, see Matthew Weiner 
(2005).  
5
 Note that having reason to believe something need not entail actually believing it. Jennifer Lackey 
(2007) is a prominent defender of this account and she maintains—interestingly—that one might 
properly assert something if one has good reason to believe it, even when one does not in fact 
believe it. 
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evidence. Given her exemplary epistemic character, it is plainly implausible to 
suggest she can be held responsible for her incorrect or inappropriate assertions. 
And we do sometimes adopt a blame-like stance towards asserters. For 
example, consider our stance to gossips: people who habitually spread 
unsubstantiated rumours. Not only is it conversationally appropriate to criticise 
gossips, there is a strong sense in which the criticism involved is deontic criticism: 
we regard such people as behaving in a way that they ought not to. Our critical 
stance towards gossips constitutes a blame-like stance. 
The Reason To Believe Account might be able to sidestep this sort of 
example by following Cohen in claiming that such a person would still have reason 
to believe what she is asserting in this scenario, and hence that her assertions 
violate no norm. Yet there are other cases that fail to meet the norms of assertion 
on all three accounts despite the speaker being undeserving of criticism.  
The clearest example of this would be a case of justified lying. Consider a 
Rwandan harbouring Tutsis during the Rwandan Genocide, who regularly lies to 
roaming bands of Hutu extremists in order to protect the Tutsis. There is nothing 
blameworthy about telling these sorts of lies. If anything, we would be more 
inclined to criticise anybody who did not lie in circumstances like those. In the 
imagined scenario, not only is the statement not true (and hence not known either) 
but we can safely assume that the speaker has no reasons whatsoever to believe it. 
On whichever account of assertion we favour, she must be understood as failing to 
conform to the norm of assertion.  
 So on all the available accounts of the norms of assertion, not only is it true 
that people may blamelessly fail to meet the norm of assertion, but sometimes 
speakers can even be understood as deserving criticism for following the norms of 
assertion to the letter. So if any one of these three accounts is correct, there is a 
substantial gap between judging someone to fail to meet a normative requirement, 
and criticising her for that failure. The two positions are distinct.  
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 The same conclusion follows for anybody who follows Kripke (1982) in 
holding that linguistic meaning is normative.6 For anyone sympathetic to that view, 
both the justified liar and the justified but false asserter will be examples of a 
person who has failed to meet a normative requirement, but yet is not 
blameworthy or criticisable for the failure.  
To hold that linguistic meaning is normative is typically to hold that linguistic 
rules are in fact norms: failing to use some term as these rules dictate is to fail to 
meet a normative requirement. Now any false assertion, according to the standard 
view, is an instance of an utterance that is linguistically incorrect. The linguistic 
rules that apply to the term ‘cat’ indicate that the term is appropriate only when 
applied to cats. So, if I mistake a cleverly disguised dog for a cat and utter ‘there is a 
cat’, then I am using the term incorrectly. Likewise if I deliberately say something 
untrue: all lies are cases where I am using linguistic expressions incorrectly. So all 
instances of reasonable but false beliefs, and all instances of rational or moral lying, 
will count as using language in a way contrary to a normative demand.  
 It is also widely held that a belief is an attitude that generates its own 
specific norms as well. While the orthodox position here is that belief is 
fundamentally governed by some sort of truth norm7, it is not uncommon to think 
that belief is fundamentally governed by what we might call a knowledge norm like 
‘believe only what you know’.8  
Now while the person lying to the Hutu extremists is not in violation of 
either the truth norm or the knowledge norm, since where she believes the Tutsis 
to be hidden is where they in fact are, it is clear that the reasonable but false 
believer is in violation of the norm of belief, on both accounts.  
 The upshot of this is that if we take any of these accounts of the norms of 
assertion, meaning or belief seriously, then we must conclude that taking a person 
to be in violation of a norm does not in itself obviously necessitate or entail 
                                                        
6
 This debate is slightly different to the debate about the norms of assertion in that here the debate 
is exclusively about whether meaning is normative and not at all about what these norms might be. 
If it is normative, the norms themselves will obvious.  
7
 Philosophers vary in how the details of this claim are to be understood. For example, see 
Boghossian 2003b, and Wedgwood 2002.  
8 For example, see Williamson 2000.  
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adopting a blame-like stance towards that person. Which raises the question: why 
should we assume that this entailment holds for epistemic norms and epistemic 
blame? 
 
1.3 Normative conflict 
At this point, what is required is to make sense of how it is possible to fail to meet 
some norm while remaining blameless for that failure. In particular, what we need 
to examine is whether there is any reason for thinking that while blameless 
normative failure is possible for some kinds of activity, blamelessly failing to meet 
an epistemic norm is not possible. That is to say, we need to question whether the 
considerations that suggest that a person might sometimes be beyond reproach 
despite failing to meet (for example) the norm of assertion, admit of no parallel 
considerations with regard to epistemic norms.  
Here is Williamson’s explanation of how what I’ve been calling blameless 
normative failure is possible for assertion: 
It is not denied that false assertions are sometimes warranted in the 
everyday sense that they are sometimes reasonable; the claim is 
rather that the reasonableness of such assertions is explicable as the 
joint outcome of the knowledge rule [i.e.: assert that p only if you 
know that p] and cognitive considerations not specific to assertion. 
(Williamson, 2000: 243) 
 
I take it that concluding that an assertion is reasonable in this ‘everyday sense’ that 
Williamson talks about is, in effect, to conclude that the asserter cannot be held 
responsible for asserting falsely. Now the suggestion here is that it isn’t only 
whether the assertion accords with the norms of assertion that determines 
whether an assertion is blameless. Other factors must also be taken into account.  
 What sort of factors might be relevant here? One obvious answer would be 
any other normative requirements that might apply to that assertion. In addition to 
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the norms of assertion, there are also more general norms that our assertions 
might be answerable to. An assertion is still a speech act, and so will still fall under 
the mandate of any norms that apply to action generally: prudential and moral 
norms, for example. And it is possible that normative conflict might arise. That is to 
say, it is possible that a speech act that is entirely correct according to the norms of 
assertion is also an immoral or imprudent act. Moral or prudential norms can pull 
apart from the norms of assertion.  
The Good Samaritan lying to the Hutu extremists is a clear example of this. 
By Williamson’s lights, that person is blameless despite deliberately failing to meet 
the norms of assertion because the decision to assert incorrectly was informed by 
moral considerations. She judged that it was more important to keep the Tutsis 
hidden than it was to assert what she knew to be the case. Moral norms in this 
sense overruled the norm of assertion: the relevant moral norms generated reasons 
to lie that outweighed the reasons to tell the truth that were generated by the 
norm of assertion.  
 So one way in which ‘other cognitive considerations not specific to 
assertion’ can play a role in determining whether an assertion is blameworthy or 
not is by providing reasons to act contrary to the norms of assertion that are 
stronger than the reasons generated by the norms of assertion.  
 The implication here, then, would be that at least one way of determining 
whether a speaker is blameworthy or blameless would be to look at all her reasons, 
both for and against, asserting as she did. If she had reasons that trump her reasons 
for asserting what she knows, then she is blameless. If she does not, then she is 
blameworthy.  
 One problem with this suggestion, however, is that it relies on the thought 
that the reasons generated by one set of norms are comparable with the reasons 
generated by another set of norms. The way I set up the example suggested that  
the reasons generated by the norms of assertion could be measured against the 
reasons generated by the relevant moral norms, such that we could decide that, in 
light of all these reasons, the Good Samaritan had, all things considered, stronger 
reasons to lie than to tell the truth.  
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This thought is intuitive in some cases, but yet not in others. It is plausible 
that moral norms take precedence over the norms of assertion. It seems 
unambiguous what the right thing to do is in the situation described above.  
Anybody who took the norm of assertion to be stronger than the relevant moral 
norms would have been blameworthy: the reasons in favour of telling the Hutus 
what he knows seem to pale in comparison to the reasons in favour of lying.  
But even if we allow that this is an instance where the requirements of one 
set of norms can be unproblematically measured against the requirements of 
another set of norms, it is not obvious we can do this in all cases.  Sometimes in 
cases of normative conflict the reasons generated by conflicting sets of norms 
cannot straightforwardly be compared.  
Dramatic fiction is rife with characters who must decide between conflicting 
sets of reasons for acting.  In the most interesting versions, what the all-things-
considered best thing to do is far from obvious. Sometimes these reasons are 
generated from plainly distinct sets of normative requirements. For instance, 
consider Willoughby’s decision to rescue Marianne in Jane Austin’s Sense and 
Sensibility.9 While Willoughby had excellent reasons to do as he did—Marianne did 
need his aid—he nonetheless was in clear breach of etiquette; by the standards of 
the time, the rescue constituted an inappropriately intimate contact between an 
unmarried young lady and a bachelor. Did Willoughby act rightly in terms of his best 
overall reasons? Did the moral reasons entirely trump those generated by the 
norms of etiquette? This is not so clear, given what happens after this. More 
interestingly, it is not obvious that Austin herself considers the act to be the best 
decision in terms of overall reasons. While the act is initially assumed to be 
unambiguously the best available option, the novel goes on to problematize it. This 
very act turns out to serve as an example of why those specific standards governing 
male and female interaction were considered important in the first place. The 
rescue sets in motion a chain of events that results in disastrous consequences for 
Marianne. The overall best thing to do in Willoughby’s situation, then, is arguably 
presented by the author as being indeterminate.  
                                                        
9 I am grateful to Tom Stoneham for drawing my attention to this example.  
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Nonetheless, while readers may be inclined to blame Willoughby for a great 
many of his subsequent actions, I think it fair to say we cannot reasonably blame 
him for stopping to save a young lady in need. For that act he remains blameless. 
Given that there aren’t any choices that are presented as clearly the right ones to 
make in a situation like that, Willoughby cannot be blamed despite his serious 
breach of protocol.  
Interestingly then, it looks like it is quite possible to view Willoughby as 
being blameless, but nonetheless to hold that the choice he faced was an 
impossible one: that the reasons he had for acting as he did are not in any 
interesting way comparable to the reasons he had to act differently.  
What this sort of case illustrates is that sometimes a person may be 
blameless for failing to meet a normative requirement even when she doesn’t have 
contrasting reasons that overrule her reasons for adhering to that norm.  Conflicting 
normative demands need not generate reasons that are easily comparable. But 
people caught in such conflicts might plausibly be considered blameless for failing 
to meet the normative demand they do fail to meet. That is to say, people making 
decisions in impossible situations are not blameworthy for deciding to comply with 
one normative demand at the expense of another. 
However, is it possible for another set of norms to come into conflict with 
epistemic norms? And if it is, is it possible that these other norms might either 
overrule the relevant epistemic norms or generate reasons that are incomparable 
with the reasons epistemic norms generate? It is almost universally held that this 
sort of normative failure is not possible for epistemic norms. While we might 
successfully justify an assertion by appealing to moral reasons, we cannot 
successfully justify a belief by appealing to non-epistemic reasons.  
Consider a person who acknowledges being in violation of an epistemic 
norm, but insists on keeping her belief nonetheless. Assuming for the sake of 
argument that it is even possible to adopt that sort of stance, what sort of reason 
could she offer that might plausibly make her epistemically blameless? There are no 
obvious, unproblematic candidates, and to attempt to generate such examples is to 
invite serious controversy. Beliefs, it is nearly universally held, are answerable only 
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to considerations related to their truth or falsity: other considerations may not be 
legitimately employed in support of them. Belief, the popular metaphor goes, aims 
at truth.  
A possible example would be a mother who insists on believing her fighter-
pilot son is alive despite his plane having crashed in the ocean, and the prospects of 
his survival being astoundingly slim. We might imagine a mother in such a plight 
appealing to prudential reasons for thinking he is still alive; for example, claiming 
that she simply cannot bear to face the possibility that he died.  
While we might sympathise with her plight, there remains a clear sense in 
which this belief is unacceptable. A case like this is strongly disanalogous with the 
case of the Good Samaritan lying to Hutu extremists. In that case we might fully 
condone his decision to ignore the norms of assertion in favour of more pressing 
moral obligations. But in this case we cannot condone her ignoring epistemic 
reasons in favour of prudential ones.  These prudential reasons are simply not good 
enough to overrule the epistemic reasons in favour of believing her son has died.  
A better illustration of this point might be found in the standard response to 
Pascal’s Wager.10 Pascal urges his readers to believe in God by offering reasons to 
think that believing in God is the best bet. Betting that God does not exist, he 
argues, is to risk eternal damnation for the guaranteed reward of a slightly more 
convenient life. Whereas betting God does exist is to guarantee ourselves some 
unnecessary inconvenience, but we stand to win an eternity in heaven as a result.  
It is widely agreed that Pascal offers the wrong sort of reasons in this 
argument: even if we were to agree that his appraisal of the possible risks and 
rewards is accurate, these reasons would nonetheless not suffice to counter any 
possible epistemic reasons against the existence God.  Even very strong prudential 
reasons simply cannot outweigh epistemic reasons the way moral reasons can 
outweigh our reasons to comply with the norm of assertion.  
                                                        
10
 I must hasten to point out that the following interpretation of Pascal is something of a straw man, 
and should not be considered historically accurate. I employ the argument for the purposes of 
illustration only.  
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 So while we might appeal to normative conflict to explain how it is possible 
to blamelessly fail to comply with the norm of assertion, then, it cannot so easily be 
employed to explain blamelessly failing to meet an epistemic norm.  
 
1.4 Subjective and objective norms 
Normative conflict, however, is not the only sort of situation in which one might 
blamelessly violate a norm. It is also possible to blamelessly fail to meet an 
objective norm by misidentifying its antecedent conditions.  
An objective norm, in this particular sense, is a norm that specifies what we 
ought to do when some objective state of affairs obtains. So an objective norm will 
be structured roughly like ‘if x obtains, then ϕ’. By contrast, a subjective norm is a 
norm that specifies what we ought to do when certain subjective conditions obtain.  
That is to say, a subjective norm will have a structure like ‘if it subjectively seems to 
you that x, then ϕ’.  
Paul Boghossian takes the crucial difference between an objective norm and 
a subjective norm to be that the antecedent conditions of an objective norm are 
non-transparent. Consider the following comment he makes about a 
paradigmatically objective norm, the norm ‘believe that p only if p is true’: 
What is true is that it will not always be transparent how one is to 
obey the norm [believe that p only if p is true]. Subjectively speaking, 
one might well be required by the evidence at one’s disposal to 
believe p even if (unbeknownst to one) it is not the case that p… But 
the mere fact that *it+ is a norm whose satisfaction isn’t transparent 
doesn’t mean that it isn’t important, or that it’s not a real norm.  
(Boghossian 2003b, p. 38 my emphasis) 
 
So as far as Boghossian is concerned, what makes this norm objective in this sense 
is that its antecedent conditions are not transparent to us: that we may sometimes 
be unable to tell whether or not the conditions in which we ought to ϕ obtain.  
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Now as the above quote indicates, Boghossian does not take the lack of 
transparency to indicate that that an objective norm is not interesting or a genuine 
norm. The example Boghossian uses to illustrate this point is the maxim ‘buy low, 
sell high’. This is straightforwardly an objective norm: it stipulates what stock 
traders ought to do when the stock price actually is low, and what they ought to do 
when it actually is high. However this norm is nonetheless the fundamental norm of 
stock trading: this norm underpins and orientates all activity on the stock market. 
Not only is it perfectly intelligible to understand this as a norm, but it is also a norm 
that is centrally important to the enterprise of buying and selling stock.  
So there is nothing in principle wrong with insisting that there are indeed 
objective norms.  
Now it is perfectly possible to blamelessly fail to comply with an objective 
norm. Given that an objective norm’s antecedent conditions are non-transparent to 
us, it is possible that we might sometimes be unable to tell whether they obtain. It 
is even logically possible that we might have excellent reasons for thinking that they 
do obtain. Objective norms, in virtue of being focussed on how things are rather 
than how things subjectively seem to us, introduce the possibility that even our 
best attempts to meet those norms may not succeed. We might thus be simply 
unlucky for failing to comply with objective norms.  
Consider a stoke-broker who buys when all the available evidence suggests 
that the stock is at its lowest, or close to its lowest. If the stock were then to fall 
significantly further—due perhaps to some unforeseeable event like a natural 
disaster—the stock broker would have failed to have complied with the norm ‘buy 
low, sell high’.  
Yet we cannot blame the stock broker for this: his failure to do so is not the 
result of shoddy research on his part but is rather due to circumstances beyond 
what we could reasonably expect him to predict. We would consider this stoke 
broker to be unlucky, not incompetent, in his failure to meet the norm of stock-
trading. We cannot hold him responsible for failing to predict that the stock price 
would fall as low as it did. His normative failure is a blameless failure.  
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This kind of blameless failure is made possible by the fact that the norm of 
stock trading is objective.  
I take it that this kind of error is not possible with regard to subjective 
norms. A subjective norm is a norm that stipulates what we ought to do when in 
certain transparent subjective states: when things seem to us to be a particular 
way, or when we have evidence in favour of something being the case.  
And to say that a state is transparent, I take it, just is to say that it is 
immediately obvious to us: we are always in a position to tell whether we are in this 
state or not. Simply considering whether it obtains is sufficient to decisively settle 
the question, one way or the other.  
I take it that we could not blamelessly misidentify the antecedent conditions 
of a subjective norm. It follows from the transparency of its antecedent conditions 
that even the most cursory consideration of the question would make it clear 
whether such states do obtain. So we could only be unaware of being in such a 
state through negligent inattentiveness: inattentiveness for which we would be 
blameworthy.  
This provides a clear explanation of another way in which the non-moral 
norms mentioned in section two may be blamelessly violated.  
As we have seen, belief is commonly claimed to be governed by either some 
version of the truth norm, or the knowledge norm. Any false belief is in violation of 
the norm of belief on both of these accounts.  
But—as Boghossian made explicit—there are many possible cases where all 
the available evidence suggests that p is true (and that we are in a position to know 
that p) when p is false. Suppose that a believer comes to believe that p after she 
has proportioned her belief to the available evidence, and has generally behaved in 
an epistemically cautious manner. She is epistemically blameless for this belief, but 
is nonetheless in violation of the truth norm and the knowledge norm.  
But since the norm of belief is an objective norm, then we have an easy 
explanation for how this is so: she had every reason to think that the antecedent 
conditions of the norm of belief obtained even though they did not. She carefully 
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complied with belief-forming procedures that are generally excellent ways of 
arriving at truth (and knowledge). She had no way of knowing that those methods 
would be ineffective in those specific circumstances. Like the stock-broker, she is 
simply epistemically unlucky for her false belief, not epistemically incompetent or 
inattentive. Since we may not appropriately hold people responsible for failures 
due entirely to bad luck, we have a clear explanation of why she is not deserving of 
any epistemic blame, reproach or criticism for her false belief. 
 The same would be true of the norm of assertion, at least on either the 
Knowledge or Truth Accounts of assertion.11 It is not always transparent to us 
whether p is true, and given that factive mental states like knowledge12 are not 
transparent either, the norms ‘assert only what is known’ and ‘assert only what is 
true’ are not transparent. So according to these accounts, the norm of assertion is 
an objective norm, not a subjective one. As such, it is possible for a failure to meet 
those norms of assertion to be due purely to bad luck, not incompetence.  
 Thus far we have established that there are at least two ways in which a 
person might blamelessly fail to meet a normative requirement. A person might 
blameless fail to comply with a norm if she is caught within a normative conflict, in 
the ways sketched in the previous section. Alternatively, it might be that the norm 
in question is objective, and she was, through no fault of her own, unable to 
properly discern whether its antecedent conditions had been met.   
We have already seen that normative conflict cannot unproblematically be 
used to explain blameless failure to comply with an epistemic norm.  Even if we 
allow that there might be other, non-epistemic norms that apply to beliefs, there 
are no plausible scenarios where epistemic norms would not straightforwardly 
trump these other norms.  Non-epistemic reasons for believing that p are always 
outweighed by purely epistemic reasons for not believing it. So, what needs to be 
established at this point is whether epistemic norms are best understood as 
                                                        
11
 We are not yet in a position to judge whether the Justified To Believe account of assertion takes 
assertion to be governed by a subjective or objective norm. Since I understand a justified belief to be 
one that complies with the relevant epistemic norms, this will depend on whether we think 
epistemic norms are themselves subjective or objective.  
12
 Assuming for the sake of argument that knowledge is a mental state. If it is not, then it is not 
transparent for more obvious reasons. 
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objective norms or subjective norms. So, if we conclude that epistemic norms must 
be subjective, then we will have good reasons to suppose that epistemic norms are 
importantly different from norms like the norm of assertion, and the norms 
generated by the nature of belief, or by mental content. So, the fact that we might 
blamelessly fail to meet those sorts of norms would not give us reason to think that 
it is possible to blamelessly fail to comply with an epistemic norm.  
 
1.5 Objective epistemic norms  
There does seem to be a train of thought that suggests epistemic norms must be 
subjective. Boghossian appeals to the subjective/objective distinction to explain 
how epistemic norms are related to the norm of belief in general. This is what he 
says about the norm of belief: 
*I+t is because belief is governed by this objective ought *‘believe only 
what is true’+ that the less controversial subjective oughts hold of it 
as well. For example: that we ought to believe that which is 
supported by the evidence and not believe that which has no support; 
that we ought not to believe p if some alternative proposition 
incompatible with p has a higher degree of support; that we ought to 
believe p only if its degree of support is high enough, given the sort 
of proposition that it is, and so on. All of these familiar epistemic 
norms are grounded in the objective norm of truth. It is that ought 
that supplies their rationale, even if it has proven extremely difficult 
to say… exactly how. (Boghossian 2003b, p. 39 my emphasis)  
 
So Boghossian’s view is that epistemic norms are (somehow) derived from the truth 
norm. The truth norm sets the target for beliefs to aim at, and epistemic norms 
provide us procedures that will reliably get our beliefs to this target. The analogy 
used to illustrate how this works is once again the analogy with the norm of stock 
trading. Boghossian says: 
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We are often in the position of attempting to comply with some non-
transparent norms by following other more transparent ones. 
Traders on the stock market are attempting to comply with the rule: 
Buy low, sell high. But there is no direct way to recognize when one’s 
stock price is low relative to the price for which one will be able to 
sell it. So traders follow certain other rules as means of attempting to 
comply with the non-transparent rule that truly captures the aim of 
their trading activity… These are rules that may be followed directly, 
by doing what the rules call for when their input conditions obtain 
(Boghossian, 2005, p. 211) 
 
Yet even if we grant for the sake of argument that epistemic norms are followed as 
an attempt to comply with the objective norm ‘believe only what is true’, why does 
it follow that epistemic norms must be transparent? 
 The account Boghossian seems to have in mind is one in which objective and 
subjective norms perform different functions. Objective norms stipulate the 
conditions under which the activity is correct or appropriate while subjective norms 
serve as a set of guiding principles that illustrate how to meet those conditions.  
 As a generalisation, that sounds like a highly plausible suggestion. But, I 
argue, there is no reason to think that objective and subjective norms are strictly 
divided into these two functional roles.  It is perfectly possible that certain objective 
norms could serve as guiding principles for other objective norms. 
 I take it that a guiding principle must meet two minimal conditions. First, it 
must reliably lead to the stipulated correctness conditions. Epistemic norms could 
not be guiding principles for the norm ‘believe only what is true’ if complying with 
them was not a reliable way of avoiding false beliefs.13 Second, it must be easier to 
                                                        
13 This assumption for many will be far too quick. For instance, readers with strongly internalist 
intuitions might insist that I am illegitimately smuggling in an externalist view of justification by 
implying that an epistemic norm must actually be a reliable guide to truth. An acceptable guiding 
principle, the suggestion might go, will simply be one that we have good reason to think is a reliable 
guide to truth. This, I think, is too inclusive a requirement: it allows just about any inferential rule to 
count as a proper epistemic norm. This is an unacceptable consequence.  I will press this point more 
thoroughly in chapter two.  
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see how to comply with a guiding principle than it is to see how to comply with the 
corresponding fundamental norm. If a norm’s antecedent conditions were as 
difficult to identify as the fundamental, stipulative norm’s antecedent conditions, 
then it would not be of any use as a guiding principle. A guiding principle’s purpose 
is to allow us to make quick and accurate decisions about whether to perform one 
action or another. Guiding principles must be helpful, not only reliable.  
 But this does not establish that objective norms cannot serve as guiding 
principles. Some objective states of affairs are significantly easier to accurately 
identify than others. Suppose there was an objective norm that stipulated that 
some action, ϕ, was correct whenever it was performed upon a mammal (if x is a 
mammal, then ϕ).  Yet it is not always easy to see whether some animal is a 
mammal or not: there are many different species of mammal, many of which look 
very unlike one another. In order to comply with this norm, we would need to 
develop a set of guiding principles. But objective norms, like ‘if x is hairy, then ϕ’, ‘if 
x has mammary glands, then ϕ’, ‘if x is a dolphin, then ϕ’, can plausibly be 
understood as fulfilling this role. The antecedent conditions identify specific 
characteristics and instantiations of mammals. Following a set of norms like those 
would make it significantly easier to recognise when exactly one ought to ϕ.  
But these norms are still objective: their antecedent conditions specify 
objective states of affairs, and they are not entirely transparent. These antecedent 
conditions are much easier to recognise than the original norm, but they are not 
entirely transparent. Conceivably, even a very careful observer could mistake a 
cleverly disguised shark for a dolphin, and could end up ϕ-ing when it was not 
appropriate. But this remote possibility does not make the norm ‘if x is a dolphin, ϕ’ 
unhelpful. Just because it is possible to think a creature is a dolphin when it is not 
does not mean that we are not generally reliable at distinguishing dolphins from 
non-dolphins. The logical possibility of cleverly disguised sharks is no reason to rule 
out the possibility that this objective norm could serve as a guiding principle.  
 So Boghossian’s claim that epistemic norms are grounded in the truth norm 
does not rule out the possibility that epistemic norms are best understood as being 
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objective. In the remains of this section, I shall argue that some of them in fact are 
best understood as being objective, not subjective.  
 Here are some possible examples of epistemic norms, all of which have, at 
one point or another, been suggested by Boghossian himself.  
 
(1) Believe that which is supported by the evidence and do not believe that 
which has no support (Boghossian, 2003b, p. 39) 
(2) Do not believe that p if some alternative proposition incompatible with p 
has a higher degree of support (Ibid.) 
(3)  Believe that p only if its degree of support is high enough, given the sort 
of proposition that p is (Ibid.) 
(4) If it perceptually seems to you that p, then, all things being equal, you 
may believe that p (Boghossian, 2008: p. 1) 
(5) For appropriate Fs and Gs, if you have observed n (for some sufficiently 
large n) Fs and they have all been Gs, then, all things being equal, you 
may believe that all Fs are Gs (Boghossian 2008: p. 1) 
(6) If you are justified in believing that p, and are justified in believing that if 
p then q, then believe q or give up one of the other beliefs (Boghossian 
2001, p. 2) 
 
Of these six, (4) has the strongest case for being taken as a subjective norm.  Its 
antecedent conditions explicitly refer to subjective states of mind that are 
transparent. If we interpret ‘evidence’ and ‘support’ as evidence that is available to 
you then (1), is arguably a subjective norm as well.  But the others are better 
construed as objective norms.  
 Consider (2). Even if we grant for the sake of argument that it is transparent 
to us whether proposition p enjoys a higher degree of support than proposition q, it 
is not always clear whether p and q are incompatible. Is the thesis that persons 
possess free will incompatible with Determinism? Is Moral Realism incompatible 
with Naturalism? Is the hypothesis that there are mental states incompatible with 
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Naturalism? Regardless of how we answer these questions, it is clear that the 
answers are not transparently obvious. Through the centuries, great philosophers, 
marshalling carefully considered arguments, have disagreed vociferously on all of 
those questions. As long as the propositions p and q are sufficiently rich and 
complex, it is certainly very possible to be mistaken about whether they are 
incompatible, no matter how carefully one considers the question. The norm’s 
antecedent conditions are not transparent.  
Let us turn to (3). For this to be subjective, the degree of epistemic support 
some proposition p enjoys would need to be entirely transparent, and it would also 
need to be transparent to us what sort of proposition p is. The thought behind this 
norm is that different sorts of propositions require different degrees of evidential 
support, so in order to judge whether or not the evidence we have for p is sufficient 
for believing p we would need to know what sort of proposition p is. For example, is 
it a proposition that requires a high degree of support or a low level?   
 The answer to that question is not transparent. Answering this question is 
fundamentally a matter of calculating how believable propositions of that nature 
are: if it is a highly unbelievable proposition, it would require a higher degree of 
evidential support than a proposition that is highly believable. But working out the 
believability of a proposition requires us to perform probability calculations, and 
people can be easily mistaken when doing so. For example, if we were to work out 
the probability of some proposition by performing a Bayesian calculation, a 
normally reliable source might have fed us incorrect base rates, or we might have 
misremembered the base rates we were given, or we might simply have made an 
error when performing the Bayesian calculation.  
And, standardly, people do not perform Bayesian calculations every time 
they need to make a judgement about the probability of some proposition. Rather, 
we rely on a number of heuristics. And while these heuristics are largely reliable, 
they nonetheless can lead to systematic errors (or cognitive biases). For example, 
one heuristic is the representativeness heuristic, which leads us to assume that a 
sample will be representative of a larger population. This heuristic is used to explain 
how Gambler’s Fallacy is so widespread. Because people know that the probability 
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of a random coin toss landing heads is 0.5, we tend to assume that five out of any 
sample of ten coin tosses will be heads. This leads them to think that a long 
sequence of tails would increases the probability of the next toss landing heads, 
when in fact the probability always remains 0.5.  
 As a result, the question of whether or not the degree of support a 
proposition enjoys is high enough relative to the sort of proposition it is, is not 
transparent: there are a number of ways we might be drawn into making false 
conclusions about what sort of proposition p is. So the norm is not subjective.  
 (5) is likewise not subjective. The problem with (5) is the question of 
whether n is sufficiently large is another question that people might well disagree 
about. Standardly, when we make inductive generalisations we do not actually 
count the number of Fs we have observed to determine whether our sample size is 
large enough, but rather rely on various heuristics. And once again these heuristics 
are systematically unreliable.  
Take the availability heuristic. We have a bias towards thinking that events 
that we can vividly recall are more common than they really are: that is, we assume 
that if we remember something, it must be because it is statistically relevant. So it 
is quite possible that people might take the number of Fs they have observed to be 
Gs to be significantly higher than they really are: assuming a G is a sufficiently 
memorable property it is quite possible for a person to misrepresent to herself the 
number of Fs she has observed to be Gs.  
And even those well aware of such biases might be led into error. It seems 
plausible that whatever number n is, it must be of a sufficiently high proportion of 
the overall number of Fs. If there are billions of Fs, n would need to be substantially 
higher than it would need to be if there were only several hundred Fs. And we can 
imagine possible cases where a person is, through no fault of her own, vastly 
mistaken about the overall number of Fs. If F is the property of belonging to a 
particular species, and almost all members of that species reside on a continent 
that has not yet been discovered, one could be led into error regarding whether n is 
high enough, even if one keeps careful count of what n actually is.  
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 The same is true for (6) as well. The issue here is that people might be 
systematically mistaken about what would count as evidence for the truth of an ‘if… 
then…’ statement. They might plausibly take themselves to have evidence for 
thinking that an ‘if… then…’ statement is true when they do not. As such this norm 
is not subjective.  
 The results of the Wason Selection Task establish that people are 
astoundingly poor at establishing what would count as a possible counterexample 
to the rule ‘if a card has an even number on one side, then it is red on the other 
side’, or at least as that rule is interpreted according to classical logic. Wason found 
that when presented with four cards (for example, odd number, even number, red, 
purple) participants were overwhelmingly inclined to turn over not only the even-
numbered card and the purple card to test the rule, but also the red card as well, 
even though the rule does not imply that only even-numbered cards have red 
backs. If this sort of error generalises, a scenario in which a person is radically 
mistaken about whether the evidence available to her supports the statement ‘if p 
then q’ is possible. This norm is not subjective either.  
 So, Boghossian’s claim that epistemic norms are subjective is surprisingly at 
odds with what he takes to be actual examples of epistemic norms: of the six 
examples selected here, only two of those putative norms had antecedent 
conditions that could plausibly be construed as transparent. All of the others 
expressly pick out states of affairs that we could easily be mistaken about.  
 This gives us a clear recipe for generating examples of blameless failure to 
comply with an epistemic norm. All we need do is pick an epistemic norm that is 
objective, and construct a scenario in which a person displaying an admirable 
degree of epistemic caution and thoughtfulness, is mistaken about whether the 
antecedent conditions of the norm obtain.  
 To resist this move, what would need to be established is that the putative 
epistemic norms examined here are not in fact epistemic norms at all, these are not 
the rules we in fact comply with when we form beliefs in a rational, responsible 
manner. And this, I will argue, is not plausible.  
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1.6 Epistemic norms and doxastic rules 
Our working hypothesis about epistemic norms is that they are a set of guiding 
principles designed to help us achieve the fundamental norm of belief. There are a 
number of candidates as to what this fundamental norm might be: most commonly 
it is taken to be one or another version of the truth norm (‘believe p only if p is 
true’; ‘if p is true, then believe that p’ ‘believe that p if and only if p is true’ etc.) or, 
less commonly, the knowledge norm (‘believe that p only if you know that p’). 
Given that knowing that p entails that p is true, whichever fundamental norm or 
norms we prefer14, it is clear that epistemic norms are to be understood as a set of 
principles designed at least in part to help us arrive at true beliefs rather than false 
ones.  To perform this function, an epistemic norm must be both reliable and 
instructive. That is to say, it has to be the case that following an epistemic norm 
would reliably result in arriving at true belief. But it also has to be the case that 
what an epistemic norm prescribes is relatively easy to follow: that its antecedent 
conditions are relatively easy to identify.  
It is important to see, however, that describing epistemic norms as guiding 
principles is to speak metaphorically, not literally. That is to say, the claim that an 
epistemic norm is a guiding principle is to be understood in roughly the way that 
the claim ‘belief aims at truth’ is understood. Beliefs themselves don’t literally aim 
at anything; this is simply a metaphor that many philosophers have found useful. 
Similarly, I do not mean to suggest that epistemic norms necessarily serve as a set 
of instructions that we turn to whenever we are in doubt as to what to believe 
(though some people might well be able to employ them like this). And like the 
metaphor that belief aims at truth, the claim that epistemic norms are guiding 
principles may be interpreted in a variety of ways. I take this claim to be consistent 
with a variety of accounts of epistemic norms, and of rule-following generally. As 
such I intend this claim to be a very broad, basic point, rather than a substantive 
philosophical view.  
                                                        
14
 I am sympathetic towards it being ‘believe that p only if p is true’ but the positive claims I make 
about epistemic norms will not presuppose this.   
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Let me explain. Tyler Burge has recently argued for a controversial 
understanding of normativity that does not require the creature complying with the 
norm to be able to ‘represent, appreciate, sense, or be at least subliminally guided 
by the norm’ (Burge, 2010, p. 314). In his view, there are norms governing even 
non-rational creatures that have nothing like the cognitive sophistication required 
to appreciate what a norm is, or be influenced by one. Normativity, in his view, is 
conceptually tied to agency rather than rationality, and his account of agency is 
such that even very primitive organisms possess it.  
Yet his account of epistemic norms is, in rough outline, very much like the 
one sketched here.  He says: 
Norms for truth and epistemic warrant, which are constitutively 
associated with belief, further exemplify norms that are apriori 
associated with representational function, but that do not depend on 
agent aim or purpose. All these norms are representational natural 
norms. I believe that neither the psychology of perception, belief, 
and inference, nor the epistemology of any kind of belief or inference, 
can be understood without reference to representational natural 
norms. None of these norms depends on being set, or acceded to, as 
goals or standards by individuals. (Burge, 2010 p. 313) 
 
Burge takes representation to be a fundamentally teleological notion; representing 
is conceptually a purposive, goal-oriented activity. Belief, as a type of 
representational state, inherits its fundamental goals from the goals of 
representation in general. And epistemic norms, as a set of norms that apply to 
belief, are designed to help belief achieve one of those goals.15 An epistemic norm, 
in his view, is a standard that is ‘in some way adequate for fulfilment of *that+ 
function or purpose’ (Burge 2010, p. 311).   
                                                        
15
 Interestingly, in Burge’s view epistemic norms are only one of several sets of norms applying to 
belief.  
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 To say that a belief is in accordance with an epistemic norm, then, is to say 
that it has adequately fulfilled one of its functions. in Burge’s view, belief has 
several functions; the one epistemic norms are derived from is the function of being 
as reliably veridical as possible, given the cognitive and representational limitations 
of the believer (Burge, 2010, p. 312). Epistemic norms specify the standards a belief 
must keep to if it is to adequately fulfil that purpose. In other words, epistemic 
norms are the norms that specify how to go about fulfilling that particular function 
or purpose of belief.  
So, according to this view, if we were to formulate an epistemic norm into a 
general rule of the form ‘if x then you may believe p’, it is still the case that ‘x’ 
would need to be a reliable indicator of the truth of p, and an indicator that is 
tailored to the representational and cognitive limitations of the believer. That is to 
say, an indicator that the believer in question is good at picking up on. So while 
Burge doesn’t understand norms to necessarily be principles that literally guide 
beliefs or actions, introducing the metaphor of a guiding principle is still a useful 
way of describing what epistemic norms do, on his account. I take the claim that 
epistemic norms are guiding principles to be consistent with this sort of view as well 
as with the more standard conception, where norms influence the activities they 
govern more directly.  
 It is also worth explicitly distinguishing epistemic norms from what we might 
call doxastic rules. I take some rule, r, to count as a doxastic rule just in case it is a 
rule that we do in fact follow when forming or revising our beliefs. To say r is a 
doxastic rule is to make a purely descriptive claim. On the other hand, epistemic 
norms are those rules or principles that we ought to be following. To claim that rule 
r is an epistemic norm is to make a normative claim, not a descriptive one.  
As some of the arguments employed in the previous section indicate, many 
of the doxastic rules we follow are not epistemic norms. Empirical research 
suggests that we employ a number of heuristics, or rules of thumb, in our garden-
variety, everyday reasoning. But these heuristics are systematically unreliable in 
certain circumstances. So how we ought to be reasoning in those cases comes apart 
from how we generally are reasoning.  
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Now I take it that anyone denying that the putative norms put forward in 
the previous section are genuine epistemic norms would need to argue that these 
are examples of mere doxastic rules, not epistemic norms. So what needs to be 
addressed is how to distinguish a genuine epistemic norm from a mere doxastic 
rule.  
Complicating this task is the fact that both doxastic rules and epistemic 
norms are fluid, and are liable to be different from person to person. So we will not 
easily be able to simply list the epistemic norms at play in any given case, and rule 
that anything not on that list is merely a doxastic rule.  
This fluidity is easiest to see for doxastic rules: there is plenty of empirical 
evidence suggesting that people approach theoretical problems in different ways, 
and find certain sorts of reasons more persuasive than other sorts of reasons. What 
one person might consider an obviously decisive piece of evidence, another might 
dismiss as irrelevant. One possible explanation for this variance is that some types 
of background beliefs can affect how one reasons. Consider how you might go 
about getting someone to stop falling for Gambler’s Fallacy. One way to do this 
would be to get them to think about probabilistic reasoning and heuristics. If you 
can get a person to believe that the probability of a coin toss landing heads is 0.5 no 
matter what sample group it belongs to, and alert them to the dangers of relying 
upon heuristics, then you can change how they actually reason. In other words, by 
introducing a new set of background beliefs, you can change the doxastic rules they 
follow.  What we believe about probabilistic reasoning and the dangers of relying 
on heuristics can shape how we in fact reason in specific circumstances. Our 
hypothetical subject, once alerted, might well stop relying on the 
representativeness heuristic when approaching questions such as whether the next 
coin toss will land heads or tails: this is a real possibility. If that does happen, then 
the doxastic rule she follows has changed.  Given this, we can not only expect 
doxastic rules to vary between different people, depending on their background 
beliefs, but we can also expect them to be evolving, changing in light of newly 
acquired or discarded background beliefs.  
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 These sorts of changes need not happen as consciously as they do in the 
above example. A novice birdwatcher might find herself deliberately formulating a 
set of inferential rules to help her identify a bird’s species; for example: 
(Robin Rule) ‘If bird b is plump with an orange breast, then, all things 
being equal, believe b is a Robin’.  
 
These might be highly idiosyncratic, and tailored specifically to her own 
recognitional abilities. If she finds that her hearing is not very refined, and that she 
simply cannot hear any difference between, for example, a swallow’s song and a 
sparrow’s, her list of rules might have purely visual criteria in their antecedent 
conditions. (Whereas someone with an excellent ear but poor eyesight might 
formulate rules that have purely auditory criteria in their antecedent conditions.)   
As she spends more time looking carefully at birds, she might find herself 
able to just see that a particular bird is a Robin. That is to say, she may, without 
actually noticing herself doing so, shift from employing her own original inferential 
rules to something like following norm: 
 
(4) If it perceptually seems to you that p, then all things being equal you 
may believe that p 
 
Doxastic rules, then, can shift on their own, without us consciously replacing them 
with a different rule.  
This example, interestingly, is not just an example of different doxastic rules 
changing over time. The Robin Rule is just as much an epistemic norm as (4) is. The 
Robin Rule is both reliable and informative. Its antecedent conditions are easily 
identifiable, and employing that rule will reliably lead to true belief about what 
species bird b belongs to.  
 The point here is that there might be a number of different but equally 
effective guiding principles. Consider once again Boghossian’s analogy with the 
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norm of stock trading: ‘buy low, sell high’. As Boghossian says, stock traders might 
employ a number of other rules as a means of attempting to comply with that one, 
but, importantly, he also acknowledges that these guiding principles might not be 
the same in every instance: ‘Some will use rules based on technical indicators, 
others will use rules based on fundamentals’ (Boghossian 2005, p. 211). So if this is 
the model on which we are to make sense of epistemic norms, there is no reason 
whatsoever to think that people would not be able to generate their own guiding 
principles based on their own epistemic strengths and preferences,  and stick with 
those. Just as there are a number of generally reliable methods of complying with 
the norm ‘buy low, sell high’, there are a number of generally reliable methods of 
safeguarding your beliefs against falsity.  
 So we cannot distinguish a genuine epistemic norm for a mere doxastic rule 
in terms of its idiosyncrasy. While people might have highly personalised doxastic 
rules, insofar as these are reliable, these cannot be disqualified out of hand from 
being an epistemic norm. 
 A doxastic rule may also have the same aim as an epistemic norm. People 
particularly prone to self-deception may find themselves following a series of 
deviant doxastic rules, aimed to avoid painful beliefs rather than false ones 
(‘believe that p if not p is too painful to consider’), but not all mere doxastic rules 
need be like those. Suppose a person acquires the belief that affirming the 
consequent is a valid argument structure. (Let us imagine she is a struggling first-
year logic student who is told this by a very convincing but mischievous logic 
lecturer who wants to see what lies he can get away with telling).  Suppose as a 
result she comes to follow the following doxastic rule: 
If you are justified in believing that if p then q, and are justified in 
believing that q, then believe p or give up one of the other beliefs 
 
Now the only reason she follows this rule is because she has been told that 
affirming the consequent is a deductively valid argument form, and she is poor 
enough at logic to be convinced that this is right. She is still following it in order to 
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arrive at truth. Yet it is not a genuine epistemic norm, even though it shares the 
same aim as one.  
 The fundamental difference between a mere doxastic rule and an epistemic 
norm, then, is that following an epistemic norm is reliable method of arriving at  the 
fundamental norm of belief (or one of its fundamental norms), whereas following a 
mere doxastic rule may not be. Just as following Gambler’s Fallacy might well still 
lead you to correctly guess the coin toss (after all, guessing Heads after a long run 
of Tails is not less likely to be correct than guessing Tails) following a mere doxastic 
rule might also lead to truth. So essentially whether a doxastic rule you follow is 
one you ought to be following depends on whether it is a good way to arrive at 
truth. But whether or not a rule is reliably truth-conducive is something that might 
not be obvious to the person following the rule.  
 What this suggests is that the in order to establish that the putative 
epistemic norms in the previous sections are not genuine epistemic norms, one 
would need to establish the strong thesis that they cannot serve as guiding 
principles: principles we follow in order to achieve the fundamental norm of belief. 
And this I take to be implausible. The antecedent conditions of all of those rules 
give every indication of being both sufficiently easy for cognitively sophisticated 
creatures like us to follow, and of being eminently reliable. 
 
1.7 Conclusion 
I have argued that being epistemically blameless does not entail being properly 
epistemically rational or warranted. There are good grounds for taking epistemic 
norms to be set up such that it is possible to fail to comply with them despite 
forming beliefs in an unimpeachable manner. What follows from this conclusion? 
 The immediate consequence of this is that we must be careful about how 
we go about evaluating a belief as warranted or unwarranted. In epistemology it is 
common to rely purely on intuition when we make judgements about whether a 
belief is warranted or not. Some of the great epistemological arguments appeal to 
our intuitive response to a number of complex thought experiments, involving evil 
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demons, mad scientists, fake barns and cleverly disguised mules. However it is far 
from obvious that our intuitions are fine-grained enough to accurately distinguish 
warranted belief from merely blameless belief. There will be a number of cases that 
philosophers have taken to be examples of properly justified belief when in fact 
they are merely cases of blamelessly failing to comply with an epistemic norm.  
  In the next chapter, I will suggest that some of these cases are examples 
that philosophers have almost universally agreed are clear counterexamples to the 
claim that a priori warrant is incorrigible. And reinterpreting these examples as non-
decisive, I argue, reopens a range of extremely promising dialectical moves in a 
number of related philosophical debates about the a priori.  
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2: The Infallibility Thesis Reconsidered 
 
Recent discussions of the a priori have been strongly shaped by the rejection of the 
thesis that a priori warrant is necessarily a stronger type of warrant than a 
posteriori warrant. Even the most prominent of modern rationalists endorse a type 
of a priori warrant that is capable of being defeated by empirical observation.1 This 
move is notable for two reasons: first, it marks a rare occasion of near universal 
philosophical agreement, and second, it marks a decisive break with traditional 
thinking on the subject. Stretching all the way back to Plato, the overwhelming 
majority of writers on the a priori took a priori justification to be infallible: if a belief 
was warranted a priori, then the belief was true (henceforth, the Infallibility Thesis). 
This radical shift in the philosophical consensus may be traced back to a number of 
influential developments, like, for example, Quine’s assault on analyticity (Quine 
1951), and Kripke’s separating the a priori/a posteriori distinction from the 
necessary/contingent distinction (Kripke 1980). However, what is taken to truly 
settle the question is the existence of a number of crucial counter-examples. That is 
to say, it is widely acknowledged that there are clear and decisive examples of 
people having had purely a priori warrant to believe that p, even though p turned 
out to be false.  
 Yet, as I suggested in the previous chapter, our intuitions about whether a 
belief is genuinely warranted are unreliable. They are not fine-grained enough to 
reliably distinguish those believers that blamelessly fail to comply with epistemic 
norms, from those whose beliefs are genuinely warranted. So it is worth revisiting 
these putative counter-examples with this distinction in mind.  
 In this chapter I will argue that these particular counter-examples are not 
decisive: close attention to the epistemic norms at play in the examples indicates 
that these beliefs are not genuinely warranted: or at least not warranted in the way 
that commentators take them to be. Reflection on this result, I argue, suggests a 
                                                        
1 See BonJour 1998, Peacocke 2004, Burge 1993.   
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novel and promising way of distinguishing the a priori from the a posteriori. The 
thought will be that we can distinguish a priori warrant from a posteriori warrant in 
terms of the structure of the relevant epistemic norms. This gives us a clear, purely 
epistemic distinction. The fruitfulness of this suggestion will be explored in more 
detail in the following chapter.  
 
2.1 Fallible a priori warrant  
BonJour (1998) claims that the examples that can be used to establish that a priori 
warrant is fallible fall into one of three categories. He says: 
In the first place, there are claims in mathematics and logic which 
though universally regarded as self-evident by the leading minds in 
the field in question at a particular time have subsequently proved to 
be false… Second, there are the various allegedly a priori claims of 
rationalist metaphysicians… Without pausing to list specific cases, it 
is obvious that all such claims cannot be true, and thus cannot be 
infallible, if only because of the great extent to which they conflict 
with each other… Third, and perhaps most obvious, there are the 
routine errors in calculation, proof and reasoning that are familiar to 
anyone who has routinely engaged in such processes. Notoriously, 
even the most powerful minds are susceptible to such slips… *T+here 
is no reason to think that a degree of care that would ordinarily be 
taken to be adequate will make mistake impossible. And even if 
there was a degree of care and attention that would avoid all such 
mistakes, there would obviously be no way to be sure that it has in 
fact been exercised in a particular case and thus no reason to regard 
any particular case of alleged rational insight as infallible. (BonJour, 
1998: 111-12)  
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While it is not clear that BonJour intended this list to be exhaustive, it does nicely 
capture a range of possible cases, and provide us with a place to start. Let us begin, 
then, by fleshing out the kind of examples BonJour has in mind. 
The crucial kind of example here is the first one. A paradigmatic example of 
this category is the belief that Euclidean geometry is true: and this example more 
than any other is appealed to in motivating the thought that a priori justification is 
fallible and capable of being empirically defeated. While Euclidean geometry was 
for centuries widely held by the greatest mathematicians to be the geometric 
system that best described physical space, it has subsequently not only been 
decisively overturned, but decisively overturned by empirical observation. The 
problem with Euclidean geometry can be traced to its reliance on the parallel 
postulate, which serves as one of its axioms. The parallel postulate holds that if a 
straight line (A) intersects two other straight lines (B and C) such that the sum of 
the interior angles at the two points of intersection  is less than the sum of the 
exterior angles, then B and C will eventually meet if they are extended indefinitely.  
 Now this postulate was disproved when it was established empirically that 
General Relativity is true, and hence that space can be bent by gravity. In this way, 
if A and B were sufficiently far apart, and were extended through space, there is no 
guarantee that they would meet. If one of them passed by a large planet or star, it 
could be bent away from the other line. Since Euclidean geometry as a whole 
depends crucially on the parallel postulate, it is thus falsified.  
 And yet, the thought goes, there were excellent reasons to believe in 
Euclidean geometry up until this point, as evidenced by the fact that so many great 
rational and mathematical minds did believe it. Yet the reasons these 
mathematicians had were entirely a priori. As a result, the epistemic warrant in 
favour of Euclidean geometry was both a priori and not only defeasible, but 
defeated.  
 In the second category are metaphysical but purely a priori arguments with 
false conclusions. Assuming for the sake of argument that there isn’t a God, let us 
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take a possible interpretation of Descartes’ Ontological argument for the existence 
of God.2   
 (P1)  I have an idea of a supremely perfect being (i.e. God) 
 (P2)  Existence is a perfection 
 (C)  A supremely perfect being exists 
 
Now this argument is widely celebrated as being purely a priori3 but is also widely 
thought to fail to establish its conclusion. The most common objection is that (P2) is 
false. But Descartes provides robust defences of both premises both in the 
Meditations and in his replies. As a result, the thought goes, he clearly has reasons 
for believing (P2), even if that premise is false. So Descartes was not entirely 
unjustified in believing (P2) despite its falsity. But, whatever justification Descartes 
had, it was entirely a priori. Hence, Descartes had fallible a priori justification for 
believing that God exists.  
 The third sort of case BonJour mentions is a case in which a person makes 
an error in calculation or reasoning. This happens all the time. For example, I 
sometimes try to calculate my grocery bill in my head as I shop, but quite often 
arrive at the wrong answer due to making simple addition error at some point. Now 
it might not be obvious that I am warranted in believing that my groceries will 
amount to £m, given that we can attribute the error to simple inattentiveness on 
my part, resulting from the fact that I was not concentrating properly at the time.  
However BonJour hypothises, plausibly, that it is possible to make these sorts of 
errors even when we are displaying the appropriate level of attentiveness and care. 
Suppose a very good mathematics student sitting an exam makes a silly calculation 
error at some point, even though she is concentrating properly and doing her best 
to get the answers right. The level of concentration she is displaying, let us suppose, 
                                                        
2
 Descartes (1641) 
3
 This is in spite of the fact that the first premise is arguably justified not on the basis of traditional a 
priori reasoning, but on the basis of introspection. I will return to the question of whether 
introspection like this counts as a priori in chapter five.  
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is consistent throughout. So while this level is sufficient for her correctly performing 
a number of other equally difficult calculations, she nonetheless slips up on this 
one. Given that she arrives at the incorrect answer only after performing a 
calculation over which she has taken an appropriate amount of care, it seems 
plausible to say that she is justified in believing it.  
 
2.2 Following epistemic norms 
What these examples do clearly establish is that what seems to us to be obvious a 
priori is not always true. One may be supremely confident that a belief based on a 
priori reasoning is true even when it is false. However it has not yet been settled 
whether these examples establish that the Infallibility Thesis is false. It is important 
to note that the Infallibility Thesis is a claim about the relation between a priori 
warrant, and truth: it holds merely that if p really is warranted a priori, then it is 
true. This thesis does not entail that if p seems a priori obvious to subject S, then p 
is true. For p seeming a priori obvious to S, is not sufficient for S having a priori 
warrant for believing that p. 
What the previous chapter established is that there is a dialectical move 
available to the infallibility theorist that has not yet been taken seriously: that is, 
she might claim that these above examples are simply cases of blameless but yet 
unwarranted belief.  If this move is a plausible one, then we have not yet produced 
counter-examples to the claim that a priori warrant is infallible, or truth 
guaranteeing.  
 Now all three of these examples are cases where a person arrives at a (false) 
belief on the basis of some sort of a priori reasoning. What we need to establish is 
whether the kind of reasoning exhibited in these examples is in compliance with the 
relevant epistemic norms.  So what needs to be made clear at this stage is how to 
distinguish reasoning that is in compliance with epistemic norms from reasoning 
that is not.  
 However, as I argued in the previous chapter, it is perfectly possible for us to 
mistake a doxastic rule for a genuine epistemic norm: that is, while it might seem to 
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us that some belief-forming method or inferential principle is perfectly acceptable, 
it might turn out that we are wrong about this. The sort of reasoning involved in 
Gambler’s Fallacy strikes many gamblers as eminently reasonable: this does not 
alter the fact that it is not.    
 What this indicates, then, is that just because a person takes herself to be 
reasoning in a perfectly correct manner, it does not follow that she is. 
 So in determining whether the above examples are indeed examples of a 
priori warranted but false beliefs, we must determine whether the doxastic rule the 
believer is following in each of the above examples is an epistemic norm or a mere 
doxastic rule.  
At this point is it worth briefly considering what following a rule entails. I do 
not hope to put forward a thoroughgoing account of rule-following here: such a 
task would take us too far off-course. All I want to make clear is that there is a 
distinction between following a rule, and acting in a way that is consistent with a 
rule. Suppose a chimpanzee is put in front of a chess board, and, purely at random, 
he picks up a pawn and moves it one square further forward. This action is 
consistent with the rules of chess but the chimpanzee is not following the rules of 
chess: he is simply moving pieces about at random. 
 For my action to be following a rule, it must be the case that, at the very 
least, the rule explains the action. While it is far from obvious that this is a sufficient 
condition for following a rule, it is uncontroversial that it is a necessary condition. 
To say that a rule explains my action is simply to say that I acted as I did at least 
partly because of ‘some appropriate relation’ (Boghossian, 2008, p. 10) that obtains 
between the rule and my action. This leaves it entirely open-ended what the 
appropriate relation might consist in. Boghossian, for example, thinks that the 
appropriate relation in question is one that makes the explanation a rationalizing 
explanation. He says: 
However the notion of acceptance [of a rule] is understood, what is 
important is that, in any given case of rule-following, we have 
something with the following structure: a state that can play the role 
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of rule acceptance; and some nondeviant causal chain leading from 
that state to a piece of behaviour that would allow us to say that the 
accepted rule explains and rationalizes the behaviour. (Boghossian 
2008, p. 11)  
 
Burge, on the other hand, would find this view to be an example of ‘hyper-
intellectualization’ (Burge, 2010, p. 314), since some rules are ‘basic, natural norms’ 
that apply not only to us, but also to non-rational, unreflective creatures.4 Yet he 
still thinks that even basic, natural norms must play some sort of appropriate 
explanatory role; just not (necessarily?) a rationalizing one: 
An individual need not understand or be guided by the norms, or by 
any other general principles, even though general principles help 
explain the individual’s actions. Basic natural norms apply to such 
agency even if an individual cannot understand or be guided by them. 
(Burge 2010, p. 340 my emphasis) 
 
However, he does not specify what this explanatory role may or may not consist in.  
 Complications about what sort of explanations suffice for rule-following 
aside, it is clear that the first step in assessing whether or not a person is genuinely 
following a norm is considering whether that norm could plausibly be construed as 
                                                        
4 It would be interesting to see what Boghossian makes of this account. At the end of Boghossian 
2008, he speculates that a primitivist account of rule-following with regard to epistemic norms might 
be the best way to avoid an infinite regress problem. A primitivist account is one where our reliance 
on epistemic norms is not something that itself requires justification; it would be one where: ‘we 
take as primitive a general (often conditional) content serving as the reason for which one believes 
something; without this being mediated by inference of any kind’ (Boghossian, 2008: p. 29). The 
inference Boghossian is concerned about here is the one that supposedly takes place when we recall 
a rule, and infer from it to what we ought to do (or believe) in our current situation. Boghossian 
argues that this inference itself requires justification, which sparks an infinite regress: employing an 
epistemic norm involves performing an inference from general rule to particular belief, which itself 
would require employing another epistemic norm, which in turn requires another inferential step. 
Given Burge is at pains to deny that basic norms inform or guide our actions and beliefs in the way 
this picture of rule-following suggests, he is offering precisely the primitivist account Boghossian was 
speculating about.  
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an explanation for the person’s action. If it could not, then we have established that 
the person is certainly not following that norm.  
 As such, when we consider these examples of supposedly a priori 
warranted, but false beliefs, it is important that we keep in mind not only whether 
their beliefs were a result of a belief-forming procedure that is consistent with a 
genuine epistemic norm, but also whether that epistemic norm could plausibly 
explain the belief in question.  To be genuinely following an epistemic norm, it 
cannot, for example, be purely accidental that one is reasoning in the way that one 
is.  
 
2.3 Miscalculations and reasoning slips 
So equipped, let us turn to the three examples of warranted but false a priori 
beliefs. I take it that the third case, the example where a very good mathematics 
student makes a calculation error of some sort while sitting an exam, is the least 
persuasive of the three. The worry with this case is that the sorts of considerations 
BonJour appeals to in motivating the thought that her belief is justified are related 
primarily to the concentration, attentiveness and care that she is proposed to be 
taking.  But these are all considerations that relate to the question of whether or 
not the believer in question is epistemically blameworthy. When we are judging 
whether or not a person can be held responsible for a false belief, amongst the 
questions we consider will be questions about whether she has been epistemically 
careful or sloppy, attentive or inattentive. So by pointing out that the student’s 
concentration levels were at a usually acceptable standard, BonJour is pointing to 
considerations relating primarily to whether she is blameworthy for her belief.  
  And these are not even decisive considerations. Is a student really blameless 
for this sort of miscalculation? This is not readily apparent. My intuitions diverge 
with BonJour’s on this point. If you make a slip in reasoning, then you have, on that 
occasion, displayed poor reasoning. Holding one responsible for that mistake seems 
perfectly appropriate. If students give incorrect answers to mathematical problems 
in exams, they are marked down by their examiners.  Marking a person down for 
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her answer to a question, I take it, is an expression of epistemic blame. So not only 
is epistemic blame appropriate, it is also commonly present.  
Even if we were to set this concern aside, once we abandon the thought 
that being epistemically blameless entails being epistemically warranted, then we 
have no reason to take the fact that the mathematics student is concentrating 
properly, and is exhibiting the sort of level of care and caution that is standardly 
sufficient for correctly performing these calculations, to be indicative of her 
possessing genuine epistemic warrant.  
 So there are no decisive considerations in favour of taking her to be 
genuinely a priori warranted, which is enough to demonstrate that this particular 
case is not a counter-example to the Infallibility Thesis. We can, however, go one 
better than this: reflection on the relevant epistemic norms at play in cases like this 
provide reasons to think that she is not warranted in this sort of case.  Let us begin 
by considering what the relevant epistemic norm would have to look like in order 
for this to be a belief that is fully in compliance with an epistemic norm.  One option 
would be something like this: 
 
(7) If it seems to you that x plus y equals z, then all things being equal you 
may believe that x + y = z  is true 
 
However, this rule would generally not be relevant in the cases we are discussing. 
Making calculation errors is far more common in cases where we have no intuitions 
whatsoever about what the conclusion is: where it does not ‘seem’ to us one way 
or another whether the answer is ‘z’. So in fact the sort of rule we are looking for 
would have to be something like this: 
 
(8) If after appropriately careful deliberation you arrive at the conclusion 
that x plus y equals z, then all things being equal you may believe that x 
+ y = z is true 
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So could (8) count as a proper epistemic norm? One reason to be wary of this rule is 
that if we combine (7) and (8)—along with an analogous set of rules for subtraction, 
multiplication, division, and so on—then almost any mathematical belief is 
warranted. If both (7) and (8) are epistemic norms, then the only occasions in which 
an addition-belief is unwarranted is when all things are not equal in some way; that 
is to say, when the believer is in some way cognitively impaired. Whenever a person 
is in her normal operating conditions, all her addition-beliefs are warranted.  This 
suggests that these rules are too inclusive.5  
  This thought is borne out with regard to (8) when we consider that there are 
many ways in which a person might try to work out what the sum of x and y is, and 
not all of them are reliably truth-conducive. If someone has somehow acquired an 
improper way of adding numbers, the results of her calculations will not be reliable 
no matter how careful she is with them. As a result, (8) is far too broad.  
Suppose that x and y are multiple digit numbers and that a student is trying 
to work out the answer on a piece of paper rather than with a calculator. She sets 
the two numbers out in rows, such that their digits are appropriately aligned in 
columns, and works down the columns, digit by digit. However, let’s suppose she 
does this the wrong way around. So she works from left to right rather than right to 
left. Whenever a column adds up to a double-digit number she carries the extra 
digit to the column to the right, not to the left. So she ends up with a completely 
inaccurate answer. Now if (8) were an epistemic norm then she would be properly 
warranted in believing her answer, insofar as she was sufficiently careful in how she 
went about it. This is clearly an unacceptable conclusion: beliefs acquired via wildly 
inaccurate reasoning processes are precisely the sort of beliefs an epistemic norm is 
supposed to legislate against.  
Though perhaps this example does not demonstrate appropriately careful 
deliberation. The fact that this is an unreliable method of adding numbers, it might 
be argued, should be obvious to anyone who reflects carefully enough on the 
method itself.  
                                                        
5
 Since (7) is not relevant to the type of example under discussion I will set it to one side for the 
moment. I will return to rules like this in sections six and seven.  
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Let us grant for the sake of argument that this is true for this case. However, 
suppose that we change the mathematical problem being attempted to one that 
requires a more complicated mathematical formula in order to solve (for example, 
the quadratic formula). We then simply need to suppose that the student in 
question has been taught an incorrect version of the formula.6 Perhaps: 
 
  
   √      
  
 
Instead of:  
  
   √      
  
 
 
Following the wrong formula is once again the kind of reasoning that epistemic 
norms are supposed to legislate against: it is something that will not reliably lead 
one to having true beliefs. But is this an error that should be obvious to anyone 
reflecting on the quadratic formula? That thought would, I take it, be much harder 
to motivate. Moreover, motivating that thought would run a very real risk of doing 
too much. If we strengthen the notion of appropriately careful deliberation such 
that mistakenly believing an incorrect version of a mathematical formula will always 
entail not having deliberated carefully enough, then it is very implausible to think 
that one might be sufficiently careful in one’s deliberations but yet still make a 
calculation error.  
It is also very difficult to see why anyone would want to draw the line at that 
precise point. If we want to argue that being sufficiently careful in our 
mathematical reasoning requires us to reflect on the reliability of the formulae we 
employ in our calculations, why would we want to also maintain that being 
sufficiently careful does not preclude making simple miscalculations? Drawing the 
line at such a point seems ad hoc.  
                                                        
6 Perhaps as a result of their teacher having made a typographical error when writing it on the board.  
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 Furthermore, doxastic rules for mathematical reasoning that have 
antecedent conditions specifying the appropriate level of care one takes in 
performing calculations seem unnecessarily complicated. The appropriate level of 
care is going to vary across people and situations. People with a very good grasp of 
mathematics find calculations easier to perform than those with a weaker grasp. 
Plausibly, they don’t—and are not required to—deliberate all that carefully when 
calculating. It would be an unacceptable view of mathematical justification that 
held that people who were excellent at performing calculations were less justified 
than those who are bad at it simply because they do it more quickly and less 
deliberately.  
So working out how much care you ought to be taking with your calculations 
is then itself a complicated calculation: potentially as challenging as the calculation 
itself. This suggests that the doxastic rule is a bad guiding principle.  
The following reformulation is both more straightforward and more reliable: 
 
(8*)  If you conclude that x plus y equals z after following a reliably veridical 
method of calculation, then all things being equal you may believe that x + y 
= z is true 
 
Whether or not a method of mathematical calculation is reliably veridical is 
something that can be known through armchair reflection, so the rule is not 
obviously guilty of providing antecedent conditions that are unacceptably difficult 
to ascertain. This would also rule out beliefs resulting from misunderstood 
mathematical formulas or calculation methods.  
But it would also rule out the sorts of miscalculation BonJour thinks are 
cases of warranted but false belief. If I have miscalculated then I have not in fact 
performed a veridical calculation. I have attempted to do so, but not succeeded.  
Suppose a student employs a perfectly appropriate method of adding 
numbers but performs a standard miscalculation. For instance, suppose she 
attempted to work out the sum of 57 and 68 (while displaying the normal amount 
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of attentiveness) and arrived at 115, having forgotten to carry the ‘1’ after adding 
the ‘7’ and the ‘8’. Since she did not carry the ‘1’, it follows that she did not, in fact, 
follow a veridical method in coming to her answer. The method in question 
prescribes something like the following: 
 
(8.1) When adding multiple digit numbers, arrange the numbers in rows such 
that the digits are properly aligned 
 
(8.2) If the sum of a column is more than one digit, leave the last digit at the 
bottom of the column and carry the first digit to the top of the first 
column to the left 
 
Since she has not stuck to (8.2) she has not in fact followed this particular method: 
she has merely attempted to follow it. Her belief-formation process does not count 
as an instance of following rule (8*). And if we modify (8*) to accommodate these 
sorts of cases, we once again make the rule unacceptably broad. Suppose we 
change it to something like: 
 
(8**) If you conclude that x plus y equals z after attempting to follow a reliably 
veridical addition method, then all things being equal you may believe 
that x + y = z  is true 
 
The problem with this clause is that, generally, people using non-veridical methods 
of adding numbers still believe their method to be veridical. Plausibly, they are still 
trying to follow a veridical method; they just have false beliefs about how to 
accomplish that.  
  As a result, we have reasons to doubt that miscalculations can count as 
legitimate examples of properly justified but false a priori beliefs. Attempts to 
characterise the relevant epistemic norms in a manner that would allow beliefs 
based on mathematical miscalculations to be properly justified make justification 
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far too easy: these characterisations allow in beliefs that are exactly of the sort of 
belief epistemic norms are supposed to safeguard us against.  
 Miscalculations are far more plausibly understood as failed attempts to 
follow an epistemic norm. Depending on the circumstances under which it was 
performed, the miscalculation may perhaps qualify as an epistemically blameless 
failed attempt, but a failed attempt nonetheless.  
 
2.4 Fallacious arguments 
So let us turn to the second type of case BonJour mentions: cases of purely a priori 
philosophical arguments for conclusions that are false. The example I used to 
illustrate this case was the following: 
 
(P1)  I have an idea of a supremely perfect being (i.e. God) 
 (P2)  Existence is a perfection 
 (C)   A supremely perfect being exists 
 
I have chosen to focus on a straightforward (putatively) deductive argument, 
because these are the sorts of examples I take BonJour to have in mind: the most 
celebrated and discussed a priori philosophical arguments are set up as deductive 
proofs of their conclusions. While non-deductive a priori arguments are possible—I 
return to these arguments later— these are not as common or well-known as their 
deductive counter-parts.  
In attending to this type of example, I will be making the following 
assumption about the philosopher putting forward the argument. I am assuming 
that the argument is not used only as a rhetorical device designed to convince her 
readers of the conclusion: the argument also serves to explain why the philosopher 
in question believes the conclusion.  What we are considering is whether someone 
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would be epistemically permitted to believe the conclusion, assuming that she has 
no reasons for believing the premises other than the ones provided, and no reasons 
for believing the conclusion other than the premises. So in what follows, I will 
assume that these arguments and the evidential support offered for the premises 
are the only grounds the philosopher advancing the argument has for believing the 
conclusion.  
 Let us begin by rehearsing the reasons there might be to take the believer 
of an argument like this to be justified. The idea here is that since philosophers like 
Descartes have clearly thought carefully about this argument, and have attempted 
to defend it from critics, they must be justified in accepting its conclusion, even if 
the conclusion is false.  
 But is this obvious? If the conclusion of a (putatively) deductive argument 
really is false, then it follows necessarily that either at least one of the premises is 
false, or the argument is not really formally valid. In this section I will concentrate 
primarily on the second horn of this dilemma: I shall argue that the conclusion of 
any fallacious, putatively a priori argument is not justified a priori. Since the sort of 
formally invalid arguments under consideration here are fallacious arguments, it 
follows that these conclusions are not justified a priori.  
 However let us first briefly consider the first horn: the possibility that while 
the argument is formally valid, a premise is false. So, by hypothesis, the argument is 
such that it is logically impossible for it to be the case both that all the premises are 
true and the conclusion false, but yet one of the premises is indeed false. Under 
what circumstances would one be a priori justified in believing the conclusion? 
 The way a deductive argument justifies its conclusion, in my view, is by 
transmitting epistemic warrant from its premises to its conclusion. If I can establish 
that conclusion (C) follows logically from premises (P1) and (P2), for example, then 
what I have shown is that whatever reasons I have for thinking that both (P1) and 
(P2) are true, these also serve as reasons to think that (C) is true. On this view, (C)’s 
justification or warrant stands or falls with the justification or warrant for believing 
both the premises to be true. If it turns out that I have no good reason to think that 
both of the premises are true (perhaps (P2) is entirely unjustified, or perhaps both 
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premises enjoy some epistemic support, but there are stronger reasons for thinking 
that (P1) and (P2) are mutually inconsistent) then I have no good reason to believe 
the conclusion. Deductively valid arguments do not themselves generate new 
epistemic warrant.  A valid argument is not a source of epistemic warrant, it is 
merely a means of passing it from one belief to another.  
 Another way to put this point would be to say that the epistemic norms 
governing deductive inferences only permit us to believe a conclusion that follows 
logically from its premises, if we are already epistemically permitted to believe that 
the premises are all true. Forming beliefs by performing valid inferences from 
unwarranted premises is a belief-formation method that is in violation of the norms 
of deductive inferences.  
 So I could only be warranted in believing the false conclusion of a valid, 
purely a priori, argument if I was warranted in believing all of the premises: 
including the false premise. This suggests that if it is indeed possible to be 
epistemically permitted to believe premises like (P1) and (P2) even when they are 
false, then it would be possible to be warranted in believing (C) even when it is 
false. 
 If an argument is purely a priori its premises must all be justified (if at all) a 
priori. Now, typically, the standard procedure in defending a premise of a 
deductively valid a priori argument is not to wheel out a separate a priori argument 
in favour of it: the most common strategy is for the philosopher defending the 
argument to make an appeal to intuition in motivating her premises. This is 
precisely how (P2) in the above argument is usually motivated: the defender of the 
ontological argument will invite us to compare an infinitely perfect being that 
actually exists, with a non-existent one. She will then urge us to see that the 
existent infinitely perfect being is even more perfect than the non-existent one, and 
hence that existence is a perfection.  
For the sake of argument, let us assume (P2) is indeed the false premise in 
the above argument.  Could this be justified but false? Answering this question 
requires some sort of account of how intuitions justify beliefs. More precisely it 
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requires us to adjudicate over whether a rule like the following could constitute an 
epistemic norm: 
 
(9) If it intuitively seems to you that p, then all things being equal you may 
believe that p  
 
This is an important question, and one that will be considered in depth in sections 
six, seven and eight. In the meantime I turn to the other horn of the dilemma; the 
possibility that the argument in question has some sort of improper structure, 
rather than merely being unsound.  
Now fallacies are widely explained as being examples of incorrect or faulty 
reasoning, so immediately there seem to be some intuitive grounds for thinking 
that fallacious reasoning is reasoning that is normatively improper. Calling a piece 
of reasoning ‘incorrect’ is a way of accusing the reasoner of reasoning in a way she 
ought not to have done. In what follows, I argue that accusations like this are 
entirely on the money.  
Let us illustrate the point by considering an argument that is generally 
understood to be fallacious. Suppose we were to uncharitably interpret Descartes 
as replying upon an argument like this: 
(P1*)  I clearly and distinctly perceive that a benevolent God exists 
(P2*)  What I clearly and distinctly perceive is true 
(C*)   It is true that a benevolent God exists 
 
Let us further suppose that Descartes argues for (P2*) by appealing to the notion of 
a benevolent God, claiming that such a being would not have made the world such 
that his (Descartes’) clear and distinct perceptions were non-veridical.  
 Such an argument is not invalid, but it is widely thought to have something 
in common with an invalid argument in that its premises, like those of an invalid 
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argument, fail to generate good reasons to believe the conclusion.  The problem 
with an argument like this is that it would be of no use in persuading even the most 
rational, reason-responsive of interlocutors, insofar as that interlocutor doubted 
the conclusion. No one who rationally doubts (C*) should accept the reasons 
provided for (P2*). As a result, no rational doubter of (C*) should find the argument 
persuasive. In this sense the argument is thought to beg the question: it indirectly 
presupposes what it is supposed to prove.  
But would it follow from this that reasoning in accordance with such an 
argument would be in violation of an epistemic norm?  I take it that if a person who 
generally accepts that question-begging arguments are fallacious were to infer (C*) 
from those premises then she would not be following an epistemic norm in forming 
the belief that (C*). This would be the logical equivalent of a miscalculation: she 
accepts that these sorts of inferences are impermissible, but simply failed to 
recognise that her own inference is an inference of that sort.  She has failed to 
follow the doxastic rule she intended to follow: so her belief cannot be plausibly 
understood as actually following an epistemic norm, no matter what the epistemic 
norms at play here are.  
Suppose, however, that she is fully aware that her reasons for thinking (P2*) 
presuppose the truth of the conclusion, but that she does not believe that there is 
anything problematic about that presupposition. That is to say, she disagrees that 
this argument genuinely is fallacious, and instead takes inferring (C*) on the basis of 
(P1*) and (P2*) to be epistemically permissible, despite the fact that she is well 
aware that her warrant for believing that (P2*) is true presupposes the truth of the 
conclusion.  Perhaps she has only come to think that this inference is permissible 
after endorsing a form of coherentism about justification that would render 
reasoning even in this tight a circle epistemically permissible.7  
 So construed, this example would be importantly different from the 
miscalculation case. This isn’t a case of accidentally lapsing into an invalid 
argument, this is a case of someone coming to adopt a different doxastic rule as a 
                                                        
7
 It is difficult to think of how one could come up with plausible-looking coherentist grounds for 
accepting this argument, given the mutually supporting beliefs are so few but let’s suppose it can be 
done.   
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result of her background beliefs. The difference between her and those who take 
this argument to be fallacious is a disagreement about whether the above 
argument is cogent.  
Now over the last decade, an interesting debate has developed over the 
conditions under which a deductive argument is cogent.8 There is widespread 
agreement however, that arguments like the one above are not cogent. Crispin 
Wright sets up a cogent argument as one where:  
[I]t is possible to learn of the truth of the conclusion by getting 
warrant for the premises and then reasoning to it by the steps 
involved in the argument in question. Thus a valid argument with 
warranted premises cannot be cogent if the route to warrant for its 
premises go – of necessity , or under the constraints of a current 
epistemic context – via a prior warrant for its conclusion (Wright, 
2003: p. 57) 
 
Now, while Wright’s phrasing occasionally slips between descriptive or normative 
language when explaining cogency, Martin Davies is explicit that whether or not an 
argument is cogent is a purely normative matter: for him, saying an argument is not 
cogent is to say that inferring the conclusion, on the basis of its premises, is 
reasoning contrary to the way epistemic norms prescribe. That is to say, the 
primary issue for Davies is not that a non-cogent argument is not psychologically 
persuasive9: the issue is that inference from the premises of a non-cogent argument 
to its conclusion is impermissible. Davies is less interested in explaining what is 
wrong with arguments that beg the question; rather he is interested in explaining 
what is wrong with people who take the premises of question-begging arguments 
to provide good reasons for believing the conclusion. That is to say, he is interested 
                                                        
8
 The leading contributors to this debate are Crispin Wright and Martin Davies. See for example 
Wright 1985, 2000, 2003, Davies 1998, 2000, 2003, 2005.  
9
 Sometimes Wright presents the question as if this is his primary concern. However, I take this 
presentation to be misleading; Wright is very much concerned with the question of how epistemic 
warrant is transmitted or not transmitted from premises to conclusion, which is a question about 
the evidential support such conclusions have.  
60 
 
in cases where epistemic warrant does not transmit from the premises of a valid 
argument to a conclusion, in the way it usually does. 
 That epistemic warrant may sometimes not transmit from the premises of a 
valid argument to its conclusion, is a surprising and interesting claim. In their series 
of papers on this topic, Wright and Davies have each developed and argued for a 
variety of different limitation principles which set out the conditions under which 
epistemic warrant fails to transmit, despite the argument being deductively valid. 
While they often disagree about what exactly the various limitation principles are, 
and employ their limitation principles as a means of resisting the conclusions of a 
variety of philosophical arguments, they take arguments like the one above as a 
prime example of a non-cogent argument: question-begging arguments are for 
them the clearest examples of non-cogent, yet valid, arguments. Wright, as the 
above illustrates, uses an argument that presupposes prior warrant for its 
conclusion as an illustration of a non-cogent argument. And Davies offers the 
following as one of his limitation principles: 
Epistemic warrant cannot be transmitted from the premises of a 
valid argument to its conclusion if, for one of its premisses, the 
warrant for that premiss counts as a warrant only against the 
background of certain assumptions and acceptance of those 
assumptions cannot rationally be combined with doubt about the 
truth of the conclusion. (Davies, 2000, p. 402) 
 
 It is important to see that any disagreement about whether an argument is cogent 
is essentially a disagreement about epistemic norms. If Davies and Wright are right 
that question-begging arguments are not cogent, for example, then it follows that 
coming to believe (C*) by inferring it from (P1*) and (P2*) is epistemically 
impermissible. Even if the person in question endorses any inferential rule that 
allows such inferences, she is nonetheless not following a genuine epistemic norm.  
Regardless of which participant in this debate have false beliefs about whether such 
arguments are cogent, that person also has false beliefs about how we ought to be 
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reasoning in certain circumstances. If those beliefs have directly affected how she 
actually reasons, then she will have come to follow a rule that is not a genuine 
epistemic norm. Whatever beliefs arise from her following that rule will not be 
beliefs that are genuinely justified.  We might very well consider here to be 
blameless for this, depending on how plausible we take the false cogency-belief to 
be, but she will not be properly warranted.  
 So if Davies and Wright are correct about this, then our coherentist who 
thinks herself perfectly justified in inferring (C*) is not in keeping with the genuine 
norms governing deductive reasoning. Like the person who comes to change how 
she reasons after acquiring background beliefs about probabilities and the dangers 
of heuristics, her background beliefs (i.e. her acceptance of her version of 
coherentism) have altered the doxastic rule she follows. However, in this instance 
her background beliefs have led her from following an epistemic norm to following 
a mere doxastic rule, not the other way around.  
  In this way, then, it is difficult to see how we might plausibly maintain that 
someone inferring a false conclusion from the premises of an invalid a priori 
argument could be properly in keeping with an epistemic norm. Either she accepts 
that this type of invalid argument is fallacious or she does not. If she does, then her 
mistake is like a miscalculation and she cannot be construed as successfully 
following an epistemic norm in forming her beliefs. If she does not, and for some 
reason takes the argument to be deductively valid, then—as a result of her 
background beliefs about validity—the doxastic rule she follows is not an epistemic 
norm. Either way, the resulting belief is not properly justified. 
 
2.5 Euclidean geometry 
Let us turn to the most plausible of BonJour’s examples: the case of Euclidean 
geometry. Unlike the products of miscalculations or the conclusions of 
philosophical a priori metaphysical arguments, for a substantial period of time 
there was an overwhelming consensus amongst mathematicians that Euclidean 
geometry was just obviously the geometric system that described physical space. 
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This gives us much stronger prima facie reasons for thinking this belief to be 
genuinely justified than either miscalculations, where even the calculator herself 
takes the reasoning to be incorrect, or the conclusions of philosophical arguments, 
which other philosophers will frequently take to be incorrect or insufficiently 
supported. If there was something epistemically incorrect in the reasoning behind 
the belief that Euclidean geometry was true, it is highly surprising that this went 
unnoticed for so long amongst those who are generally very rigorous and careful 
about their mathematical beliefs. 
 All the same, I will argue that such a belief was not justified, or at least not 
justified a priori.  
 The problem with Euclidean geometry, I claimed earlier, was that one of its 
axioms, the parallel postulate, turned out to be false as a description of space, and 
this invalidated the entire geometric system. However, axioms are not subject to 
mathematical proof. There was never anything that was widely taken to be 
mathematical proof that the parallel postulate was true.  
The grounds for believing the parallel postulate, amongst mathematicians, 
was purely intuitive. Yet there is some historical evidence to think that even Euclid 
himself regarded this axiom as less intuitively obvious than his other four axioms or 
postulates, and that thought seems to have been shared even amongst those who 
followed him in accepting it as an axiom. The history of mathematics shows a 
number of (failed) attempts to prove the parallel postulate, suggesting that it was 
often regarded as being in need of proof, an unusual stance to take towards an 
axiom. Axioms are most commonly treated as self-evident, as propositions that 
need no further epistemic support. So while the parallel postulate might have been 
intuitively appealing to those who endorsed it, it seems to have been taken to be 
less obvious than the other four postulates.  
So the question of whether the supporters of Euclidean geometry were 
warranted in believing it depends on whether they were warranted in believing the 
parallel postulate. And whether they were warranted in believing the parallel 
postulate depends on whether we are entitled to form beliefs on the basis of the 
sort of intuitive support that the parallel postulate enjoys. The question here is 
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about the conditions under which we are entitled to form beliefs directly on basis of 
an intuition like the intuition that the parallel postulate is true.  
If we think that belief in the parallel postulate was genuinely warranted, 
then it looks like we are claiming that something like the following is an epistemic 
norm: 
 
(9) If it intuitively seems to you that p, then, all things being equal, you may 
believe that p is true 
 
Now the question of whether or not something like (9) can be an epistemic norm 
has come up before. In section four I argued that this question was at the heart of 
whether or not those philosophers who employed cogent a priori arguments for 
false conclusions were properly warranted. There, once again, the possibility of 
warranted but false a priori belief depended on whether beliefs that were directly 
justified by a priori intuition could be justified.  If we accept—as seems 
undeniable—that philosophical or mathematical intuitions are sometimes false, and 
we accept that we are epistemically entitled to follow a rule like (9), then we would 
have an easy recipe for generating false but warranted a priori beliefs. Any a priori 
belief that is either based directly on an intuition, or is the conclusion of a cogent 
argument or mathematical proof with premises that are based on an intuition, runs 
the risk of being false, despite the fact that it is formed entirely in keeping with the 
epistemic norms at play.  
 In the next few sections, however, I will argue that (9) is not an epistemic 
norm.  
 
2.6  Intuitions as intellectual seemings  
I take an a priori intuition to be what we might call an ‘intellectual seeming’.10 I take 
it to be clear that they are such ‘seemings’, independent of any corresponding 
                                                        
10 See for example, Bealer 1996a, Sosa 2007, Weatherson 2003 for others who take this approach. 
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beliefs, for the standard reasons. Not all a priori beliefs intellectually ‘seem’ true to 
us: ‘741852 + 9369167 = 1678769’ does not seem either true or false to me, even 
though I believe it is true.  
And sometimes it intellectually seems as if something is true even if we do 
not believe it is. To borrow an example of Boghossian’s, it does intellectually seem 
to me that there must be more natural numbers than there are even natural 
numbers, even though I do not believe that there are.11  
 Accepting that there are intellectual seemings in this sense is not to commit 
oneself to the existence of some sort of quasi-perceptual faculty of ‘rational 
insight’12, or to take such seemings to be some sort of ‘sui generis, irreducible, 
natural propositional attitude which occurs episodically’ (Bealer, 1996b, p. 169). 
While these are some ways we may understand an intellectual seeming, they are 
not compulsory.  
All it is to have an intellectual seeming that p is to feel intellectually 
attracted towards p; to feel what Sosa calls the ‘pull’ of certain considerations in 
favour of p. To talk of intellectual seemings in this loose sense is to remain neutral 
about what type of mental state it is, or where it comes from. It is neutral as to 
whether an intellectual seeming is dispositional or episodic, whether it is generated 
by a perception-like faculty or simply by the employment of other more 
commonplace cognitive faculties, like our ability to understand concepts and logical 
relations. I intend the notion of an intellectual seeming to pick out a familiar, 
everyday phenomenon, rather than to take a stance regarding what that 
phenomenon actually is.  
 It has become increasing clear that our a priori intuitions are not as reliable 
as we might once have supposed. While Bealer claims that:  
[A]lthough different people do have conflicting intuitions from time 
to time, there is an impressive corroboration by others of one’s 
                                                        
11
 See Boghossian 2009. 
12
 There is a long tradition of philosophers who endorse that sort of view. See BonJour 1998 for a 
prominent recent example.  
65 
 
elementary logical, mathematical, conceptual, and modal intuitions 
(Bealer 1996a, p. 125) 
 
And even more strongly: 
The on-balance reliability of our elementary concrete-case intuitions 
is without question one of the most impressive facts about human 
cognition (Bealer 1996b, p. 163)  
 
There is a significant body of empirical evidence that suggests the opposite. I have 
already offered some empirical grounds for thinking that people’s logical and 
probabilistic intuitions are systematically unreliable in a number of different types 
of circumstances. There is also evidence suggesting this is true about some of our 
conceptual intuitions. Empirical findings indicate that people’s intuitions about the 
conditions in which a person knows or is justified in believing that p vary 
significantly across culture, across socio-economic status, and across how much 
philosophy the subject has been exposed to (Weinberg, Nichols and Stich, 2003).  
While this may have surprised Bealer, it would not have surprised William 
Lycan, who thinks ‘philosophical intuition is and always will be laughably 
unreliable’, and who also suggests that ‘some *intuitions] are just mathematical or 
(worse) philosophical opinions that present themselves in the guise of seemings’ 
(Lycan 1996, p. 144, his emphasis).  
There is certainly some plausibility in Lycan’s suggestion that one’s 
philosophical opinions do shape how things intellectually seem to one. When I was 
first introduced to philosophy as an undergraduate I had, not atypically, very strong 
intuitions in favour of Cartesian scepticism and against any type of externalism 
about meaning or content. And yet both sets of intuitions, again not atypically, have 
faded over time: I no longer feel anything resembling the intellectual ‘pulls’ that I 
did then. The hypothesis that this change in intuition was the result of the various 
changes in my philosophical views since then is as good as any.  
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So what does this suggest about a norm like (9)? The rule was: 
 
(9)  If it intuitively seems to you that p, then all things being equal you may 
believe that p is true 
 
If this rule is to be a genuine norm, recall, then it must be reliable: following it must 
generally result in true belief. For that to be the case, our intuitions would need to 
be reliably veridical. Yet there is empirical evidence suggesting that a great many 
people have non-veridical mathematical and logical intuitions, and that people with 
different cultural backgrounds, socio-economic status and philosophical exposure 
have very divergent conceptual intuitions, at least with regard to epistemological 
concepts. Since these divergent conceptual intuitions cannot all be right, at least 
some people will have non-veridical conceptual intuitions as well. (9), this suggests, 
will not be a reliable rule as it stands. 
 Defenders of (9), I take it, might respond by offering a more precise account 
of what an intuition is, and then argue that these empirical cases are not largely 
cases of people with non-veridical intuitions; they are cases of people with non-
veridical pseudo-intuitions. Bealer appears to take this route with regard to the 
evidence suggesting we have unreliable probabilistic or logical intuitions. He says:  
Intuitions are also distinct from judgements, guesses, and hunches… 
the work of cognitive psychologists such as Wason, Johnson-Laird, 
Eleanor Rosh, Richard Nisbett, D. Kahneman and A. Tversky tells us 
little about intuition in the restricted use of the term relevant here; 
they have simply not been concerned with intuitions in this sense. 
(Bealer, 1996a: 124)  
 
In the following section, I argue that this approach is not tenable.  
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2.7 Intuition as pure understanding 
 There are two serious obstacles to this approach. First, arguing that the term 
‘intuition’ is to be understood such that it does not apply in the problematic cases 
requires a more restricted, and less plausible, conception of what an intuition is. 
Second, even with a plausible restricted conception of an intuition, the restriction 
would still make the rule expressed by (9) unacceptably impractical.  
What this approach amounts to is the claim that the way in which it seems 
to some people that the answer to the Wason selection task is to turn over three of 
the cards, not two, and in which it seems to people that a coin is now more likely to 
land heads than tails given the previous tosses, is simply not the relevant sort of 
‘seeming’. This immediately raises the question: what is the right sort? Bealer’s own 
view is that an intuition is a sui generis episodic mental state entirely distinct from 
beliefs, judgements, guess and hunches. So while if I have a hunch that p or take an 
educated guess that p, there is a sense in which it seems to me that p, and this 
seeming might be distinct from the belief that p, but it does not qualify as the 
intuition that p.  
 Yet this answer requires more motivation than Bealer gives it: as it stands it 
is not plausible. Why should we take intuitions to be ontologically distinct 
psychological episodes from hunches? There are no clear phenomenological 
differences between the two. As Williamson remarks (Williamson, 2007, p. 217), 
intuitions do not enjoy an especially rich phenomenology in the first place. 
Phenomenologically speaking, all it is to have an intuition that p is to feel attracted 
towards that proposition, to use Sosa’s metaphor. But that feeling of attraction is 
present also in hunches.  
Perhaps Bealer thinks that there is a difference in degree of intellectual 
attraction between hunches and intuitions if not in kind. But that thought is also 
not plausible: intuitions and hunches both come in varying degrees of strength. If 
we were to mark a distinction between the two in those terms, it is difficult to see 
what could motivate us to pick one cut-off point rather than another: there are no 
obvious phenomenological facts of the matter about where hunches end and 
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intuitions begin. So construed, the distinction between intuitions and hunches 
would not be a natural one.  
 If we are to mark a distinction here, I take it, our best option would be to 
distinguish intuitions from phenomenologically similar attitudes like hunches and 
educated guesses in terms of their causal history. Hunches and educated guess, 
perhaps, are to be understood as products of heuristic-based probabilistic 
reasoning and various background beliefs and opinions, whereas intuitions are 
seemings that are the result of some sort of rational insight or pure understanding, 
unaffected by folk-theories or background beliefs.  
I will tackle these suggestions in turn. If we take intuition to be the product 
of a rational insight, the thought would be that we should understand a priori 
intuitions by means of an analogy with sense perception. Just as vision (for 
example) produces visual experiences, rational insight produces a priori intuitions. 
Cases of systematically mistaken intuitions then, would be the equivalent of either 
illusions or hallucinations.  
The trouble with this suggestion, however, is well documented. Perceptual 
experiences, after all, do not just pop into our heads; they are the product of an 
easily identifiable perceptual faculty. But the idea of a special faculty of rational 
insight, that lets us somehow ‘see’ that certain modal truths obtain, is hard to make 
sense of. Endorsing such a view would run the risk of making intuition into the 
product of a mysterious, ‘spooky’ faculty.  
Not all philosophers who endorse the rational insight model of intuition hold 
that there is a distinct faculty of rational insight: BonJour, for instance, doubts that 
intuitions are the products of a separate perception-like faculty.  
Clearly and trivially, a capacity or ability is involved, but that this 
must involve a distinct psychological faculty in any more interesting 
sense is anything but obvious. (BonJour 1998, p. 109)  
 
However, if this is the case, it is difficult to see how seriously we should take 
perceptual metaphor. If all the account commits BonJour to is the ‘trivial’ fact that 
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there is some sort of capacity or ability involved in the production of intuitions, 
then we are no closer to understanding what intuitions are than when we started. 
As BonJour himself notes, that much was already clear. Calling an intuition a 
rational insight explains very little, on this sort of account.  
 So let us consider the more plausible of these two suggestions: the thought 
that a priori intuitions are simply the products of our ability to understand 
propositions, perhaps in combination with some other basic reasoning abilities. 
On this sort of picture, an intellectual seeming is a genuine intuition only 
when it is derived purely from our grasp of the relevant concepts and, arguably, the 
logical relations between them. Pseudo-intuitions might arise when an intellectual 
seeming is derived not only from our grasp of the relevant concepts, but also from 
whatever folk-theories or background beliefs we might have about the things the 
concept refers to.  
 This is an improvement on the rational insight account, as at least we have a 
clearer, more plausible idea of what intuitions are and where they come from. We 
already know that we have the ability to understand concepts and logical relations. 
Intuitions would simply be produced by the employment of some combination of 
those sorts of abilities. I will discuss the merits of this sort of view in greater length 
in the next chapter, but for the moment it is worth noting that even if we do take 
this to be a sufficiently plausible account of intuition, the rule (9) expresses is still 
unacceptably impractical. 
 Earlier I suggested that the function of an epistemic norm is to serve as a 
guiding principle for the fundamental norm (or one of the fundamental norms) of 
beliefs. Given this function, an epistemic norm would need to be structured such 
that its antecedent conditions, if not transparent to us, had to pick out things that 
we were generally good at recognising.  It would have to be easier for us to follow 
than a rule like: 
(T)  Believe that p only if p is true 
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If a doxastic rule is no easier to follow than (T) then the rule is of no practical use to 
us; it cannot play the role that an epistemic norm is supposed to.  
On the present account of intuition, (9) is no easier to follow than (T). Hence 
it cannot play the role that an epistemic norm is required to play.  
The issue here is that if our ontology of intellectual seemings is such that 
some of them are genuine intuitions and some of them are merely pseudo-
intuitions, the resulting picture suggests that people frequently confuse intuitions 
with pseudo-intuitions. Consider the people to whom it seems that the answer to 
the Wason Selection Task is to turn over three cards, rather than two. No matter 
how strongly it seems to them that this is the right answer, this seeming cannot be 
called an intuition: rather it is a hunch, or some other sort of pseudo-intuition. This 
seeming is different in kind from the seeming involved when it seems to me that 
modus ponens is a valid argument form, for example. In the latter case, the story 
goes, this seeming is just the result of my basic understanding of logical connectives 
(or something to that effect), whereas in the former case the seeming in question is 
the result of something else in addition to my understanding of those connectives.  
But it isn’t obvious that we can reliably tell whether our own seemings really 
are the result of understanding alone or whether they are infected also by some 
opinion, folk-theory, or other result-skewing factor. The results of the Wason 
Selection task suggest that we are in fact generally poor at telling these seemings 
apart: less than 10% of participants got the answer to the task correct. In many 
cases, it often is not even obvious how we could go about working this out.  
Consider the results of the Weinberg, Nichols and Stich study, for instance. If 
our supposed epistemic intuitions do vary systematically across cultural 
background, socioeconomic status and level of philosophical training, then, at the 
very least, the intellectual seemings of some of these different groups must be 
pseudo-intuitions, seemings that are infected by background beliefs. But how do 
we tell which group, if any, has the genuine intuitions? It is very difficult to see how 
to settle a question like that. Intellectual seemings are pre-reflective reactions to 
propositions; they do not wear their causal history on their sleeve.  
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The problem with this interpretation of intuitions then, is that it implies that 
(9) is formulated such that its antecedent conditions are not properly tailored to 
our recognitional abilities. This picture of intuitions gives us no reason to suppose 
that we would be good at telling whether any particular intellectual seeming is an 
intuition or something else. While the rule might come out as reliably true on this 
interpretation, it does so at the cost of making the rule impractical. This suggests 
that (9), as presently understood, is not the correct formulation of the epistemic 
norm that applies to a priori intuitions. 
 
2.8 Intellectual and Perceptual Seemings 
This, I argue, suggests that the epistemic norm governing a priori intuitions is 
structurally unlike the norms governing perception. Consider a norm like: 
 
(4) If it visually seems to you that p, then, all things being equal, you may 
believe that p 
 
I take it to be uncontroversial that this is a reliable, easy-to-follow doxastic rule. 
There are no obvious reasons (4) could not serve as an epistemic norm.    
And this is because, plausibly, visual experiences are not like intuitions in 
two key respects. First, we have a clear idea of where visual experiences come 
from. That is, they are the products of a remarkably veridical perceptual faculty: 
vision.  
Second, they come with a rich, clearly identifiable phenomenology.  
Standardly we can easily distinguish a visual experience from something like an 
imagining. While it might well be possible for someone to mistake an imagining for 
a visual experience13, in all but the most unusual cases, there is a clear 
phenomenological difference between the two. Perceptual experiences are 
                                                        
13
 This might be one way to understand hallucinations, and related phenomena. Kent Bach offers a 
plausible-looking characterisation of hallucinatory experiences along these lines of this in Bach 
(1985).  
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typically both far richer in content and far more vivid than imaginings. As a result, 
we are generally in a position to know very well when we are perceptually 
experiencing something and when we are just imagining it.  
 Intuitions, however, are not like this in either respect. Intuitions do not have 
a rich or clear phenomenology, and are harder to tell apart from related 
psychological episodes like hunches, educated guesses and even opinions. 
Furthermore, we cannot, with any great confidence, take any given intuition to be 
the product of a reliably veridical cognitive faculty. Even if we can give a plausible 
account the cognitive faculties that are responsible for producing veridical 
intuitions, empirical evidence suggests that intellectual seemings are subject to a 
great many cognitive biases. Our immediate, intuitive attraction to some 
proposition might very well have arisen as a result of social influence, or of our own 
personal background beliefs, or as a result of unknowingly employing a 
systematically unreliable heuristic in our thinking about that proposition.  
 So then how should we understand the relevant epistemic norm? My 
suggestion is that the norm in question should be something like this: 
 
(10) If it is self-evident that p, then you may believe that p without 
considering any further evidence for it 
 
In the remainder of this section I will offer two reasons in favour of (10). First, (10) 
fits nicely with our epistemic practices. Second, (10) avoids the pitfalls of (9) by 
bypassing any mention of how it seems to us.   
 First, not all of our intuitions strike us as self-evident. But the ones we 
appeal to in philosophical arguments do strike us as self-evident. This is why 
philosophers appeal to those intuitions in the first place. Consider the sort of 
examples philosophers take to be typical examples of intellectual seemings: 
 
(a) 1+1=2 (Sosa, 2007, p. 46) 
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(b) Nothing can be red and green all over at the same time (BonJour, 1998, 
p. 100) 
(c) Modus ponens is a valid argument form (Boghossian, 2003a, p. 231) 
(d) Gettier’s examples are  cases where the believer lacks knowledge 
(Weatherson 2003, p. 1, Williamson 2007, p. 216) 
 
These are all claims that intuitively ‘seem’ true to many of us. But they are also 
claims that many take to be just obviously true.  Some philosophers have even gone 
so far as to suggest that anybody who declines to assent to (a), (b), and (c) does not 
genuinely understand what the propositions mean (Boghossian 2001, 2003a, 
Peacocke 2004). Frank Jackson has implied exactly this about (d) as well: he says: 
I have occasionally run across people who resolutely resist the 
Gettier cases.  Sometimes it has seemed right to accuse them of 
confusion… but sometimes it is clear that they are not confused;  
what we then learn from the stand-off is simply that they use the 
word ‘knowledge’ to cover different cases from most of us.  In these 
cases it is, it seems to me, misguided to accuse them of error (unless 
they go on to say that their concept of knowledge is ours).  (Jackson, 
1998, p. 32) 
 
As far as Jackson is concerned, the Gettier cases are so overwhelmingly obvious 
that anybody who resists them is either horribly confused, or is using the word 
‘knowledge’ differently from the rest of us.  
 Direct appeals to intuition, furthermore, are typically not tolerated when 
the intuition in question is not blatantly obvious or self-evident. Consider the 
following passage: 
I have heard a professional philosopher argue that persons are not 
their brains by saying that he had an intuition that he weighed more 
than three pounds. Surely there are better ways of weighing oneself 
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than by intuition. But such inapposite appeals to intuition should not 
be dismissed as mere idiosyncratic misjudgements. They are clues to 
the role of the term “intuition” in contemporary analytic philosophy. 
(Williamson, 2007, p. 214) 
 
While Williamson might be more disparaging about these sorts of appeals to 
intuition than most, it is not unusual for philosophers to find fault with arguments 
that appeal to intuitions they deem suspicious. Sosa, for instance, makes sure to 
accommodate this thought in his own theory of intuitions: he is careful to point out 
that an important difference between perceptual experiences and intuitions is that 
intuitions are epistemically evaluable. In his view, it makes sense to evaluate at 
least some intuitions as themselves warranted or unwarranted in a way that it does 
not make sense to do so for perceptual experiences. He says: 
[A] consideration can be assigned the wrong weight, as it attracts 
one too strongly or too weakly. Why should intuitive attractions be 
any exception? The sheer considering of a proposition can attract too 
much, if for example its attraction derives from enculturation into an 
unfortunate bias or superstition.  (Sosa 2007, p. 50) 
 
Insofar as Williamson’s reaction to that kind of appeal to intuition is not entirely 
inappropriate, and insofar as Sosa is right in thinking that it makes sense to consider 
people’s intuitions as unwarranted, a doxastic rule like (10) is perfectly in keeping 
with our epistemic practices.  
 Moreover, (10) avoids the sorts of problems that (9) faces. If a judgement 
really is self-evident, then it is true. The rule is thus more than reliably veridical.  
 Furthermore, a rule’s appealing to self-evidence in its antecedent conditions 
is no obstacle to its being easy enough to follow. While I will go into more detail 
about self-evidence in chapters four and five, for the moment I will say that 
whether or not a proposition is self-evident does not depend on extrinsic facts 
about it like its causal ancestry; self-evidence is a property that propositions wear 
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on their sleeve. While we might not always recognise the property when we see it, 
it is there to be recognised. And generally we are good at recognising self-evident 
propositions.  
 For example, we seem to have no trouble in recognising self-evident 
propositions whenever we make introspective reports about our occurrent beliefs, 
desires, sensations and other easily introspectable mental states. I will discuss 
introspection in more detail in chapter five, but for the moment I will simply note 
that we seem to have no trouble following a rule like (10) whenever we attribute a 
relatively wide range of mental states to ourselves. When we consciously and 
deliberately consider whether proposition p is true or false, for instance, it is self-
evident to us that we are considering it. This is something we can know directly, 
without the need to appeal to any further evidence. And upon such reflection, it is 
almost always perfectly clear to us whether we do believe p or not. When we 
decide that we believe that p as a result of this sort of introspective reflection, it is 
self-evident to us that we believe it. It is just obvious to us that this is the case: that 
we believe p (if we do) is self-evident to us, and furthermore it is clear to us that it 
is self-evident.  
 
2.9 Conclusion 
An implication of this is that appeals to false a priori intuitions are better 
understood as failed attempts to comply with (10) rather than successful attempts 
to comply with (9). They are not, then, genuinely warranted. This is true even if it 
turns out that we cannot hold people responsible for their failure to comply with 
(10).  
 And if this is right, then the putative counter-examples to the Infallibility 
Thesis are not conclusive as they are commonly taken to be. The most plausible of 
BonJour’s three examples are cases where the false conclusion depends on a 
plausible-seeming but false premise, a premise that it justified, if at all, by an appeal 
to intuition. This is the scenario we are being invited to imagine when we consider 
76 
 
the believer in Euclidean geometry, by far the most influential and persuasive of the 
counter-examples to the Infallibility Thesis.  
 The conclusion that the believer in Euclidean geometry was unwarranted 
even before General Relativity was established is certainly a surprising conclusion: 
after all, many of the greatest mathematical minds of their time endorsed that 
geometric system. How can we plausibly insist that they were all unwarranted?  
 However, the sorts of considerations we appeal to in motivating the thought 
that these excellent mathematicians were justified in their acceptance of Euclidean 
geometry are really only considerations relating to whether they are epistemically 
blameless. That the intuition seemed a plausible one, or that they had no reason to 
doubt it, or that they took great care when forming their mathematical beliefs, or 
that they displayed great intelligence in their mathematical reasoning are not 
decisive indicators that the resulting belief is warranted. All this indicates is that 
there is a strong case for saying that they are epistemically blameless. Given that 
epistemic blamelessness is not a sufficient condition for epistemic warrant, the 
intuition that these believers were warranted may be resisted.  
 What attention to these examples has uncovered then, is that for at least a 
central range of a priori beliefs, the long-discredited Infallibility Thesis seems to 
hold. It is an implication of the argument in section eight that the Infallibility Thesis 
holds for those a priori beliefs that are justified directly, without appeal to 
evidence: beliefs like ‘nothing is red and green all over at the same time’ or ‘1+1=2’ 
are warranted only if they are also true. That propositions intuitively seem self-
evident to us is not sufficient for their being warranted. In this sense, a priori 
warrant is not dependent on how things seem to us. The epistemic norm governing 
‘intuitive’ a priori judgements is entirely unlike the epistemic norm governing non-
inferred perceptual belief.  
So what are the prospects of the Infallibility Thesis? The outcomes of this 
chapter suggest that it holds for an important range of a priori beliefs. But there are 
still good reasons to be suspicious of it as a general account of the a priori.  The 
examples examined in this chapter have all been examples of direct or 
demonstrative a priori judgements: those beliefs that we either form directly, 
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without inferring them from any other beliefs, or those beliefs that we take to be 
logically entailed by other beliefs we hold. Yet it is far from clear that these options 
exhaust the possible ways of forming beliefs a priori.  
It is incontestable that not all inferences that we perform are 
demonstrative. Sometimes we infer that some generalisation holds on the basis of a 
number of observations we have made. At other times, we infer that some 
conclusion is true on the basis that it is the best explanation of the phenomenon we 
are investigating.  
Inferences like these are not infallibly truth-preserving in the same way that 
the demonstrative inferences examined in this chapter are. Some generalisations 
require only a single counter-example to be falsified. No matter how many 
observations we have made, it remains logically possible that there is an 
unobserved counter-example to the generalisation. Likewise, sometimes the most 
elegant and plausible explanation of some chain of events is not the correct one. 
Outrageous co-incidences are logically possible: so no matter how much more likely 
one explanation appears than another, it remains possible that the unlikely 
explanation is in fact the correct one.  
In this way, if it is possible to perform an inductive or abductive inference 
from premises that are warranted a priori, then, arguably, we would have arrived at 
an a priori belief that has only fallible warrant.  
Despite these concerns, the outcomes of this chapter are philosophically 
significant. As I will argue in the next chapter, the fact that direct a priori 
judgements are not governed by a norm like (9) suggests a novel and fruitful way of 
marking the divide between the a priori and the a posteriori.  
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3: A Priority As Seeming-Independence 
 
In the previous chapter I argued that epistemically direct, intuitively obvious, a 
priori beliefs are governed by a different kind of epistemic norm to the one that 
governs analogously direct perceptual beliefs. The sort of norm governing 
perceptual belief may be structured such that its antecedent conditions appeal to 
what we might call ‘perceptual seemings’. Yet I argued that we cannot plausibly 
construct a norm governing a priori belief-formation that appeals to ‘intellectual 
seemings’. This is because these intellectual seemings differ from perceptual 
seemings in some key respects: the most important of which is that intellectual 
seemings are far less reliably veridical than perceptual seemings. Rather, I 
suggested, the norm that governs such belief formation would be more plausibly 
understood as something like this: 
 
(10) If it is self-evident that p, then you may believe that p without 
considering any further evidence for it 
 
An implication of this was that it entailed that a central range of a priori beliefs are 
infallibly warranted, if warranted at all. Self-evidence is factive: all self-evident 
propositions are true. So anybody who correctly follows this norm when forming 
direct a priori beliefs will arrive only at true beliefs. Any false, psychologically direct, 
a priori belief would at best be a case where the believer has attempted to comply 
with a norm like (10) but failed. Depending on the attempt, we might judge the 
belief to be epistemically blameless. But it will not be epistemically rational.  
And there are several notable examples of propositions that we have taken 
to be self-evident, but which were not: Euclid’s parallel postulate for one. But the 
fact that we can sometimes be mistaken about whether a proposition is self-
evident is no obstacle to (10) counting as an epistemic norm. Epistemic norms, I 
argued in chapter one, do not have to be transparent. As long as we are generally 
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good at telling self-evident propositions from ones that are not self-evident, there is 
no problem with (10).1  
 In this chapter, I intend to suggest that this substantial difference between 
the structure of the epistemic norms governing perceptual beliefs, and the 
structure those governing direct, ‘intuitive’ a priori beliefs, offers a theoretically 
fruitful characterisation of the well-known thought that a priori beliefs are those 
that are independent of experience.  
 
3.1 Experience independence as seeming-independence 
The difference between the a priori and the a posteriori is widely understood to be 
an epistemic difference. To say a belief is a priori is to say that it has a different type 
of justification or epistemic warrant from a belief that is a posteriori. Yet the 
fundamental distinction between the a priori and the a posteriori is surprisingly 
unclear. Traditionally, the a priori is generally distinguished from the a posteriori in 
terms of its relation to experience: a belief is a priori, the thought goes, if its 
justification or warrant is in some sense independent of experience. As Kant 
famously put the point: 
By the term “a priori knowledge”, therefore, we shall … understand 
not such as is independent of this or that kind of experience, but 
such as is absolutely so of all experience. (Kant 1781, p. 28) 
 
Yet it is not obvious what mental state counts as the relevant type of experience 
and what does not. More importantly, it is also unclear why the question of 
whether or not epistemic warrant depends on some type of mental state should 
make a difference to the type of epistemic warrant that it is. In this section, I argue 
                                                        
1 Since self-evidence bears some resemblance to Descartes’ notion of clear and distinct perceptions, 
it is worth pointing out that, unlike Descartes, I do not take appeals to self-evidence to do any 
substantial work in the fight against scepticism. It would be question-begging to claim that since 
some proposition p is self-evident, scepticism about p is refuted. A thorough-going sceptic at this 
point would simply contest the claim that we can tell that p is self-evident. The claim that we can 
easily distinguish self-evident claims from those that are not self-evident presupposes that 
scepticism is false: it does not establish that scepticism is false.  
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that a plausible way to characterise the sense in which a priori justification is 
independent of experience is to argue that whether or not a person is a priori 
warranted does not depend in any way on how it seems to her. This 
characterisation, I argue, has the key advantage of making it obvious why the 
distinction matters: on this reading, the archetypical a priori beliefs are infallibly 
justified, making them importantly different from a posteriori beliefs.  
 As Kant was well aware, very few beliefs, if any, could be plausibly 
understood to have arisen entirely independently of experience. Generally concepts 
are not innate. They have to be learned to be understood, and learning requires 
experience. Moreover, it is also now widely thought that semantic content can 
sometimes depend crucially on facts about our physical environment and linguistic 
community. Being able to think that water is wet, for example, is often thought to 
be possible only if your environment at some point contained samples of H2O.  
So Kant’s claim that a priori knowledge is knowledge that is absolutely 
independent of experience must be understood carefully. The idea is often recast 
as the thought that a priori warrant is epistemically independent of experience. One 
does not need to have any specific experience to be warranted in believing that 
nothing can be both red and green all over at the same time. We need to have had 
certain kinds of experiences in order to grasp concepts like red, and green, but 
experience plays no further role once the concepts have been mastered. As Burge 
puts the point: 
I understand 'apriori' to apply to a person's knowledge when that 
knowledge is underwritten by an apriori justification or entitlement 
that needs no further justification or entitlement to make it 
knowledge. A justification or entitlement is apriori if its justificational 
force is in no way constituted or enhanced by reference to or 
reliance on the specifics of some range of sense experiences or 
perceptual beliefs. (Burge 1993, p. 458) 
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Now this is not true of beliefs warranted a posteriori.  One of my current beliefs is 
that I am presently drinking coffee. Now once again, I needed to have certain types 
of experience to come to understand what coffee is, but I also need other, more 
specific, experiences for my belief to be justified. If I was not currently perceptually 
experiencing drinking coffee, then I would not be justified in believing that I was.  
 But it is not entirely obvious whether it is only perceptual experiences of 
that sort that counts as the relevant sense of ‘experience’.  
 For instance, Michael McKinsey says: ‘I will call knowledge obtained 
independently of empirical investigation a priori knowledge’ (McKinsey 1991, p. 9).  
Since an empirical investigation is an investigation premised upon information 
obtained via the senses, McKinsey takes the a priori to be those propositions that 
we can come to know that do not depend on information acquired via the senses 
for their justification or warrant.  
But this understanding of experience is controversial. While McKinsey’s 
conception of the a priori was adopted by most participants in the debate about 
the compatibility of content externalism and self-knowledge that followed that 
particular McKinsey paper 2, many had clear reservations about doing so. Jessica 
Brown, for instance, describes this usage as ‘not entirely happy’ (Brown 1995, p. 
149). 
The reason for this unhappiness is that this formulation has the 
consequence of making introspective judgements, by definition, a priori. Now that 
would be an intriguing consequence, since it entails that there are a great many 
contingent propositions that we can know a priori to be true. That I am thinking 
about coffee, for instance, is contingent if anything is, and yet McKinsey 
understands ‘experience’ in such a way that I can know this a priori.  
This strikes many philosophers as implausible. As a result, others understand 
‘experience’ more liberally. Jim Pryor, for instance, says:  
I understand a priori justification to be justification that does not 
derive from occurrent experiences. By ‘occurrent experience’ I 
                                                        
2 For early examples, see Brueckner (1992) and Warfield (1992). 
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include perceptual experience and I also include occurrent mental 
states and processes’. (Pryor 2006, p. 239)   
 
It is important to see that a great deal does hang on which of these two has the 
right account of experience. If philosophers are free to simply stipulate what counts 
as experience and what does not then the distinction between the a priori and a 
posteriori begins to look dangerously ad hoc. If there is a significant epistemological 
difference between a priori warrant and a posteriori warrant, then the question of 
whether introspection counts as a priori cannot be settled simply by stipulation. 
Settling the question would require us to consider the epistemic facts of the matter. 
Is the sort of epistemic warrant enjoyed by introspective beliefs like perceptual 
warrant, or is it like the type of warrant that the belief that 1+1=2 has?  
 The point is that if we are to endorse an epistemological distinction like the 
a priori/a posteriori distinction in the first place, then it is important to ensure, as 
John Hawthorne puts it, that the distinction ‘marks a joint in our epistemological 
lives’ (Hawthorne 2007, p. 218). The more gerrymandered the distinction appears, 
the less obvious it is why we should be interested in it.  
 Yet to motivate a choice between whether to include or exclude 
introspective beliefs in the category of belief based on experience, we need to 
consider why dependence on experience matters.  
 Now experience, however construed, is a type of mental state. What needs 
to be made clear is why epistemic dependence on that type of mental state is 
significant.  
I take it that epistemic dependence itself is not the issue here: that a belief 
depends on another mental state does not make the belief a posteriori.  Many 
canonical examples of both a priori and a posteriori belief depend, epistemically, on 
other beliefs. Both scientific and a priori philosophical theories are generally arrived 
at via an inference from some other belief or set of beliefs.  
So, plausibly, it is something about the nature of experience itself that 
makes the epistemic difference. But how can this be? Why does whether your 
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belief epistemically depends on one type of mental state rather than another make 
a difference to the type of warrant that belief has? 
What is needed, then, is an account of experience that makes it clear first, 
why dependence on experience is epistemologically relevant, and, second, why a 
priori beliefs do not depend upon it.  
Now if the account of the epistemic norms governing non-inferential a priori 
beliefs developed last chapter is correct, then we have a plausible-looking account 
that can do this. To see this, let us once again compare the following three possible 
norms: 
 
(4) If it perceptually seems to you that p, then, all things being equal, you 
may believe that p  
(9) If it intuitively seems to you that p, then all things being equal you may 
believe that p is true 
(10)  If it is self-evident that p, then you may believe that p without 
considering any further evidence for it 
 
Consider a perceptual belief, p. Now we might say that p depends on experience in 
the sense that whether I am warranted in believing p depends in part on how it 
perceptually seems to me. When, in normal conditions, it perceptually seems to me 
that p is true, I am entitled to believe that p. Norm (4) entitles us to (in normal 
conditions) rely or depend upon our perceptual experiences when forming beliefs.  
 Now if (9) were an epistemic norm, a priori beliefs would depend in exactly 
the same way on intellectual seemings. So the proponent of (9) would need to 
motivate the thought that intellectual seemings do not count as experiences. But to 
do that, she would have to argue that there was an important epistemological 
difference between intellectual and perceptual seemings.  
But, if (10) is the relevant epistemic norm rather than (9), then a priori 
judgements do not depend epistemically on how things intellectually seem to us at 
all. There is no need to try to find an epistemological difference between 
84 
 
intellectual and perceptual seemings, given that the norm governing non-inferred a 
priori beliefs ignores intellectual seemings entirely. So this gives us an 
unproblematic account of how a priori beliefs are independent on experience.  We 
would simply understand ‘experience’ in the relevant sense to refer to how it seems 
to us. (Henceforth, I shall refer to this characterisation of the a priori as Seeming-
Independence.) 
And we also have available an easy explanation of why it matters whether 
or not a belief depends on experience. This is because seemings are not factive. 
That it perceptually seems to you that p does not ensure that p is true. The specific 
perceptual experience that the belief that p depends upon might or might not be 
veridical. As a result, any belief that epistemically depends in part on a perceptual 
experience is fallibly justified: the epistemic norm at play cannot guarantee truth.  
But, if the inferential rule I am following is (10) rather than (9), then I am not 
entitled to rely or depend upon how it seems to me when forming the belief that p 
in the way I am entitled to depend upon perceptual seemings. Whether or not I am 
a priori justified in believing that p depends, in this sense, only on whether p is in 
fact self-evident. That it seems self-evident to me would be insufficient for the 
belief being warranted, or epistemically rational. The fact that a priori beliefs don’t 
depend on how it seems to us, then, is epistemologically important: it confers 
infallible justification on at least those obvious, intuitive a priori beliefs.  
This gives us a nice and clear explanation of why dependence on experience 
should be epistemically important. It also makes it clear how we would go about 
finding out whether introspective judgements are dependent or independent of 
experience. The answer to this question can be determined by establishing whether 
introspective beliefs are governed by a rule like (10), or whether they are governed 
by something like: 
 
(11) If it introspectively seems to you that p, then you may believe that p 
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My own view is that they are governed by something like (10), but I will leave 
further discussion of introspection until chapter five.  
 It’s worth emphasising that Seeming-Independence is not the view that the 
epistemologically important difference between the a priori and the a posteriori is 
that all a priori judgements are infallibly justified. There remains a concern over 
nondemonstrative inferences involving a priori premises.  
 But I take it that if we are to find any substantive epistemological 
differences between the a priori and the a posteriori, the sorts of a priori 
judgements that we should focus on are the direct, non-inferential variety: the ones 
where their relationship to experience is at its most clear.  Focussing on beliefs 
arrived at via inference from other beliefs is just going to obscure any possible 
differences. This is because how exactly an inferred belief is supported by the 
beliefs it is inferred from will vary, depending upon the sort of inferential reasoning 
involved, and —crucially—it is not obvious that any particular sort of inferential 
reasoning belongs purely on one side of the distinction or the other. For instance, 
the paradigmatic examples of inferred a priori judgements are those that are 
reached via deductive reasoning. This is why it is examples of this sort that the 
previous chapter was primarily concerned with. But whether a deductive argument 
is a priori depends upon the warrant enjoyed by its premises. While there are 
deductive arguments containing purely a priori premises, there are also deductive 
arguments containing a posteriori premises. Consider this version of Kripke’s (1980) 
argument for the claim that water is necessarily H2O: 
 
(I) Water is identical to H2O 
(II) If a true identity claim is flanked by two rigid designators, then it is 
necessarily true 
(III) ‘Water is identical to H2O’ is an identity claim flanked by two rigid 
designators 
(IV)  ‘Water is identical to H2O’ is necessarily true 
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This argument is deductive, in that (IV) follows logically from (I), (II) and (III), but it is 
clearly not a priori. This is because premise (I) is justified a posteriori. This suffices 
to make (IV) warranted a posteriori. Since a person is only justified in believing (IV) 
on the basis of this argument if she is also justified in believing all of the premises, 
her justification for believing (IV) depends in part on her justification for believing 
(I). And since (I)’s warrant depends epistemically on information acquired through 
perception, (IV)’s warrant depends epistemically on information acquired through 
perception as well. Epistemic dependence on experience is transferred from the 
premises of an argument to its conclusion.  
As such, it’s not obvious how focussing on how the premises of a deductive 
argument support its conclusion could tell us anything interesting about a priori 
judgements in particular.  
Likewise, while the paradigmatic examples of inferred a posteriori 
judgements are those reached via inductive or abductive reasoning, whether or not 
an abductive or an inductive argument is a posteriori once again depends upon its 
premises. A great deal of philosophy operates abductively; we frequently choose 
between different philosophical theories on the basis that one is a better 
explanation of the phenomena in question than the other. As Williamson points 
out: 
When [philosophers] cannot provide a deductive argument, they still 
offer supporting considerations. Often they cite phenomena which, 
they suggest, their theory best explains: they provide abductive 
arguments. (Williamson 2007, p. 208) 
 
For instance, philosophers might run an abductive argument in arguing for one 
system of logic opposed to another. In this case all the premises of such an 
argument would be claims about logic: paradigmatically a priori propositions. On 
what basis could we claim that the conclusions of such arguments are themselves 
not a priori? They are not based on experience in any obvious sense.  
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Mathematics, the other paradigmatically a priori discipline, also admits of 
inductive or abductive reasoning. Burge points out the following: 
Some mathematical arguments are nondemonstrative, even broadly 
inductive, yet apriori … If a principle is accepted because its truth 
would explain or derive a variety of other accepted mathematical 
principles, the justification for accepting the principle is 
nondemonstrative; but it may not derive any of its force from 
perceptual beliefs. (Burge, 1993, p. 461) 
 
As this example illustrates, abductive reasoning has a place in mathematics, just as 
it has in philosophy. The same is true for inductive reasoning. I might offer an 
inductive argument for the conclusion that Goldbach’s Conjecture is true—that is, 
that every even integer over 2 can be expressed as the sum of two prime numbers. 
I might infer from the fact that every even integer greater than 2 that I have 
counted so far is the sum of two primes, that all even integers can be expressed as 
the sum of two primes. Each premise in this argument (‘4 is the sum of two primes’, 
‘6 is the sum of two primes, ‘8 is the sum of two primes’, ’10 is the sum of two 
primes, etc.), will itself be justified a priori. 
 The point is that what makes the conclusion of an argument a priori rather 
than a posteriori will have nothing to do with the logical structure of the argument. 
We can have both demonstrative and nondemonstrative a priori arguments. What 
makes the conclusion a priori rather than a posteriori is the type of warrant enjoyed 
by the premises. If we want to find significant differences between the a priori and 
the a posteriori, the beliefs we should be examining are those that are not inferred 
from other beliefs. What we want to identify are those epistemic features that a 
belief has in virtue of being a priori. Not those features that are a result of it being 
the product of one type of inference rather than another.  
For it is clear that the premises of a cogent deductive argument support 
their conclusion differently from how the premises of a good nondemonstrative 
argument do. The truth of the conclusion of a deductive argument is logically 
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entailed by the truth of the premises. As such if I have very strong reason to believe 
that all the premises of that argument are true, that reason also serves as very 
strong reason to think the conclusion is true. But the premises of a 
nondemonstrative argument only make the conclusion probable. The truth of the 
premises does not guarantee the truth of their conclusion.  The reasons I have for 
thinking the premises are true serve as less decisive reasons to think the conclusion 
really is true. Some degree of epistemic warrant is lost in the transfer from premise 
to conclusion. No nondemonstrative argument, then, can guarantee the truth of its 
conclusion. Its logical structure makes the type of warrant produced necessarily 
fallible.  
 The point here is that the fact that nondemonstrative a priori arguments 
generate fallible epistemic warrant for their conclusions tells us nothing significant 
about the a priori in general. Nondemonstrative a posteriori arguments also 
generate less decisive reasons for their conclusions than deductive a posteriori 
arguments do. That is just a logical consequence of their inferential structure. But if 
the only examples of propositions that enjoy merely fallible a priori warrant are the 
conclusions of abductive or inductive arguments, then we have still discovered an 
epistemologically significant difference between the a priori and the a posteriori.  
We should not let the fact that no abductive or inductive argument can guarantee 
the truth of its conclusion blind us to the fact that the central, paradigmatic 
examples of a priori warranted beliefs do enjoy infallible justification. That is 
enough of a difference to make the a priori/a posteriori distinction 
epistemologically significant.   
 
3.2 Traditional infalliblism and mathematical knowledge 
Now any proposed account of the a priori faces two key challenges. First, it must 
demonstrate that the distinction is a theoretically significant one: that is, that a 
priori warrant really is interestingly different from a posteriori warrant. If it turned 
out to be either incoherent or coherent but ad hoc, then I take it that the account 
would fail.  
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On the other hand, however, it must also make its account of the a priori 
realistic: it must make it clear that a priori warrant is something that creatures like 
us are capable of achieving. If an account successfully demonstrated that a priori 
warrant was interestingly different from a posteriori warrant, but yet conceived of 
the a priori such that none or almost none of our beliefs actually had a priori 
warrant, then once again the account would fail. It would be hard to see why an 
empty or very nearly empty epistemic category should be worthy of philosophical 
interest.  
In this section, I argue that Seeming-Independence is better equipped to 
meet these challenges than the traditional, Kantian, version.  
Philip Kitcher has argued that the traditional conception of the a priori is 
such that ‘a priori warrants are ultra-reliable; they never lead us astray’ (Kitcher 
1980, p. 9). Kitcher finds this implication in his reading of Kant: 
I believe that Kant’s account implies that three conditions should be 
met. The same type of process [i.e. the process of pure intuition that 
produces a priori mathematical knowledge] must be available 
independently of experience. It must produce warranted belief 
independently of experience. And it must produce true belief 
independent of experience. (Kitcher, 1980: p. 8) 
 
So on an account like this, there is clearly an important epistemological difference 
between a priori warrant and a posteriori warrant: a priori intuition is a cognitive 
faculty that infallibly produces true belief. Given that perception clearly does not do 
this it gives us a clearly epistemological reason to distinguish those beliefs based on 
a priori intuition from those based on perception.  
 In the last chapter I argued that explaining a priori warrant by appeal to this 
sort of intuition was problematic: there are excellent reasons to doubt that we do 
possess this sort of mysteriously infallible cognitive faculty. The account is arguably 
psychologically unrealistic in that sense. A separate problem is that, as Kitcher 
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argues, on this understanding there are only very few beliefs that could conceivably 
count as genuinely a priori.  
In his view, it is a grave misunderstanding of the epistemology of 
mathematics to suggest that mathematical beliefs are typically produced 
straightforwardly from some sort of infallible intuitive faculty. In Kitcher (1983), he 
notes that mathematical beliefs, as they are in fact formed and maintained, depend 
strongly on the mathematical traditions in which the believer is located. That is to 
say, mathematical belief is largely dependent on information acquired through 
testimony. Kitcher takes this dependence to undermine the thought that 
mathematics is an a priori discipline: given that mathematical beliefs can be 
overturned by information acquired via testimony, in his view, it does not possess 
the sort of infallible justification it would need to possess to be properly a priori. So 
by taking the a priori to apply strictly to those beliefs that are produced purely by 
some sort of infallible intuitive faculty, we effectively exclude most mathematical 
beliefs from counting as genuinely a priori. Not only is the traditional account 
lumbered with the problematic notion of an infallible faculty of intuition, but it also 
seems ill-equipped to accommodate the actual epistemic practices of the 
mathematical community.  
Now I take it that there is nothing objectionable to the thought that many 
non-experts are massively reliant on the testimony of experts in acquiring their 
mathematical beliefs. In fact, it might be that almost all of the more sophisticated 
mathematical propositions that they believe—say, ‘Fermat’s Last Theorem is 
true’—are known entirely through testimony if known at all. That is to say, we 
might expect the general public to have no idea what the actual proof for this 
theorem looks like; they have simply be told that it has been proven, and accept 
that at face value. I see no immediate problem with describing this sort of 
mathematical knowledge as a posteriori. That claim would not, in my view, be 
devastating to an account of the a priori.  
What is far more problematic, however, is Kitcher’s claim that mathematical 
experts do not have a priori knowledge of mathematics. Mathematics, as it is 
practiced by professional mathematicians, is widely considered a paradigmatically a 
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priori discipline: a discipline that is a priori if anything is. If it were to turn out not to 
be a priori after all, it would be a strong indication that the category of the a priori 
was either entirely empty or close enough to it to make it unworthy of so much 
philosophical attention.  
So it seems that the traditional infalliblist approach does well at meeting the 
first challenge for an account of the a priori, in that it offers a clearly epistemic 
criterion for marking the distinction. However it does badly at meeting the second 
challenge. We have strong reasons to think that this account of the a priori is simply 
unrealistic in that it presupposes the existence of a dubious cognitive faculty and 
seems out of step with the realities of how mathematics—an a priori discipline if 
anything is—actually operates.  
Seeming-Independence, I submit, does substantially better than the 
traditional model on this score.  
Seeming-Independence has two key advantages over the traditional model. 
First, and most importantly, it does not presuppose any type of pure intuition that 
is capable of infallibly distinguishing true logical or mathematical propositions from 
false ones. Humans remain quite capable of arriving at false beliefs via pure, 
armchair reflection. Sometimes what seems to us to be mathematically obvious is 
not so. The point is simply that the falsity of such seemings undercuts their 
justification. The resulting beliefs will not count as being warranted a priori.    
What makes direct a priori beliefs infallibly justified, on Seeming-
Independence, is not that they are produced by an ‘ultra-reliable’ cognitive faculty. 
Rather, the infallibility derives from the structure of the relevant epistemic norms. 
Epistemic norms do not have to be transparent. It is quite possible that an 
epistemic norm is such that even those who put in a decent effort to comply with it 
might fail to do so. The norm governing direct, ‘intuitive’ a priori beliefs, on this 
account, is like that. It is structured such that its antecedent conditions pick out a 
non-transparent (but recognisable) property that is factive.  
 Second, and relatedly, Seeming-Independence allows that mathematical 
beliefs acquired purely via armchair reflection may be overturned by evidence 
acquired through testimony. Even if we grant Kitcher’s claim that knowledge 
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acquired through testimony is knowledge that is dependent upon experience3, the 
fact that our beliefs can be overturned in this way does not entail that 
mathematical beliefs in general lack infallible justification.  It does not follow that if 
empirical evidence leads us to change our minds about mathematical claims, then 
we originally had fallible epistemic warrant for believing them. It is also possible 
that the claim was never warranted in the first place.  
Given the distinction between subjective and objective epistemic norms, 
epistemic norms with transparent antecedent conditions and norms with non-
transparent antecedent conditions, this is a viable option even in those cases where 
the overturned belief was held by a gifted mathematician.  
 Furthermore, as I have already stressed, Seeming-Independence is not 
committed to the claim that all a priori warrant is infallible. The infallibility is a 
result of the structure of the proposed epistemic norm governing propositions that 
strike us as a priori obvious, or self-evident. But a priori reflection is not restricted 
to self-evident propositions: for example, it might also involve inferring an 
unobvious proposition from a series of self-evident ones. Such beliefs will be 
answerable to a different set of norms: the norms governing the relevant type of 
inference.  
In chapter two I suggested that generally the conclusions of deductive or 
putatively deductive a priori arguments have infallible warrant, if they have warrant 
at all. Yet, as argued above, some inferential mathematical reasoning may be 
nondemonstrative. And since nondemonstrative inferences are fallible inferences, 
the resulting belief will not be infallibly warranted.  
 Now the advantage of this thought is that it offers us further dialectical 
options with which to resist Kitcher’s claim that mathematics is in fact an empirical 
discipline, rather than an a priori one. One explanation of how we revise our 
mathematical beliefs in light of findings elsewhere in the mathematical community, 
for example, is that we come to see that we were mistaken in taking some axiom to 
be self-evident, or in taking the conclusion of a supposed proof to follow logically 
from some axiom. These are cases in which our putatively a priori warrant is 
                                                        
3 Burge (1993) famously rejects this view.  
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undercut: it is revealed not to be a priori warrant at all. But in other cases we might 
be in possession of genuinely a priori warrant that is overruled. This is a legitimate 
possibility for those cases where the mathematical belief in question was arrived at 
via a nondemonstrative inference.  
 For example, Euclid’s parallel postulate was widely regarded as less obvious 
than his other axioms even before it was disproven. In the last chapter I suggested 
that one explanation of how this postulate came to be believed was that it was 
believed because it seemed true, if less obviously so than the other axioms. But 
another possible explanation might be that the belief was arrived at via an 
abductive or inductive inference. We could just as plausibly understand the sort of 
nondemonstrative mathematical reasoning Burge describes as applying to many of 
those mathematicians who accepted the parallel postulate. If someone took the 
best explanation of the nature of physical space to be the theorems of Euclidean 
Geometry, for example, and recognised the indispensability of the parallel 
postulate to those theorems, then she might well be inclined to abductively infer 
that the parallel postulate was true, regardless of whether or not it struck her as 
intuitively obvious. 
 Assuming that this abductive reasoning was good, she would have had 
fallible a priori justification for believing the parallel postulate. This fallible 
justification would be open to be overturned by any stronger evidence to the 
contrary, irrespective of whether that evidence was a priori or a posteriori.  
 So not every false mathematical belief, then, would need to be explained as 
an instance of someone failing to follow some epistemic norm. This gives us the 
flexibility to consider the epistemic status of false mathematical beliefs on a case by 
case basis.  
 This flexibility is a crucial dialectical advantage: it allows Seeming-
Independence to be adaptable enough to cope with the sorts of features of 
mathematical belief formation that Kitcher mentions. The ruling that mathematics, 
as it is actually practiced, is not genuinely a priori would then require a great deal 
more motivation than has been provided.  
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3.3 Seeming-Independence and ultra-reliability 
There is also a case to be made for the claim that Seeming-Independence does even 
better than the traditional Infalliblist view of the a priori at making the a priori/a 
posteriori distinction an overtly epistemological distinction. One worry for 
understanding the distinction in terms of infallibility— or ‘ultra-reliability’ as Kitcher 
prefers to put it—is that being ultra-reliable is not a clear hallmark of the a priori. 
There are clear cases of ultra-reliable a posteriori beliefs as well. Furthermore, and 
relatedly, the question of whether a belief is ultra-reliable is not obviously an 
epistemological question. This is because the ultra-reliability of a belief is a property 
that need not be explained by any epistemological features of the belief.   
 Consider a demonstrative judgement like ‘that pen exists’. Now 
demonstratives take their semantic content directly from the objects that they pick 
out: so a thought with that content can only be considered in the first place if I 
successfully make reference to a pen. In situations where there is no pen in front of 
me, my judgement is not demonstrative, even though it might seem to me that it is. 
It has an altogether different content.  
 And we individuate beliefs not in terms of the content they seem to have, 
but in terms of the content they do have. So in possible worlds where there is no 
pen in front of me, I do not believe the same thing as I do in possible worlds where 
there is a pen in front of me. 4 
But a clear implication of this is that when I hold the demonstrative belief 
‘that pen exists’, it must be true. The belief is ultra-reliable: there is no possible way 
to hold this kind of belief without there being a pen to pick out. What makes it 
possible for me to think that thought also makes the belief true. Yet it is also clearly 
a posteriori: I know that there is a pen there only because I can see that there is. So, 
what we have here is an ultra-reliable a posteriori warranted belief.  
But on the traditional infalliblist account of the a priori, ultra-reliability is 
supposed to be the defining characteristic of the a priori. Infallibility was supposed 
to serve as the clearly epistemological criterion they could point to in support of the 
                                                        
4 See Pyor 2006 for a discussion of these cases. 
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view that the a priori/a posteriori distinction is an epistemic one rather than a 
metaphysical or modal distinction. The presence of ultra-reliable a posteriori 
beliefs, then, suggests that this view does not cleanly capture the distinction 
between the a priori and the a posteriori.  
A closely related point is that ultra-reliability is not an essentially 
epistemological property. That is to say, the fact that a particular belief cannot 
possibly be false does not, in itself, add to the epistemological status of the belief. 
Whether this infallibility makes a difference to the epistemological status of the 
belief depends on why the belief is ultra-reliable.  
Suppose that I am aware that I have been slipped a drug that makes me 
hallucinate extremely realistic-looking pens. This is a context, I take it, in which 
norm (4)5 would not permit me to rely purely on how it seems to me in forming 
beliefs about pens: this would be a situation where the ceteris paribus clause of 
norm (4) comes into play. Coming to believe that there is a pen in front of me just 
because it perceptually seems to me that there is in those circumstances where I 
have reason to mistrust my perceptual experiences is clearly and even 
paradigmatically irrational: this cannot be construed as a belief that follows a 
legitimate epistemic norm.6 
But suppose that I ignore this and maintain my (misplaced) faith in my 
perceptual faculties. Suppose further that I do manage to make reference to the 
single genuine pen in my environment and form the demonstrative belief ‘that pen 
exists’. This belief is ultra-reliable. But that has no relevance to the question of 
whether the belief is rational. Our epistemic assessment of the belief is not, in this 
context, altered by considerations of its ultra-reliability. My belief is entirely 
unwarranted, even though it is ultra-reliable. In this case, then, questions of 
whether I am warranted in holding my demonstrative belief come apart from 
questions of its status as an ultra-reliable belief. Ultra-reliability in and of itself is 
not an indicator of epistemic standing.  
                                                        
5
 (4) If it perceptually seems to you that p then all things being equal you may believe that p. 
6 I will explain what this particular sort of epistemic irrationality consists in, in section 6.  
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Now Seeming-Independence has an advantage in that it holds that direct a 
priori beliefs are ultra-reliable in virtue of their having been formed in a manner 
that is in compliance with a special kind of epistemic norm. So we might say that 
such beliefs are ultra-reliable because they are warranted.  
While Seeming-Independence does not hold that every a priori belief is 
ultra-reliable, it does make ultra-reliability a product of the belief’s epistemic 
status.  
 To rephrase the point, there is something importantly different about why 
this kind of demonstrative thought is guaranteed to be true, and why a non-
inferential a priori warranted judgement is guaranteed to be true. With direct a 
priori beliefs, this ultra-reliability applies only to those beliefs that are in full 
compliance with the relevant epistemic norms; that is, to those beliefs that are fully 
and genuinely rational. The infallibility, then, comes from the way in which the 
belief was arrived at. 
 Consider some logical belief I hold, l. Let us suppose l is a true logical 
principle that strikes professional logicians as plainly self-evident, but which is 
beyond the intuitions of some less reflective non-philosophers.  Now in this case, 
professional logicians will believe l because it is self-evident. An unsophisticated 
layman, however, might come to believe l only on the basis of the testimony of an 
expert logician.   
Now it is important to see that, on Seeming-Independence, whether the 
belief is infallibly warranted depends on whether one is following norm (10) in 
believing l. There is nothing wrong with relying on expert testimony when forming 
logical beliefs. This is most commonly how laymen acquire information about 
technical subjects. For instance, all or almost all of my scientific beliefs are formed 
like this. There is no reason to think it inappropriate for logic.  
There might even be good reason to prefer that method to the normal, 
direct method. If I have reasons to doubt that I am good at telling self-evident 
logical propositions from plausible-looking false ones, then relying on an expert in 
forming logical beliefs would be better than not doing so.  
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But doing this can bring different epistemic norms into play. By employing 
different belief-forming methodologies, we can actually make our beliefs 
answerable to different epistemic norms. If norm (10) has nothing to do with either 
why I formed the belief, nor why I continue to believe it, then the warrant for that 
belief must come from another source. The self-evidence of a proposition can only 
justify my belief in those cases where I follow norm (10). There is nothing 
preventing that warrant coming from my trusting the word of an expert. Seeming-
Independence does not claim that all logically self-evident propositions are 
warranted a priori. It is possible that someone might hold that belief for reasons 
entirely unrelated to its self-evidence. Depending on what those reasons are, this 
might make the logical belief, unusually, a posteriori. On Seeming-Independence, 
whether a belief is a priori depends exclusively on the norms the believer is 
complying with. Norm (10) offers us an infallible route by which to come to believe 
l, but there might also be other acceptable routes that are not infallible.  
 The point is that on Seeming-Independence, the infallibility of direct a priori 
beliefs is to be explained not by the content of the beliefs themselves, but by the 
way we go about acquiring and maintaining that belief.  What this type of a priori 
reasoning does, this suggests, is provide us with a special route to knowledge—a 
route that, if followed correctly, guarantees truth. The fact remains that a posteriori 
warrant cannot itself provide this sort of guarantee, even if sometimes the content 
of certain a posteriori beliefs can provide it.  
This, I think, suffices to retain a significant epistemic difference between the 
a priori and the a posteriori. According to Seeming-Independence, the type of 
warrant that we typically have for those logical, conceptual or mathematical beliefs 
that strike us as intuitively obvious, is different in kind from the warrant we have 
for those similarly immediate perceptual beliefs. Propositions like ‘1+1=2’, or 
‘nothing is both red and green all over at the same time’ are typically governed by 
norm (10): that is, we believe these propositions because they are self-evident. 7   
                                                        
7
 Though, as we have seen, they are not always governed by this norm. Conceptual truths don’t have 
to be a priori: there are other possible ways of acquiring beliefs about them.    
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This supplies them with a kind of infallible epistemic warrant. Since self-
evidence is factive, anybody who follows norm (10) correctly will arrive at true 
belief. Epistemic warrant and truth are inseparable in this case: the former ensures 
the presence of the latter. Typically, beliefs like ‘there is a pen on my desk’ are 
governed by norm (4): it is partly because it perceptually seems to me that there is 
a pen on my desk that I believe there is. Since how it seems to me is not factive, (4) 
supplies merely fallible warrant: it cannot absolutely guarantee that there is indeed 
a pen on my desk.  
 
3.4 Problems of length and width 
Seeming-Independence, I have argued, enjoys a crucial dialectical advantage over 
the traditional infallibilist view. It is better able to explain how a priori warrant and 
knowledge is achievable for creatures with our cognitive limitations and epistemic 
practices.  Yet it also retains a commitment to a highly restricted version of the 
Infallibility Thesis: that is, it maintains that non-inferential a priori beliefs are 
infallibly warranted if warranted at all. Arguably, then, it retains and even improves 
on the key strength of the traditional view—that it makes the a priori/a posteriori 
distinction an overtly epistemological one—while avoiding its costs.  
 However, just because this account uses some sort of epistemological 
criteria in dividing a priori and the a posteriori, it does not follow that the 
distinction is a clear, natural one. Just because there is an epistemological 
difference of sorts, it does not entail that the distinction is not ad hoc.  
Hawthorne (2007) has recently argued that the supposed distinction 
between the a priori and the a posteriori is simply not a natural one: it does not 
divide up our ‘epistemological lives’ in a natural way. In pressing this point, he 
targets two ways of construing Kant’s claim that a priori knowledge is independent 
of experience. The first construal understands a priori knowledge to be knowledge 
that is independent of the believer’s environment. The second construal 
understands a priori knowledge to be knowledge that is ‘sustained by a method 
that is not experience-involving’ (Hawthorne 2007, p. 7). Hawthorne argues that 
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neither construal is a natural one. On both ways of marking the divide, the 
distinction does cleanly separate the a priori from the a posteriori. On natural 
readings of both construals, paradigmatically a priori beliefs end up on the wrong 
side of the divide. There is no way to preserve the distinction, Hawthorne 
concludes, without making it unacceptably ad hoc.  
While I have thus far focussed primarily on a priori warrant, rather than on a 
priori knowledge, Seeming-Independence does indeed appear to be committed to a 
version of this second construal of a priori knowledge. However, in the next two 
sections, I will argue that it can avoid Hawthorne’s objections.  
While I will focus primarily on Hawthorne’s criticisms of the second 
construal (‘Experience-Independence’) I will first briefly sketch Hawthorne’s 
problems with the ‘Environment-Independence’ construal of a priori knowledge.  
Hawthorne takes the idea behind Environment-Dependence to be this.  For 
a belief to count as knowledge, in his view, it must be sufficiently safe from error. 
Generally, in order for a belief to be sufficiently safe the believer’s environment 
must be configured in such a way that it provides a ‘safe haven’ (Hawthorne 2007, 
p.3). My perceptual belief that I have just driven past a barn, for instance, is only 
safe if I am not in an area filled with realistic barn facades. In fake barn country, 
that belief, even if true, is not safe enough to count as knowledge. The claim that a 
priori knowledge is Environment-Dependent, in his view, is the claim that a priori 
belief ‘stands in no special need of a safe haven from the environment since the 
environment can’t but provide a safe haven’ (Hawthorne 2007, p. 3).  
Now, as Hawthorne points, out, this claim is simply not true. Just as 
perceptual knowledge requires the thinker’s environment to be free of ‘Bad 
experiences’ so too does a priori knowledge. For instance, in the same way that it is 
possible for one’s environment to contain an abundance of fake barns, it is also 
possible for one’s environment to contain something like an a priori gas; a gas that 
‘induces the phenomenology of blatant obviousness’ (Hawthorne 2007, p. 4) 
whenever the believer considers manifestly false propositions. The presence of 
such a gas in one’s environment would render any ‘obvious’ a priori belief unsafe in 
the same way that the presence of fake barns renders barn-beliefs unsafe. Just as 
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perceptual knowledge depends in part on facts about our environment, so too, in 
Hawthorne’s view, does a priori knowledge.   
I take Hawthorne to be correct in that the safety of an a priori belief does 
depend on the believer’s environment in a variety of respects. Just as 
environmental conditions can affect the veridicality of our perceptual beliefs, so too 
can they affect the veridicality of armchair reflection.8  Armchair reflection is only 
reliably veridical when we are thinking clearly: and there is no good reason to 
suppose that environmental factors cannot affect how clearly a person reasons. If 
our environment was such that the possibility of reason-affecting conditions 
obtaining was a real one, then our judgements arrived at via non-empirical 
armchair reflection would lack safety. So if we think that safety really is a necessary 
condition for a priori knowledge, then we must concede that Environment-
Independence rules out far too many beliefs to be credible.  
Before turning to Experience-Independence, it is worth pointing out that the 
safety requirement is at its most plausible as a requirement for knowledge, and not 
as a requirement for warrant or justification. Consider once again the fake barn 
case. Plausibly, we have seen, I would not know that I had just driven past a barn if I 
happened to be driving through an area that for some reason had a high prevalence 
of fake barns. But would I be justified9  in believing that I had just driven past a 
barn? On this question, intuitions diverge. Some reliablists about justification might 
think that since our perceptual faculties are not reliably veridical barn-detectors in 
those surroundings, the relevant belief is not the product of a reliable process and is 
thus unwarranted. Philosophers with stronger internalist intuitions, on the other 
hand, might think that the presence of the fake barns by themselves does not 
undermine my justification. Provided I had no reason to suspect that I was in fake 
barn country, the belief in question remains justified. Anyone attracted to this way 
of understanding the picture might then be inclined to understand fake barn 
                                                        
8 I take the term ‘armchair reflection’ to apply to those beliefs acquired non-emipirically, through 
pure reflection. Note that beliefs arrived at via armchair reflection are not necessarily warranted a 
priori. Armchair reflection might generate miscalculations, or other rational errors. The resulting 
beliefs would not count as warranted a priori.  
9
 I use justification and warrant interchangeably here. The literature on these cases typically refers 
to justification rather than warrant, so I am introducing talk of justification only to make the 
connections between the literature and what I say here clearer.  
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scenarios as being like the Gettier examples: cases of justified true belief that are 
not knowledge.  
The same holds for the a priori gas scenario. It is not obvious that the mere 
presence of an a priori gas in the surrounding environment undercuts the epistemic 
warrant of an obvious a priori judgement made by someone unaffected by the gas. 
Whether philosophers take these cases to be warranted or unwarranted depends 
on the particular brand of a priori warrant endorsed. And on my account, this sort 
of case would not be a case of unwarranted a priori belief.  
Let me explain. Whether a belief is warranted depends, in my view, only on 
whether the believer has followed the relevant epistemic norm or norms. The 
presence of an a priori gas in her surroundings does not entail that she has failed to 
comply with those norms. The way the a priori affects belief, I take it, is that it 
disrupts our reasoning in such a way as to render us incapable of following certain 
epistemic norms. So suppose while in this environment a person comes to consider 
whether it is possible for something to be both red and green all over at the same 
time. If she is lucky enough not to be affected by the gas, she will decide, rightly, 
that this is not possible. There is nothing problematic about how she went about 
forming this belief: she recognised that it is self-evident that an object can be 
entirely one colour and entirely another colour simultaneously, and formed her 
belief accordingly.  
If she was affected by the gas, however, she would be temporarily incapable 
of telling self-evident propositions from non-self-evident ones: false propositions 
rather than true ones strike her as ‘blatantly obvious’. So if she had been under the 
influence of this gas while considering this question, she would have believed it 
blatantly obvious that something could indeed be both red and green all over at the 
same time. What the gas has done is make her temporarily unable to follow norm 
(10) by making her unable to identify its antecedent conditions. 
The presence of a priori gas in the believer’s vicinity makes it lucky that she 
is able to comply with norm (10) in those cases where she is not affected by it. If we 
hold that the involvement of this sort of luck is inimical to the belief counting as 
knowledge then we will agree with Hawthorne that these are not cases of 
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knowledge. Yet there is no reason to suppose this sort of luck is inimical to her 
belief counting as warranted. 
Bear in mind that whether or not one is properly warranted in believing that 
p depends on whether one has successfully followed the relevant epistemic norms 
in arriving at p. While I do not offer an account of rule-following here, any plausible 
account of rule following must hold that  following an epistemic norm—however it 
characterises this—is not the same as simply believing in a way that is consistent 
with a norm. To be following an epistemic norm, it must be the case that the norm 
in some specific way explains the belief.  
So there must be a non-accidental, luck-free connection of some sort 
between the norm and the belief, otherwise the belief is not properly warranted. 
So some types of epistemic luck certainly are inimical to a belief counting as 
warranted. But the type of epistemic luck that a priori gas introduces does not 
appear to be so. The presence of a priori gas does not entail that an unaffected 
person cannot properly follow epistemic norms. As such, we have no reason to 
doubt her belief is properly warranted.  
So, if we agree with Hawthorne that the sort of luck that a priori gas brings 
into play really is inimical to a belief counting as knowledge, then our only recourse 
is to take this case to be a Gettier-like case: a situation where a justified true belief 
is not knowledge.10  
I take this conclusion to be not unacceptable: it is well established that it is 
possible to have a justified true belief that is not knowledge. Moreover, the a priori 
gas case closely resembles Gettier’s famous examples of such cases. I take it that 
the reason we do not take Gettier’s examples to be cases of knowledge is precisely 
because the believer is lucky that his or her belief turned out to be true. Smith, the 
                                                        
10 I will not pursue this thought here, but it does not strike me as undeniable that this sort of luck is 
knowledge-defeating, given the level at which the epistemic luck takes place. This is not, as it is in 
most cases of epistemic luck, a situation where she is lucky that her belief-forming method arrives at 
truth. It isn’t a situation in which the believer follows a line of reasoning that could have easily have 
led her astray. I agree that those cases are clearly cases where the believer lacks knowledge. But in 
this scenario, there is no luck whatsoever about the fact that her reasoning method was truth-
conducive. What is lucky is just that she was epistemically competent enough to follow that method. 
But it isn’t obvious to me that competency-luck is epistemically relevant. And since cases where one 
is luckily competent are still cases where the belief is not safe, I do not consider Hawthorne’s safety 
requirement to be undeniable either. I accept it here simply for the sake of argument.  
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job applicant who believes that the person who will get the job has ten coins in his 
pocket, is lucky that this belief turned out true, given that it was based on the 
reasonable but false assumption that his competitor for the post will get the job. It 
is this luck that defeats his knowledge. In the a priori gas case, as I have stressed, it 
is also the presence of luck that prevents the belief from counting as knowledge 
(assuming it does). The case mirrors Gettier’s in this respect.  
With that in mind, let us now consider Experience-Independence.  So on this 
conception, a priori knowledge is understood to be knowledge sustained by a non-
experience-involving method. Now Hawthorne’s concern with this construal is that 
whether a cognitive process counts as experience-involving or not depends on how 
we choose to individuate it. And, in many cases, there are no obvious facts of the 
matter that make one choice better than any other. This makes the distinction 
unnatural. In this picture, whether an item of knowledge falls into one 
epistemological category or another depends on nothing more than how we 
individuate the process, and there are no obviously ‘correct’ ways to individuate it. 
As such it is hard to see why it should matter which category it falls into.  
Meeting Hawthorne’s challenge here requires addressing two distinct 
problems: problems of width, and problems of length. Problems of width stem from 
concerns similar to those we have already come across: that the presence of 
empirical evidence can sometimes prevent a particular a priori belief counting as 
knowledge. As Hawthorne says: 
Even if I have carefully worked through a mathematical proof that p, I 
will not know that p if I get empirical evidence that I am mad, or that 
human and mechanized experts agree that not-p, or that there is a 
priori gas in the area, or that I have made lots of mistakes using a 
very similar proof technique in the past or that lots of smart people 
are inclined to laugh when they hear my proof. (Hawthorne 2007, p. 
8) 
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Given the presence of these Bad experiences in or around the process that sustains 
the belief that p, that belief does not count as knowledge. Now one possible way to 
interpret this thought is to say that the process that produced p is knowledge-
generating if it includes only Good experiences. Hawthorne states his case as 
follows: 
That my proof counts as knowledge appears to depend crucially on it 
being accompanied by Good experiences. But if the process of 
arriving at putatively a priori knowledge is individuated so as to 
include Good experiences, then it will count as a posteriori by the 
experience dependent criterion … There is a general problem of 
width here. All sorts of facts at one time have some causal bearing on 
belief at a slightly later time. Which of them are to count as part of 
the belief forming process? (Hawthorne, 2007, p. 9) 
 
In addition to the problem of width, there is also a problem relating to where we 
take the relevant belief-forming process to have begun.  
Consider a scenario where a person learns a set of natural laws as a child. 
Much later in life, she recalls these laws to mind, and from them infers that some 
more specific conditional obtains: say, ‘if I drop a penny, it will fall downwards’. If 
we take the cognitive process to begin with her learning the laws, then, according 
to Experience-Independence, her knowledge of the conditional is a posteriori. 
However, if we take the relevant cognitive process to begin from the point where 
she brings these laws to mind, then it shall count as a priori. Hawthorne sets up the 
problem here as follows: 
It is important to realize here that when one considers a stream of 
events, various processes can be distinguished, some longer in 
temporal extent than others … Suppose someone extracts a 
conditional prediction about the course of events. There is a process 
that begins with the teacher telling him the laws and ends with 
applying some laws to derive a conditional prediction. But there is a 
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shorter process that begins with retrieving the laws from the 
relevant internal information bank and ends with producing the 
conditional prediction … Which shall we use to test whether the 
belief is a priori? … Is there any deep mistake in taking [the shorter 
process] to be the relevant safe method? (Hawthorne 2007, p. 10) 
 
Once again, what is required is a non-ad hoc way of determining which way of 
individuating a cognitive process is the appropriate one.  
 The problem here is exacerbated by the fact that to prevent the belief 
inferred from natural laws from counting as a priori, we need to take the relevant 
process to be the longer process. Yet to avoid an unacceptable result in other cases, 
we would need to take the relevant process to be a shorter process. For instance, 
Hawthorne notes that all our initial mathematical beliefs are epistemically based on 
the testimony of our teachers. If we were to take the cognitive process involved in 
any mathematical calculation to be a long process, then it would start to look like all 
our mathematical beliefs are a posteriori. This would be an unacceptable 
conclusion. To avoid it, we must take the relevant cognitive process in this case to 
be the shorter one. But is there any principled reason that the process in the 
natural laws example is long, and the process in the mathematical calculation case 
is short? The decision to take one to be short and the other long looks to be ad hoc.   
 In the remainder of this chapter I will argue that these concerns are only 
pressing for those that endorse the sort of account of knowledge that Hawthorne 
does. On the account of a priori warrant and knowledge I favour, it can indeed be a 
‘deep mistake’ to take the relevant process to be too short or too wide.  
 
3.5 Cognitive processes and epistemic norms 
On a normative approach to knowledge and epistemic warrant, a belief is 
warranted when the believer follows the relevant epistemic norms in forming and 
maintaining her belief. A belief is knowledge when the belief that is formed and 
maintained in this way is also (lucklessly) true. So when deliberating about whether 
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some belief counts as knowledge, we must consider whether the believer has 
indeed been following the relevant epistemic norms.  
 Now every belief is the result of some cognitive process or another. And any 
cognitive process can be individuated in a variety of ways. But when we are 
considering whether the belief is knowledge or not, what we are considering is 
whether the cognitive process that produced the belief could be legitimately 
individuated as an instance of the believer following an epistemic norm. If it can be 
so individuated, then it is warranted. If it is also lucklessly true, then it will count as 
knowledge. If it cannot accurately be so individuated, then the belief is not 
warranted and is not known. 
 Now whether a belief is known a priori on the suggested construal depends 
primarily on whether, as Burge put it, it is ‘underwritten by an a priori justification 
or entitlement that needs no further justification or entitlement to make it 
knowledge’ (Burge 1993, p. 461). And whether it is underwritten in this way will 
depend on which epistemic norms were followed. If those norms are structured 
such that their antecedent conditions appeal to non-factive ‘seemings’ then the 
resulting belief is a posteriori. If the relevant norms are not so structured then the 
belief is warranted a priori. If it is also known, then it is known a priori.  
 In settling whether a belief is a priori or not then, the right way to 
individuate the cognitive process that resulted in the belief is clear. It must be 
individuated as an instance (or a series of instances) of epistemic norm-following.  
No other way of individuating the cognitive process is relevant. And this allows us 
to settle conclusively how long or how wide the relevant cognitive process should 
be taken to be: the relevant norms determine what the proper length and width of 
the relevant cognitive process is.  
 Consider the following norms: 
 
(2) Do not believe that p if some alternative proposition incompatible with p 
has a higher degree of support  
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(6) If you are justified in believing that p, and are justified in believing that if p 
then q, then believe q or give up one of the other beliefs 
(10) If it is self-evident that p then you may believe that p without considering 
any further evidence for it 
 
Now the cognitive process individuated as instances of following each of these 
norms will have very different lengths and widths from each other. Suppose a 
believer comes to believe that one plus two equals three in the usual sort of way.  
Once again we can individuate the process as leading up to this belief in a variety of 
ways. We could consider it as part of a process that began when she was first 
introduced to numerical concepts. Or we could think of it as part of a holistic 
process that stretches all the way out to her background beliefs about her own 
sanity and what mathematical experts think. But what makes this belief warranted 
is that the believer arrives at this belief as a result of following norm (10). This 
means that the relevant way of individuating the process is to take it to be both 
very short and very narrow: it begins with her considering the proposition, taking it 
to be blatantly obvious, and concluding that it is true.  
 However following norm (2) involves a very different methodology. Consider 
a concrete case of a person’s following norm (2). Suppose a person who believes 
that p, but then suddenly discovers that another belief she holds, q, is inconsistent 
with p. After careful deliberation, she decides that overall the evidence in favour of 
q is substantially stronger than the evidence in favour of p, so she stops believing 
that p and maintains her belief that q. Now what we have described here is what 
Hawthorne would call a wide cognitive process: the believer has brought to mind 
and weighed up a range of different considerations in determining whether to 
believe that p.  
 Following norm (6) is different from both of these. Suppose a person comes 
to believe that p after being told that it is true by a highly reliable source. Some 
time later she discovers that the conditional ‘If p then q’ obtains, and immediately 
forms the belief that q. Now once again, we could take this process to have begun 
when she discovered that the conditional obtains, and leapt to the conclusion that 
108 
 
q. But that cognitive act in isolation is not an instance of following norm (6). The 
question of whether the believer is justified in believing that p is relevant to the 
question of whether or not she has followed (6). If a third party were ask to 
consider, for example, whether this person knows that q, he would need to 
determine whether or not the belief that p was justified. In other words, he would 
need to view her belief-forming process as a long one; as having begun when she 
acquired the belief that p and ended much later after she arrived at q.  
 The point is that different epistemic norms have different demands. 
Meeting these demands sometimes requires us to consider a wide range of 
propositions, and other times it requires us to rely upon evidence we received in 
the past. How long or wide we should take a cognitive process to be can be 
definitely determined by considering what epistemic norms are at play in any given 
example.  
 So it is not the case that we have no principled means available of 
determining the appropriate length and width of the cognitive process that 
produces some belief. If we can determine exactly which epistemic norms would 
apply to the belief in question, then we can determine how long or wide the 
cognitive process should be taken to be.  
 This highlights a crucial advantage that a normative approach enjoys over 
Hawthorne’s preferred safety account of knowledge. The issue with Hawthorne’s 
view is that the only restriction on a cognitive process counting as knowledge-
producing is that it must be a cognitive process that produces safe beliefs. So all 
that is required is that it be a process that is reliably veridical in the context in 
which the believer formed her belief. But, since this is the only requirement, it is 
difficult to motivate one characterisation of a cognitive process over another. But 
since a normative approach is explicitly only focussed on whether the belief in 
question was formed as a result of following an epistemic norm, the question is 
significantly easier to cope with.  
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3.6 Following norms and the transmission of epistemic warrant 
However, even if Hawthorne’s examples fail to establish that there is no way to 
motivate construing a cognitive process to be of some specific length and width 
rather than some other length or width, the cases he draws attention to might yet 
serve as counter-examples to Seeming-Independence. It might be that one could 
argue that these examples are cases where one’s epistemic warrant is not properly 
independent of how it seems to you, given that ‘Good experiences’ do possibly play 
some sort of significant epistemic role. The suggestion here is that what these 
examples might also call attention to is the fact that Seeming-Independence has not 
yet been fleshed out enough to allow us to determine whether it really does 
capture a plausible conception of the a priori. Does this conception of the a priori/a 
posteriori distinction get the right results in the more complicated cases that 
Hawthorne brings up?  
 I take it that Hawthorne’s suggestion that inferences from long-
remembered natural laws might count as a priori is easily settled. The above 
discussion gives us a quick and clear rebuttal to this thought. Given that all 
inferences function by passing on warrant from premises to conclusion, the norm 
involved in this sort of case will be like norm (6), in the sense that the norm will 
have the general form of ‘If you are justified in believing that x, then ϕ’.  Since the 
manner in which the belief was acquired is relevant to whether it is justified, 
considering whether any belief is an instance of following a norm like this would 
require us to construe the cognitive process involved as an extremely long process, 
beginning when the natural laws were initially learned. On Seeming-Independence, 
then, we can definitely rule that this case is not a case of a priori knowledge.   
 A more problematic case for Seeming-Independence is case where one has 
empirical evidence that indicates that a putatively a priori item of knowledge is not 
known: that is, where one has evidence that indicates that there is a priori gas in 
the area, or that one is mad, or that the belief in question is generally derided by 
mathematical experts, or something to that effect. 
 The first point to note is that a case like this is importantly different to the 
case where a priori gas was merely present in one’s environment. Above I argued 
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that the presence of a priori gas would not undermine the belief’s epistemic 
warrant. However, evidence that there was a priori gas in one’s environment would 
indeed be warrant-defeating. I take it to be untenable to deny that anybody 
accepting at face value what seemed self-evident to them, in cases where they 
knew they were vulnerable to something like a priori gas, would not be warranted. 
But how does Seeming-Independence account for this?  
 The worry here is that the person blithely accepting what seems to her to be 
self-evident in cases where all the evidence suggests she is vulnerable to a priori gas 
is clearly in violation of an epistemic norm. It is undeniable that she ought not to 
ignore this evidence. But the evidence in question is empirical: it is thus ultimately 
seeming-dependent.  
So—arguably—the natural explanation for this is to suppose that self-
evident a priori beliefs are answerable to an epistemic norm that ultimately appeals 
to ‘seemings’ in its antecedent conditions. In addition to norm (10), perhaps there is 
a set of seeming-dependent norms at play with regard to these beliefs.  
 Yet Seeming-Independence is not committed to positing the existence of a 
further epistemic norm to explain why such cases are not warranted. Indeed, we 
would have excellent reasons to suppose that the person who accepts what strikes 
them as obvious in cases where she has reasons to suppose that she is vulnerable 
to a priori gas, is not following norm (10). As a result there is no need to posit a 
further, seeming-dependent norm to explain why such cases are not warranted.  
 Recall that in order for a believer to be following a norm, the belief has to be 
in some way explained by the norm itself. And for a belief to be explained by norm 
(10), I take it, it must be the case that the belief is held because it is self-evident. 
That the belief has, or appears to have, the property of self-evidence must be 
salient in the causal explanation of how the believer arrived at the belief in 
question. If this were not to be the case, then it would be difficult to make sense of 
how the person in question is genuinely following norm (10).  
 But if a person believes that p in the face of evidence that indicates that p 
might very easily not be self-evident after all, it does suggest that it is not the self-
evidence of the proposition in question that explains her believing it. If self-
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evidence was causally salient we would expect evidence that casts into doubt 
whether a proposition is self-evident to have some sort of effect on her believing it. 
That it does not, suggests the believer is not genuinely following norm (10) after all.  
 The point of this is that, on Seeming-Independence, there are two sets of 
considerations that need to be taken into account when assessing whether a belief 
is properly warranted. Set One pertains to whether the belief in question is 
consistent with the relevant epistemic norms. If we are considering whether some 
belief, p, is consistent with the norm ‘If x then believe that p’, what we would be 
concerned with here is whether x obtains. In other words, Set One contains just 
those considerations relevant to whether or not the antecedent conditions of the 
norm obtain. If so, then the belief that p is consistent with the norm ‘If x then 
believe that p’.  
 Set Two pertains to whether the believer has actually followed that norm in 
forming and maintaining the belief. Now I take it that the belief being consistent 
with a norm is necessary for a believer to have followed it. But mere consistency, as 
I have stressed, is not sufficient for rule-following. In determining whether a 
believer has followed some norm, we would also need to establish that the norm 
explains the belief in the right sort of way. That is to say, we would need to see 
whether it was because x obtained that the subject believes that p. Considerations 
relevant to this more complicated explanatory question are the considerations that 
I take to belong in Set Two.  
 Now the considerations that belong in these two sets play distinct 
epistemological roles. The sorts of considerations that belong in Set One play what 
we might call a warrant-generating role. The considerations that belong in Set Two 
play what we might call a warrant-transmitting role.  
 Let me explain this distinction by means of an example. Suppose we are 
considering whether I have followed norm (10) in believing that nothing can be 
both red and green all over at the same time. Now, what would make my belief 
warranted would just be the fact that the proposition is self-evident. It is this 
feature that makes it rational for me to believe that particular proposition. In other 
words, the epistemic warrant for that belief comes from its self-evidence.  
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 However, in order for the self-evidence of that proposition to justify my 
belief that it is true, there must be the right sort of connection between it being 
self-evident, and my believing it. If I didn’t think it was blatantly obvious that one 
object cannot be entirely one colour and entirely another at the same time, but 
rather held this belief on the basis of some deviant theory about the nature of 
redness and greenness in particular, then the fact that the proposition is self-
evident would not be able to justify my believing it.  
So in order for the proposition’s self-evidence to justify my believing it, 
there must be some sort of causal chain between its self-evidence and my belief. To 
speak metaphorically, the links in this causal chain would serve as warrant 
transmitters: they allow the epistemic warrant to pass from the self-evidence of the 
proposition, to my belief that the proposition is true.  
Now the point here is that Seeming-Independence, as I set it up in section 
one, is just the view that none of the epistemic norms that apply to an a priori 
belief have seemings in their antecedent conditions. So essentially, all this view is 
committed to is the claim that perceptual and intellectual seemings are not what 
makes the belief justified, in the way that perceptual seemings are part of what 
makes perceptual beliefs justified.  Seemings are not warrant-generators for a priori 
beliefs. However, the theory remains neutral on whether or not seemings might 
sometimes be warrant-transmitters.  
And it seems plausible to think that sometimes seemings— both intellectual 
and perceptual—might be warrant-transmitters. For instance, if it did not seem 
blatantly obvious to me that the proposition ‘nothing can be both red and green all 
over at the same time’ was true, it would be difficult to imagine how the self-
evidence of that proposition could explain my believing it. That a proposition strikes 
me as self-evident looks like it would be relevant to the question of whether it is 
the self-evidence of the proposition that explains my belief.  
An intellectual seeming, recall, is just a kind of intellectual attraction. If I 
don’t experience that attraction towards a proposition, if it does not strike me as 
blatantly obvious, then it is doubtful whether I have recognised that the proposition 
genuinely is self-evident. And that I have not recognised its self-evidence, casts 
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doubt on the hypothesis that the self-evidence of the proposition explains my 
belief.  
Let me illustrate this point by means of an analogy. Burge (1993) argues, 
against Chisholm, that the fact that memory is involved in any long mathematical or 
logical demonstration does not prevent the conclusion of the demonstration from 
counting as a priori. He says this: 
Chisholm’s conception of the role of memory in demonstrative 
reasoning seems to me to be off the mark. If memory supplied, as 
part of the demonstration, “contingent propositions about what we 
happen to remember”, the demonstration would not be purely 
logical or mathematical. But the normal role of memory in 
demonstrative reasoning is, I think, different. Memory does not 
supply for the demonstration propositions about memory, the 
reasoner, or past events. It supplies the propositions that serve as 
links in the demonstration itself. Or, rather, it preserves them, 
together with their judgemental force, and makes them available for 
use at later times. (Burge 1993, p. 462, my emphasis) 
 
Burge thinks that what actually justifies the conclusion of a long demonstrative 
argument is its premises alone. Memory is involved, but it serves merely to make it 
possible for those premises to justify the conclusion.  
 Seeming-Independence is open to the possibility that intellectual or even 
perceptual seemings play that sort of role in a priori belief-formation. Just as Burge 
thinks you need memory in order for the premises of a long demonstrative 
argument to be able to justify its conclusion, you might sometimes need an 
intellectual seeming in order for the self-evidence of a proposition to justify your 
belief in it. Seemings, like, memory, might sometimes play a warrant-transmitting 
role. All Seeming-Independence claims is that, for a priori beliefs, seemings do not 
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play the sort of role that Burge takes the premises of the demonstration to play in 
that example. 11 
 So the fact that Hawthorne’s so-called ‘Good experiences’ —all those 
experiences that are not experiences indicating that there is a priori gas around, or 
that you are mad, or that experts think your belief is laughable, etc.— do seem to 
be necessary for an a priori belief to be warranted does not undermine Seeming-
Independence. Good experiences can very plausibly be understood to be playing a 
warrant-transmitting role. That is, we might plausibly take the absence of Good 
experiences (or the presence of Bad experiences) to indicate that an a priori belief 
is not held because its antecedent conditions obtained. 
 
3.7 Conclusion  
Seeming-independence, then, has some important advantages. A cursory glance 
suggests that it divides the epistemological terrain such that there is a natural, 
epistemologically interesting difference between the a priori and the a posteriori, 
without raising the suspicion that beliefs with a priori warrant are entirely beyond 
creatures with our cognitive limitations and epistemic practices.  
 There remains, however, some work to be done in fleshing Seeming-
Independence out. A fundamental assumption on which Seeming-Independence 
depends is the assumption that we can understand the epistemic norm governing 
                                                        
11 And a very clear example of seemings playing the same role that memory plays in Burge’s example 
would be those familiar cases where you perform a long mathematical calculation by writing the 
steps down on paper. Intuitively, this is clearly a case of a priori reasoning: I take it that it would be 
disastrous if this everyday type of mathematical belief formation was deemed a posteriori. However, 
as Hawthorne points out (Hawthorne 2007, p. 7) the a priori status of such beliefs is tricky to explain, 
given that there does seem to be a sort of dependence on perceptual experiences involved in 
retrieving the information from the paper. Now I take it that in this case, the role that writing on and 
perceiving the paper plays is precisely the same as the role that memory plays in Burge’s example. 
We are, after all, only writing down the steps in the calculation as we go because we cannot easily 
remember all those steps. We are using the paper as a memory substitute. So, if Burge is right about 
the role that memory plays in long calculations, there is no reason that our perceptual experience of 
the paper we have written on could not play the precise same role. Plausibly, we write down those 
steps as a way to preserve them for later use: seeing what we wrote on that paper does not provide 
us with new information. It just allows us to continue to access what we already worked out. Our 
ability to write and read what we have written, arguably, merely allows the previous steps in our 
calculation to justify the conclusion, in just the way that memory sometimes does.  
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direct, ‘obvious’ a priori judgements to be governed by norm (10): ‘if p is self-
evident, then you may believe that p without considering any further evidence for 
it’. The plausibility of this suggestion depends, in turn, on the whether we can make 
sense of the notion of self-evidence that it appeals to. 
 In the remaining chapters I undertake to unpack and defend this notion.  
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4: Self-Evidence and Analyticity 
 
I have thus far provided some reasons to think that Seeming-Independence is a 
plausible and theoretically fruitful account of the a priori. Seeming-Independence 
has the advantage of using a purely epistemological criterion in dividing the a priori 
from the a posteriori: whether or not a belief is based on a non-factive seeming or 
not has clear epistemological implications. Seeming-Independence also has the 
advantage of not wedding itself to an implausible philosophy of mind. There is no 
need to posit a separate faculty of a priori intuition, nor to account for how 
intellectual seemings are as reliable as—if not more reliable than—perceptual 
seemings. Seeming-Independence is perfectly consistent with the thought that 
humans are limited and fallible reasoners. Seeming-Independence also is well 
equipped to cope with two common charges against the a priori: the charge that a 
priori warrant is a property that either no or very few beliefs possess, and the 
charge that the distinction is either incoherent or ad hoc.  
 However, in arguing for Seeming-Independence, I have appealed to a 
property that is problematic in its own right: the property of being self-evident. This 
account presupposes that self-evidence is indeed a property that some propositions 
have. And this presupposition, I take it, would be illegitimate without any 
explanation of what self-evidence is. Boghossian nicely sums up the challenge that 
is to be addressed: 
Here the problem is that no one seems to me to have shown how 
this notion is to be spelled out. In particular, no one has supplied a 
criterion for distinguishing those propositions that are self-evident 
from those that … merely seemed self-evident to many people for a 
very long time. (Boghossian 2001, p. 9) 
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This chapter will go some of the way towards meeting Boghossian’s challenge. I 
take there to be two types of self-evident beliefs.1 There are beliefs about analytic 
propositions, and there introspective beliefs: beliefs about our occurrent 
propositional attitudes and sensations. In this chapter I will concern myself only 
with analyticity, leaving discussions of self-knowledge for the next chapter.  
My aim here is not to offer a thorough defence of analyticity: such a task 
would take me too far off course. My intention is the more modest aim of offering 
some reasons to think that there is a plausible account of analyticity to be had.  
What I will suggest is that the account of normativity that I have put forward offers 
us a way of defending an epistemic conception of analyticity from what I take to be 
its most important challenge: the counter-examples Williamson offers in The 
Philosophy of Philosophy (2007). 
 
4.1 Metaphysical and epistemic analyticity 
Analyticity has been enjoying something of a resurgence. While it was once widely 
considered to have been decisively undermined by Quine (Quine, 1951), 
Boghossian, in a series of influential papers2, has introduced an understanding of 
analyticity that he thinks avoids Quine’s objections. The crucial move is that 
Boghossian distinguishes metaphysical analyticity from epistemic analyticity. The 
thought here is that the problems Quine pointed out only apply to analyticity 
understood as a metaphysical thesis. Reimagined as a purely epistemological thesis, 
analyticity is free from the problems that have traditionally plagued it.  
Now according to metaphysical analyticity, an analytic proposition like ‘all 
bachelors are unmarried men’ is made true by the meaning of the terms involved 
alone. This claim is difficult to reconcile with a plausible semantics. The issue here is 
this account seems to be committed to the implausible thesis that analytic 
propositions are made true by an entirely different class of considerations from the 
considerations that determine that a synthetic proposition is true. And it is difficult 
                                                        
1
 Though I am not in principle opposed to the idea that there may be more.  
2 See Boghossian 1996, 2001, 2003a, 2003c. 
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to see how this could be so. Specifically, it is difficult to see how something like the 
meaning of a proposition could by itself make a proposition true.  
The trouble here is that the meaning of a proposition seems to establish 
only what the proposition represents to be case. What makes a proposition true or 
false, however, are not facts about what it represents to be the case. Roughly, what 
makes a proposition true or false are the facts about whether what it represents to 
be the case, actually is the case. What makes propositions true are the facts about 
whether the states of affairs that the sentence represents as being the case, 
actually do obtain.  
According to metaphysical analyticity, however, the truth of analytic 
statements is fixed not by the facts of the matter but rather the facts about what 
the proposition means. And it is hard to see exactly how this could be the case, 
given that it differs so radically from the how truth is usually determined. 
Boghossian says: 
In general, I have no idea what would constitute a better answer to 
the question: What is responsible for generating the truth of a given 
class of statements? than something bland like 'the world' or 'the 
facts'; and … I cannot see how a good answer might be framed in 
terms of meaning, or convention, in particular. (Boghossian, 1996, p. 
36) 
 
The problem with metaphysical analyticity, then, is that it does not seem to cohere 
naturally with a general account of truth and meaning.  
Epistemic analyticity, however, is not a theory about what makes 
statements true and as such it avoids that problem. According to epistemic 
analyticity, for analytic statements, a person’s understanding of a proposition 
suffices for him being warranted in believing it. Holding a proposition to be 
epistemically analytic, then, does not entail holding there to be any kind of unusual 
connection between the meaning of that proposition and its truth. We may quite 
legitimately continue to assume that the proposition is made true in the usual way. 
119 
 
All it entails is that understanding a proposition itself generates warrant for 
believing it.  
 This does, however, require some careful articulation. How is it possible that 
understanding a proposition allows you to be justified in believing it? Is this 
genuinely a less implausible hypothesis than the hypothesis that facts about 
meaning can generate truth?  
 The standard response is to explain this by appealing to the fact that there 
are constitutive links between understanding a certain range of propositions and 
assenting to them. Anybody who understands the proposition ‘All bachelors are 
unmarried men’, the thought goes, considers it to be true, or would do so if the 
sentence is one they have not yet considered. And this connection between 
understanding and assent entails that anybody assenting to the sentence is 
warranted in doing so. Here is Boghossian’s rationale for this thought:  
Suppose it is true that my taking A to be a warrant for believing B is 
constitutive of my being able to have B-thoughts … in the first place. 
Then doesn’t it follow that I could not have been epistemically 
blameworthy in taking A to be a reason for believing B, even in the 
absence of any reason for taking A to be a reason for believing B? For 
how could I have had antecedent information to the effect that A is a 
good reason to believe B, if I could not so much have had a B-thought 
without taking A to be a reason for B in the first place? If inferring 
from A to B is required if I am to have the ingredient propositions, 
then it looks as though so inferring cannot be held against me, even 
if the inference is blind. (Boghossian, 2001 p. 240) 
 
Here Boghossian is defending the claim that if making certain inferences is 
constitutive of understanding ‘if… then…’ statements, then those inferences are 
warranted. But the reasoning here would apply equally well to the claim that if 
assenting to certain propositions was constitutive of understanding them, then one 
would be epistemically warranted in believing those propositions.  
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 And while I have misgivings about Boghossian’s appeal to epistemic 
blamelessness, I take the point to largely correct. If believing that all bachelors were 
unmarried men really is constitutive of my understanding the proposition, it is 
difficult to see how we could rationally expect a person to have in place antecedent 
reasons to think that all bachelors are unmarried men before arriving at that belief. 
This would require a person to have gathered evidence about the gender and 
marital status of bachelors before coming to understand what a bachelor was. That 
expectation is altogether unreasonable. For how could you expect people who do 
not understand what a bachelor is to gather evidence about bachelors? There is no 
way to even explain to them what this task involves, without first providing them 
with some detailed information about what a bachelor is. And that cannot be done 
without first explaining what ‘bachelor’ means.   
So the task would have failed before it could begin.  By hypothesis, 
understanding what a bachelor is constitutively entails assenting to ‘all bachelors 
are unmarried men’. In virtue of coming to understand what she is supposed to be 
gathering evidence about, the subject would have failed to have gathered evidence 
for believing the proposition, before actually coming to believe it.  
And as a result, we may reasonably conclude that it is not the case that a 
subject ought to have prior reasons to believe the proposition before coming to 
believe it. Assuming this understanding-assent link does obtain, the believer cannot 
be subject to any normative demand that would require her to obtain evidence for 
the proposition ‘all bachelors are unmarried men’.  Her belief, then, is warranted 
independently of any empirical evidence or background information: ex hypothesi, 
it is Seeming-Independent.  
 So establishing that there are understanding-assent links of this kind would 
suffice to establish that the proposition in question is self-evident. A self-evident 
proposition is just a proposition that is what we might call groundlessly warranted: 
it needs no further evidence, rationalising explanation, background beliefs or 
experiences of any sort to be warranted.  A self-evident proposition, fundamentally, 
is a proposition that in some sense generates its own epistemic warrant.  
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So if understanding-assent links do obtain for some range of propositions, 
then it follows from this that the propositions will be self-evident.  So if we can 
establish that there are understanding-assent links, we will have demonstrated one 
possible way that a proposition can be self-evident. 
 
4.2 Williamson on understanding-assent links 
The supposition that there are understanding assent-links is a highly plausible one. 
Consider Grice and Strawson’s contrasting examples of, on the one hand, a person 
(X) saying ‘My neighbour’s three-year-old child understands Russell’s Theory of 
Types’ and, on the other, another person (Y) saying ‘My neighbour’s three-year-old 
child is an adult’. Consider how we would respond to X and Y once we were 
satisfied that neither of them was lying, or joking, or speaking metaphorically. We 
can safely assume that the natural reaction would be to take X to be wrong in 
thinking a three-year-old really could understand Russell’s Theory of Types. Three-
year olds do not yet have anything like the intelligence required to understand 
complicated philosophical theories. 
But that is importantly different to how we would typically respond to Y. On 
the contrary:  
[W]e shall be inclined to say that we just don't understand what Y is 
saying, and to suspect that he just does not know the meaning of 
some of the words he is using. For unless he is prepared to admit 
that he is using words in a figurative or unusual sense, we shall say, 
not that we don't believe him, but that his words have no sense. And 
whatever kind of creature is ultimately produced for our inspection, 
it will not lead us to say that what Y said was literally true, but at 
most to say that we now see what he meant.  (Grice and Strawson, 
1956, p. 151) 
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In the first case, the natural assumption is that the speaker is gullible or naive. But 
in the second case, the assumption is not only that the speaker is gullible or naive, 
but also that he is semantically incompetent: that he simply does not properly 
understand what an adult is. A natural presumption, then, is that there is a link 
between his belief that a three-year-old child could be an adult, and his failing to 
understand what an adult really is.  
 Despite the intuitive force behind this idea, Williamson has recently argued 
that there is no necessary connection between understanding and assent. 
Williamson argues that Grice and Strawson fail to recognise that a person with 
some very unusual combination background beliefs may assent or fail to assent to 
just about anything. In such a case, the source of the difficulty will lie in the believer 
having adopted set of irrational beliefs, not in his inability to understand the 
proposition in question. Consider the following: 
Someone may believe that normal human beings attain physical and 
psychological maturity at the age of three, explaining away all the 
evidence to the contrary by ad hoc hypotheses or conspiracy 
theories … However foolish these beliefs, they do not constitute 
linguistic incompetence. (Williamson, 2007, p. 85) 
 
So the thought here is that it is not necessarily true that anybody who assents to 
‘My neighbour’s three-year-old child is an adult’ fails to understand what an adult is 
(or what a three-year old is). It is quite easy to imagine someone who knows full 
well what an adult is, but comes to believe that three-year-olds generally mature at 
a much faster rate than is commonly presumed. He thinks it takes children three 
years to achieve the sort maturity that the rest of us think it takes eighteen years to 
reach. While it is hard to imagine how anyone might rationally believe such a story, 
nothing prevents people from irrationally believing it. But the irrationality of this 
belief is just an epistemological irrationality. The problem is that he is not 
complying with epistemic norms, rather than simply failing to understand what an 
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adult is. The understanding-assent links, Williamson argues, are illusory in this 
instance.  
Yet, as Williamson acknowledges, this example is not the clearest example 
of an analytic truth. So this point might establish only that this particular case is not 
a case where understanding-assent links obtain, rather than the stronger point that 
there are no understanding-assent links whatsoever.   
However, Williamson argues that we can employ this strategy even for 
paradigmatically analytic sentences like ‘every vixen is a female fox’.  
 Consider a person with the following strange combination of beliefs. 
Suppose that Peter has, as a result of a complex argument he devised, come to 
think that ‘every x is a y’ entails that ‘there is at least one x’. Suppose further that 
Peter has also come to believe that all foxes became extinct some years ago. He 
thinks that all recent fox sightings are the result of some sort of elaborate 
government cover-up.  
Now, given this combination of beliefs, Peter would be disinclined to assent 
to ‘every vixen is a female fox’. But, Williamson stresses, Peter does not fail to 
understand this proposition. While there is a strong intuitive impression that there 
is something irrational about Peter’s denial of the proposition in question, the best 
explanation of this irrationality is that it is an epistemic irrationality. There is 
nothing wrong with his linguistic or conceptual abilities: the problem comes from 
his irrational beliefs about foxes and his non-standard logical beliefs. And these 
problems do not affect his understanding.  
 I take it that if we were to insist that Peter fails to understand the 
proposition ‘every vixen is a female fox’ the most likely source of the problem 
would be his understanding of the term ‘every’.  
Nothing about this example suggests that Peter does not understand what a 
fox or a vixen is. Nothing gives us any reason to suppose he has trouble 
understanding ‘female’, ‘is’, or ‘a’. However Peter does have non-standard beliefs 
about the truth conditions of ‘every’. If there is to be a problem with his 
understanding of any of the constituent concepts of ‘every vixen is a female fox’ it 
must surely lie with his understanding of ‘every’.  
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Williamson offers the following considerations in favour of the thought that 
Peter does not misunderstand ‘every’. First, in practice Peter uses the term ‘every’ 
in contexts that are very much like the contexts in which everybody else uses them. 
His deviation from the norm appears only in unusual cases like this one.  
Second, Peter is capable of offering a careful and articulate defence of his 
view on the logical implications of ‘every’ when challenged to do so. We can 
coherently imagine his papers on this topic to be very well-written and cleverly 
argued.  
Third, Peter takes his theory to apply to the common English sense of 
‘every’, not to some idiosyncratic usage. Given all of this, Williamson argues that 
the only plausibly conclusion is to take it that Peter means the same thing by ‘every’ 
as the rest of us do. He is not semantically incompetent. 
As I reckon it, if Williamson has successfully shown that there are no links 
between understanding ‘every vixen is a female fox’ and assenting to it, he will have 
successfully scuppered the analytic conception of analyticity. Unlike Grice and 
Strawson’s example of a three-year-old adult, this is a paradigmatic example of an 
analytic truth. If this were to turn out to not be an analytic proposition according to 
epistemic analyticity’s criteria, then so much the worse for this conception of 
analyticity.  
So it is crucial that the defender of an epistemic conception of analyticity 
has some response to this kind of example.  What might such responses look like?  
I take there to be two possible avenues of response. One option would be to 
argue that Peter is not fully competent, semantically speaking: that is, that he does 
not fully understand the sentence ‘every vixen is a female fox’.  
Or alternatively we could argue that there is an understanding-assent link of 
some sort at play in this example: that Peter does have some sort of disposition to 
assent to the sentence, but he is prevented from acting on it in this case. 
Both responses face serious challenges. Arguing that Peter is semantically 
incompetent, as Williamson claims, initially appears to set the bar for semantic 
competence implausibly high. Suppose Peter is an eminent scholar whose work on 
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logic in widely admired. There is nothing implausible about suggesting he might be: 
there are many examples of brilliant academics having decidedly odd background 
beliefs, and of excellent logicians endorsing unconventional theories.  
Now Williamson suggests that it is implausible to think that someone like 
that might misunderstand ‘every’. If even an eminent scholar who publishes 
excellent papers on the implications of ‘every’ misunderstands the word, then what 
hope do laymen have? The implication of that suggestion seems to be that not only 
are you required to think carefully about what ‘every’ entails in order to be fully 
competent in using it, but you are required to think even more carefully about it 
than Peter, a renowned logician, does. That is altogether implausible. Only 
supernaturally intelligent people would qualify as being fully semantically 
competent. Virtually everyone would count as only partially epistemically 
competent. And this makes analyticity uninteresting. For: 
Understanding-assent links that do not apply to most humans would 
be of limited epistemological interest. The picture was that those 
who appear to reject analytic sentences can be excluded from the 
discussion because they lack the linguistic competence to engage in 
it; but we cannot exclude humans who reject such sentences on 
those grounds if the connection between rejecting them and lacking 
competence holds only for super-humans, not for humans. 
(Williamson 2007, p. 92) 
 
But on the other hand, taking Peter to have some sort of disposition to assent to 
‘every vixen is a female fox’ also seems prima facie implausible. On this picture, 
Peter is fully semantically competent, but his competence is somehow blocked: 
something prevents his disposition to assent to the sentence from being realised in 
how he goes about forming beliefs. As Asa Wikforss points out: 
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*T+o fall back on the notion of ‘blocked competence’ seems perfectly 
ad hoc, since there is no evidence that speaker has the relevant 
disposition in the first place. (Wikforss, 2010, p. 8)3 
 
In the remainder of this chapter I will argue that the account of epistemic norms 
developed in chapters one and two allows us to generate a non-ad hoc account of 
how Peter may indeed be understood to have a ‘blocked competence’ in cases like 
this. This, I shall argue, provides us with a recipe for resisting Williamson-like 
counter-examples to the claim that there are understanding-assent links.  
 
4.3 Cognitive and non-cognitive accounts of understanding 
Now I take it that the central idea behind the hypothesis that there are 
understanding-assent links is that our semantic competency, our ability to 
understand specific propositions, is in some special cases all that is required to 
generate assent. So let us begin by considering how we might conceive of our 
ability to understand propositions.  
One way of categorising the various available positions in this regard would 
be to divide the field up into two broad categories: cognitive and non-cognitive 
accounts of understanding.  
Cognitivists about understanding take the possession of semantic 
competence to involve the possession a range of beliefs about meaning, whereas 
non-cognitivists about understanding will see it merely as a kind of know-how: an 
ability that need not involve beliefs about meaning at all.  
                                                        
3 Wifforss does argue against Williamson that there are understanding-assent links. However, her 
own view would be of no use to anyone hoping to base an account of analyticity on understanding-
assent links, which is why I do not include it as a third option. Wikforss thinks that there are 
understanding-assent links that apply holistically: not to individual sentences but to entire sets of 
beliefs. Her position is summed up as follows:  
 
[T]here is after all a constitutive connection with belief, only a holistic one; it suggests that 
although we cannot single out single sentences as a litmus test for understanding, unless a 
plausible background story emerges such that the ‘unorthodoxy is compensated for by 
orthodoxies at other points’, *Williamson’s example+ does entail failure of understanding 
(Wikforss, 2010, p. 12) 
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Now I take it that Williamson’s insistence that Peter is fully semantically 
competent is far more plausible on a non-cognitivist understanding of semantic 
competence. There are some obvious dialectical options available to a cognitivist 
that would allow her to argue that anybody in a situation like Peter’s would clearly 
fail to properly understand ‘every vixen is a female fox’.  
Let me explain. If semantic competence really is a matter of possessing a set 
of beliefs about meaning, then there are grounds available to argue that anybody 
who has certain wrong beliefs about what words mean would simply not 
understand a sentence that involves those words. And this, I take it, would indicate 
that she cannot understand the proposition that sentence expresses.  
But Peter, by hypothesis, has the wrong beliefs about what ‘every’ means. 
As such, there are grounds available from which to argue that he does not, on this 
view, understand the proposition ‘every vixen is a female fox’. The example is 
explicitly set up as an example in which the subject has false beliefs about the 
logical implications of ‘every’: he thinks, incorrectly, that it carries logical 
implications that it does not carry. These sorts of logical beliefs have a clear knock-
on effect with regard to semantic beliefs: anybody who takes terms to have logical 
implications that they do not have, and is consistent, will also develop false beliefs 
about how to correctly use sentences involving the term ‘every’. This is precisely 
what seems to have happened in Peter’s case: given his beliefs about the 
implications of ‘every’ he has altered his use of the term. And for a cognitivist about 
semantic competence, this change in use is to be explained by a change in belief 
about what the word means.   
Now I take it that a cognitivist need not—and probably should not—insist 
that in order to understand a sentence, we must have entirely correct beliefs about 
what all of the words in that sentence mean. The cognitivist might insist that in at 
least some cases, having mostly right beliefs about what the words in a sentence 
mean suffices for understanding the sentence.  
Suppose that someone believed that ‘river’ and ‘stream’ meant exactly the 
same thing. Let us assume this is because she has false beliefs about what ‘river’ 
means. I take it that a cognitivist would want to insist that that even though such a 
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person has a few wrong beliefs about what a river is, she can still fully understand 
sentences like ‘the river is running very high today’.   
But I assume that there will still be some grounds available to her to insist 
that some semantic beliefs are more important than others. That is, she might 
argue that Peter’s mistakenly believing that ‘every x is a y’ entails ‘there is at least 
one x’ is too important a mistake for Peter to be properly said to be fully competent 
with regard to sentences like ‘every vixen is a female fox’.  
So the cognitivist has available the resources to resist Williamson’s 
conclusion.  
But could we plausibly resist Williamson in this way? Given that there is such 
powerful intuitive support for the thought that Peter really is semantically 
competent, we might be tempted to take Williamson’s example to be a counter-
example not only to the thesis that there are understanding-assent links, but also to 
the version of cognitivism about semantic competence sketched here.  
However, the case for that is not as strong as it initially appears. In chapter 
one I argued that, given the non-transparency of epistemic norms, it is possible to 
blamelessly fail to comply with an epistemic norm. I suggested that one way in 
which this might occur would be if the person mistook a mere doxastic rule for an 
epistemic norm.  
Now in chapter two I argued that those who have acquired false 
epistemological beliefs will be susceptible to this sort of error. The example I used 
there was someone who endorsed a version of coherentism according to which the 
following argument is perfectly cogent: 
(P1*)  I clearly and distinctly perceive that a benevolent God exists 
(P2*)  What I clearly and distinctly perceive is true 
(C*)  It is true that a benevolent God exists 
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Now Davies and Wright have argued—rightly in my view—that inferring (C*) on the 
basis of (P1*) and (P2*) would not be an acceptable inference: that type of 
reasoning is in violation of an epistemic norm. If they indeed are right about this, 
then it remains true even if the person in question defends an epistemological 
theory according which such beliefs really are warranted.  
 I bring this up because a cognitivist about semantic competence would be 
well within her rights to attempt a similar approach with regard to Peter. That is to 
say, she could understand possessing semantic competence to be a matter of 
having the correct beliefs. False semantic beliefs, irrespective of the amount of 
intellectual effort and epistemic care that has gone into them, could be treated the 
same way that I treat following inferential rules that are not reliably truth 
conducive. On my view, if the inferential rule one follows is not a genuine epistemic 
norm, then beliefs acquired via that pattern of inference are not warranted. This is 
true even if one has some sort of argument in favour of that unreliable inferential 
rule.  
So we might take the considerations relating to the intellectual effort and 
epistemic care Peter has taken with regard to his semantic beliefs similarly to be 
considerations that relate primarily to whether or not he can be blamed for his 
semantic incompetence in this regard. They do not, it might be pressed, provided 
decisive reasons to deny his semantic incompetence.  
Essentially this response would be centred around the denial of 
Williamson’s accusation that claiming Peter to be semantically incompetent 
commits us to the view that that a speaker would need to be superhumanly 
intelligent in order to be semantically competent.   
The point is that there is no need for a defender of this view of semantic 
competence to hold that Peter has been led into semantic incompetency by not 
being sufficiently careful about his semantic beliefs. If that was the case then 
Williamson would indeed be correct in thinking that this account of semantic 
competency is implausibly strict, given that Peter is far more careful than most.  
 But there is another option available: a cognitivist about semantic 
competence could simply hold that Peter has taken more than enough care in how 
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he formed his semantic beliefs: nevertheless, he remains semantically incompetent 
with regards to sentences like this one. Just as it is possible to fail to comply with an 
epistemic norm despite being very careful about one’s beliefs, one might argue that 
it is possible to fail to be semantically competent despite being very careful about 
one’s semantic beliefs. 
 
4.4 Blocked competencies and epistemically ideal conditions 
Let us turn to how a non-cognitivist about understanding would respond to 
Williamson.  
In my view, non-cognitivism is the more plausible of the two accounts of 
semantic competence. So as far as I am concerned, if Williamson has succeeded 
only in demonstrating that there are no links between understanding and assent on 
a non-cognitivist account of understanding, that would suffice to establish that 
there is no good reason to think that there are understanding-assent links of any 
form. Let us consider, then, whether he has succeeded in demonstrating this.  
According to non-cognitivism about semantic competence, beliefs about the 
truth conditions of any given proposition are not necessary for understanding it. 
Understanding a proposition, on this view, consists in how one uses the 
proposition, not in what one’s beliefs about it are. Being semantically competent is 
not a matter of having a set of beliefs of any sort; rather it is a matter of possessing 
an ability or a skill. One understands a given word or concept if one tends to use it 
in roughly the right way.  
Understanding the word ‘river’, for example, consists only in generally 
employing the term correctly.  So not having a clear idea of the differences 
between a river and a stream does not indicate that one does not understand what 
a river is. Being confused over where exactly the difference lies does not preclude 
generally using the term ‘river’ in the right way: insofar as she uses the term in the 
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right way4 most of the time, we may legitimately conclude that she understands the 
term.  
 Now As Williamson points out, Peter does use ‘every’ in roughly the same 
way everyone else does. For the non-cognitivist, this is a very strong indication that 
he really does understand ‘every vixen is a female fox’. 
 So a non-cognitivist, unlike a cognitivist, would not be able to 
straightforwardly deny that Peter understands the proposition in question. 
However, I will argue that the non-cognitivist has available other means to resist 
Williamson’s conclusion.  
Let us begin by considering what a plausible version of the sort of 
understanding-assent links necessary to underwrite epistemic analyticity would 
have to look like on a non-cognitivist account.  
Let us begin by considering the notion of assent. To assent to a proposition 
is a sort of performance: it is to express approval of, or agreement with, that 
proposition. That expression might take various forms: it could take the form of 
asserting the proposition or, more commonly, it might take the form of simply 
judging it to be true.  
And to judge a proposition to be true is to consider the proposition and 
occurrently believe that it is true. Judging is the act of forming or reaffirming a 
belief. So while there might be close constitutive connections between assent and 
belief, assent differs from belief in being a performance, not a disposition.  
Now according to non-cognitivism, being semantically competent is a matter 
of possessing an ability or skill: it is a kind of know-how. But, crucially, like standard 
dispositions, abilities persist even when we are not acting on them, and even 
sometimes when we are prevented from acting on them.  
                                                        
4
 What factors determine what the right way to use the term ‘river’ is, will I take it, vary according to 
our theory of meaning. It is important to see that non-cognitivism here is not an account of meaning: 
it does not entail that our use determines the correctness conditions of the words we use. Nothing 
prevents a non-cognitivist from assuming, with the orthodoxy, that a term’s correctness conditions 
are fixed in part by environmental features and facts about one’s linguistic community. The point is 
only that to understand the word our use of it must be approximately correct.  
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For example, a person with her writing-hand in a cast will not be able to 
write for a period of time. This does not entail that she has lost her ability to write. 
That would be a wholly unacceptable understanding of how skills or abilities work.  
Rather, let us say that she knows perfectly well how to write, but that her 
present circumstances prevent her from acting on this know-how.  
And many types of circumstances might prevent us from being able to do 
what we know how to do. She would be prevented from writing if she was stranded 
on a desert island, far away from pen and paper. Once again, those circumstances 
conspire to prevent her from writing without affecting her ability.  
So if understanding is a matter of possessing an ability, then we should 
expect that this will be true for understanding as well. So, a non-cognitivist must 
allow that even if we do understand some proposition, we may sometimes be 
prevented from articulating or expressing this understanding.  
And this has implications for how a non-cognitivist ought to interpret the 
proposal that understanding propositions like ‘every vixen is a female fox’ is 
connected in some immediate way to assenting to them. The proposal would be 
that assenting to ‘every vixen is a female fox’ just is an expression of my ability to 
understand it. But if understanding is an ability, then it follows that it is logically 
possible for us to be prevented from expressing or instantiating it. Circumstances 
can sometimes prevent us from assenting to propositions without undercutting our 
understanding.   
The point here is that on any plausible non-cognitivist version of epistemic 
analyticity, what connects understanding analytic propositions to assenting to 
them, must be an underlying disposition: when p is analytic, to understand that p 
entails being disposed to assent to it when in circumstances that do not prevent us 
from expressing our semantic competence.  
The clearest examples of such a circumstance would be cases where the 
subject is temporarily cognitively impaired. Consider Hawthorne’s a priori gas 
example. 
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As I read the example, a priori gas affects our ability to assent to analytic 
propositions in the same way that alcohol affects our ability to drive. The fact that a 
person would drive poorly while under the influence of alcohol does not entail that 
she loses her ability to drive well every time she drinks. She still knows how to 
drive: her intoxication has simply placed her is in a non-ideal condition for driving. 
Alcohol has rendered her unable to exercise her competency, without actually 
undercutting it.  
In exactly this way, falling victim to a priori gas would not entail that a 
person does not understand what ‘every vixen is a female fox’ means, even though 
she would not assent to it. The a priori gas simply renders her unable to bring her 
semantic competency into play when forming a priori beliefs. In cases like this it 
should be no surprise that understanding-assent links break down: this is not, I take 
it, a counter-example to any plausible version of the claim that there are links 
between understanding propositions and assenting to them.  
So on a plausible version of the thesis that there are understanding-assent 
links of the sort Boghossian proposes, the connection between understanding and 
assent is only present in what we might call epistemically ideal conditions: those 
circumstances where our coming to assent to certain propositions is unaffected by 
extraneous factors that in some way have prevented us from bringing our semantic 
competency to bear on our beliefs.  
The thought, then, is that if proposition p is analytic, then, anybody who 
understands it will assent to it when in epistemically ideal circumstances. And we 
have good reason, I will argue, to think that the conditions that Peter is in are not 
epistemically ideal. Claiming that cases like this are cases where the subject has a 
blocked semantic competency, then, is not ad hoc.  
My argument has two stages. First, following Wikforss, I argue that 
understanding-assent links can only plausibly be understood to break down in those 
cases where the subject has some non-conventional background beliefs.  
Second, I argue that the role these background beliefs play can be plausibly 
understood as rendering one’s situation epistemically non-ideal. As a result, these 
need not be understood as counter-examples to the thesis that if someone 
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understands the proposition ‘every vixen is a female fox’ then she will assent to it if 
in epistemically ideal circumstances. So there remains an avenue by which 
epistemic analyticity can escape Williamson’s objections, even on this conception of 
semantic competence.  
Williamson takes examples like the example of Peter to serve as particularly 
good illustrations that it is possible for understanding and assent to come apart for 
paradigmatically analytic propositions. They are not, he thinks, the only ways in 
which this is possible. A community of non-logicians reasoning just like Peter might 
be another example of people for whom understanding-assent links break down. 
Once we have accepted that deviant logicians fully understand the words the 
propositions they resist assenting to, ‘we can hardly refuse that same classification 
to other speakers merely on the grounds of their unacquaintance with formal 
semantics’ (Williamson, 2007, p. 99).   
But this is not convincing. Wikforss puts the problem with this suggestion as 
follows: 
Imagine a speaker who walks around questioning sentences like 
‘Every vixen is a female fox’, and related inferences, without 
providing any reasons whatsoever for her deviance … Is there any 
inclination at all to say that such a speaker is semantically competent? 
I should think not, and the reason is precisely that there is not a set 
of background beliefs that allows us to make sense of the deviance. 
(Wikforss, 2010, p. 13) 
 
I take it that Wikforss is entirely correct on this point. Williamson must surely allow 
that there are speakers who are semantically incompetent: who do not properly 
understand some of the sentences they assent to. And the sort of speaker Wikforss 
describes is as clear an example of such speakers as any. If people like these do not 
count as failing to understand the proposition ‘every vixen is female fox’ it is 
difficult to see how anybody could fail to. It is one thing to conclude that Peter fully 
understands the proposition in question without assenting to it. But it is quite 
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another to conclude that speakers without Peter’s background beliefs who resist 
assenting to the proposition, still understand it.  
 Now Wikforss takes this point to establish only that there are very general 
‘holistic’ understanding-assent links that apply to a set of beliefs as a whole.  
But another option is to understand these background beliefs as rendering 
the subject’s situation epistemically non-ideal, and hence that these are not the 
sorts of cases where we should expect there to be any connections between 
understanding and assent.   
 In motivating this thought, I appeal to the account of epistemic rationality 
developed in the first three chapters. Now I have argued that the presence of 
certain types of false background beliefs can lead to one performing irrational 
inferences: inferences that are in violation of the relevant epistemic norms. We 
have excellent reasons to suppose that our epistemological beliefs affect how we 
actually reason.  Coming to believe that Gambler’s Fallacy is a fallacy is in most 
cases sufficient to change our probabilistic reasoning: to shift from following one 
doxastic rule to another doxastic rule. And it is perfectly possible to develop the 
wrong beliefs about how one ought to be reasoning.  
Consider Clifford’s famous declaration: ‘it is wrong always, everywhere, and 
for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence’ (Clifford 1877, p. 76). 
Now this dictum has clear implications for what we ought to believe and what we 
ought not to. For one thing, if this is true, then it entails that we ought not to adopt 
any beliefs through something like religious faith. This is in effect a very stringent 
interpretation of what epistemic norms demand from us.  
And it is not an interpretation that is universally shared. For disagreement 
we need look no further than William James’ famous response to Clifford in The 
Will to Believe (1896). There James argues that there are indeed occasions where 
one is entitled to hold a belief based purely on faith.  
Suppose for the sake of argument that James is wrong about this: that 
Clifford was right in thinking that it is ‘wrong’ to believe propositions based on faith 
alone.  It follows from this that James has false beliefs about how we ought to go 
about forming and maintaining our beliefs.  
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 It is perfectly possible, then, that James might resultantly adopt incorrect 
doxastic rules. All that we need suppose in order to imagine such a possibility is that 
James’ epistemological beliefs affect how he reasons in roughly the way that our 
beliefs about probabilities lead to us abandoning the representativeness heuristic 
when calculating the probabilities of the next coin toss landing ‘heads’ or ‘tails’. The 
difference is that we are supposing that James is coming to reason in ways he ought 
not to. His philosophical arguments have actually resulted in him believing 
irrationally. Given the doxastic rule we are supposing he adopts is ex hypothesi 
incorrect, beliefs based on that rule are not beliefs arrived at by following an 
epistemic norm. They are unwarranted, and hence irrational.  
 Now—depending on how plausible we take James’ argument for his 
epistemological view to be—I take it that we may legitimately understand James’ 
coming to reason incorrectly to be something that we cannot hold him responsible 
for; that is, we might consider him epistemically blameless for the irrational beliefs 
arrived at by following his own doxastic rule.   
If that is the case, then in effect we are taking James to be epistemically 
unlucky in a distinctive sense. He is unfortunate in that his best efforts to be an 
epistemically responsible agent have back-fired. His philosophical theorising has 
resulted in him adopting irrational belief-forming methods: it has led him down a 
blind alley. 
 Now it is important to see that the fact that he is unfortunate in this sense 
only indicates that he is blameless for his beliefs, and not that those beliefs are 
genuinely rational.  
With that in mind, let us compare the situation James is in with Hawthorne’s 
a priori gas thought experiment. What I want to point out here is that holding false 
epistemological beliefs of this sort is in some respects very much like having fallen 
victim to a priori gas.  
One way to understand such cases is to understand them as situations 
where the subject has, through misfortune, been placed in a position where a 
specific range of his beliefs will be irrational.  Once we accept that our false 
epistemological views may lead us to reason irrationally, there is no significant 
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epistemological difference between cases where one has fallen victim to a 
something like an a priori gas, and cases where one has adopted incorrect 
reasoning methods as a result of false epistemological beliefs. In both cases, there 
are hindrances interfering with the subject’s ability to reason correctly.  
But if that is the case, then it seems that nothing prevents us from viewing 
Peter’s background beliefs as rendering his situation as epistemically non-ideal. 
Here we have a case of a person’s false theoretical background beliefs being 
directly responsible for his denying a true proposition. Once we allow that having 
false theoretical beliefs, no matter how well reasoned, can actually have 
devastating, large-scale effects on the epistemic standing of one’s beliefs, then we 
must conclude that false background beliefs of this sort are epistemologically 
relevant in largely the same way that a priori gas is epistemologically relevant.  
Given, first, that false logical beliefs are required to provide a decisive break 
between understanding and assent in this case, and, second, that false logical 
beliefs affect the epistemic rationality of a believer, there is room to maintain that 
these examples are not decisive.  
We already know that understanding-assent links only plausibly apply to 
those in the right sort of epistemic context: when we are thinking clearly or when 
we are not under the influence of anything that might impair our ability to follow 
epistemic norms, for instance.  
My suggestion is that the examples Williamson has provided can plausibly 
be understood as being just like these cases. Just as a priori gas, or extreme 
tiredness, or alcohol, may block the connection between our general ability to 
understand a sentence and our assenting to it, so too may the sorts of background 
beliefs Peter has.  
The root of the problem is to be found in Williamson’s reflection on whether 
Peter and Stephen (a similarly deviant logician who also does not assent to ‘every 
vixen is a female fox’) would have assented to it had they lacked those background 
beliefs. Rhetorically, he asks: 
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Would Peter and Stephen assent to *‘every vixen is a female fox’+ if 
they lacked their conscious theoretical commitments? Perhaps not, 
but that counterfactual would show little. (Williamson, 2007, p. 102) 
 
My suggestion is that Williamson underestimates the importance of that 
counterfactual. Theoretical commitments of this sort lead to systematically 
incorrect reasoning, just as falling victim to a priori gas leads to systematically 
incorrect reasoning. Neither are situations in which we should expect the link 
between understand and assent to be preserved.  
 The point is simply that the question of whether a person has the sorts of 
theoretical commitments that Peter has, is epistemologically relevant. It affects the 
subject’s epistemic standing. As a result, we have some basis from which to claim 
that Peter may be understood to be in epistemically non-ideal conditions: 
conditions in which his general semantic competency is blocked. The account of 
epistemic normativity generated in the previous chapters strongly suggests that 
being in epistemically ideal conditions is not just a matter of being cool, calm and 
collected. It is also a matter of having avoided any deviant theoretical 
commitments.  
 
4.5 Analyticity and semantic intuitions 
Now there are naturally a number of possible ways in which one might respond to 
Williamson’s counter-examples. What I want to point out in this section is that the 
response I have sketched here has some welcome theoretical consequences. 
 Foremost of these is that if the argument presented above is right, then it is 
possible that we could legitimately extend analyticity to apply not only to what 
seem to be very trivial, uninteresting truths like ‘every vixen is a female fox’ and ‘all 
bachelors are unmarried’, but also to more substantive, theoretically interesting 
philosophical conclusions. 
 I tentatively offer the following as a possible example of a theoretically 
interesting conclusion that can be construed as epistemically analytic: ‘If Smith is 
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justified in believing that Jones has ten coins in his pocket, and Smith is justified in 
believing that Jones will get the job they have both been interviewed for, and Smith 
infers from these beliefs that the person who will get the job has ten coins in his 
pocket, then, if it turns out that in fact Smith gets the job, and that Smith 
unknowingly also has ten coins in his pocket, Smith does not know that the person 
who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket even though he is justified in 
believing it, and it is true’ (henceforth, the Gettier Claim).   
 Before offering some reasons for thinking that we can legitimately include 
claims like that as epistemically analytic, let me first offer some reasons for thinking 
that being able to do so is a welcome consequence.  
 Most philosophers, I assume, take themselves to know a priori that in that 
scenario, Smith does not know that the person who will get the job has ten coins in 
his pocket. That we can have a priori knowledge of that sort is a central epistemic 
intuition: that intuition underpins the widely held view that philosophy is an a priori 
discipline.  
Now I take it to be an explanatory advantage to be able to appeal to analyticity 
in explaining how we have such knowledge. Not only does this mean that we do not 
need to provide separate explanations in order to explain how we know that all 
bachelors are unmarried and how we know that Smith does not have knowledge, 
but there is also strong intuitive support for the idea that those propositions that 
are knowable via conceptual analysis are analytic.  
So it would be a welcome consequence of epistemic analyticity if it could 
provide an account of analyticity that could apply to more than trivial, uninteresting 
statements.  
And it is not immediately obvious that it can do so. If the Gettier Claim is 
analytic, then there are a great deal real life cases like the imaginary case of Peter. 
If the Weinberg, Stich and Nichols study mentioned in chapter two is anything to go 
by, then there are a vast number people who simply do not have the intuition that 
Smith lacks knowledge. And so they would not assent to the Gettier Claim.  
Moreover, Brian Weatherson, to name one example, would be a real life 
equivalent of Williamson’s Peter. Weatherson, like Peter, does not assent to the 
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supposedly analytic proposition in question, and backs up his denial with plausible-
looking philosophical arguments.  
The point here is that given that there are a number of real life philosophers 
who deny Gettier’s intuition, and that there are apparently a large number of 
laymen who lack the intuition altogether, it is not immediately obvious that there 
are understanding assent-links at play with regard to this particular type of 
proposition.  
This strongly indicates that the conclusion that propositions known through 
conceptual analysis are analytic does not fit naturally with epistemic analyticity. 
Epistemic analyticity only holds for those propositions for which there are 
understanding-assent links: since there do not seem to be such links in these cases, 
there is a significant prima facie problem here.  
However the response I offer to Williamson would apply equally effectively 
in this case. Rather than insisting—implausibly, in my view—that none of these 
laymen or deviant philosophers understand what ‘knowledge’ means, we might 
simply say that, like Peter, they are in epistemically non-ideal conditions.  
I take it that I do not need to defend the idea that the considerations I 
brought to bear in favour of thinking Peter is in epistemically non-ideal conditions 
apply also to Weatherson. However, the idea that they might apply also to non-
philosophers who lack Gettier’s intuition requires some explication.   
In chapter two I suggested that a plausible way to explain how people can 
come to have divergent philosophical intuitions, and also how people can change 
their intuitions over time, is to take intuitions to be open to infection from our 
background beliefs, opinions, philosophical inclinations, folk theories, idiosyncratic 
presumptions, and so forth.  
The fact that intuitions are so diverse and liable to change played a 
significant role in my argument that a priori warrant is independent of intellectual 
seemings: intellectual seemings, I argued, are the sort of things that provide a 
viable epistemic basis.   
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 But here we can also use this claim to argue a related point: that the deviant 
intuitions resulting from these background beliefs, opinions, presumptions, and so 
forth, block the links between understanding and assent in these cases.  
The fundamental claim in the last section was that having certain 
epistemological and logical background beliefs can actually affect whether or not 
one forms beliefs rationally. Our background beliefs can have a direct effect on the 
epistemic status of what we might call our foreground beliefs. So if that can be true 
of deviant logical and epistemological beliefs, why not think that—for instance— 
one’s deviant semantic intuitions can likewise have an adverse effect on the 
rationality of our foreground beliefs? 
Consider the following scenario. Suppose Mary is a normal English-speaker 
who, through no fault of her own, comes to incorrectly employ a particular concept 
—sofa. Let us suppose that Mary acquired the concept initially from her parents, 
who are in full mastery of the concept. However, during the initial learning-stage, 
Mary was exposed to no single-seated, upholstered armchairs, and so never picked 
up that her parents would not employ the concept sofa to refer to such chairs. 
Mary encounters her first upholstered armchair in the company of her 
schoolteacher, who incorrectly calls such chairs ‘sofas’. Co-incidentally, in the years 
that follow, Mary only ever describes upholstered armchairs as ‘sofas’ in the 
company of those who also misuse the word ‘sofa’. As such, Mary is never 
corrected when she uses the word in this way.  
So Mary, through no fault of her own, has simply acquired deviant semantic 
intuitions about ‘sofas’ and these intuitions lead her to systematically misapply the 
term.  
Now suppose that Mary performs an a priori conceptual analysis of the 
concept sofa. She would inevitably arrive at false beliefs about the necessary and 
sufficient conditions of sofas.   
Now would her resulting sofa-beliefs be warranted? On my account, such 
beliefs would not properly count as warranted. While we may not blame her for the 
erroneous sofa-beliefs she acquires via conceptual analysis, it is nonetheless not the 
case that these beliefs are properly rational.  
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I take it that this scenario very closely resembles Peter’s. Just as Peter’s 
theoretical beliefs had a direct effect on the rationality of a range of his beliefs, so 
too do Mary’s semantic intuitions about sofa’s undermine the rationality of her 
sofa-beliefs. These intuitions are epistemically relevant in just the way that Peter’s 
beliefs are epistemically relevant. Like Peter, then, we can legitimately take Mary to 
be in epistemically non-ideal circumstances.  
Once we have allowed that this is possible in cases like Mary’s, why not 
suppose that the same thing is going on with those who have deviant semantic 
intuitions about philosophically interesting concepts like ‘knowledge’? There seems 
no obvious reason that a similar approach would not apply just as well.  
What this indicates is that this response is particularly well equipped to 
insist that even epistemically analytic propositions do not need to be transparently 
true for everybody, all the time. By narrowing the scope of the links between 
understanding and assent to apply only in epistemically ideal conditions, and by 
allowing for the possibility that our background philosophical beliefs, folk theories 
and cultural opinions can place us in non-ideal conditions, we are well insulated 
from counter-examples. 
 This has the further advantage of potentially allowing us to extend the 
scope of epistemic analyticity, so that it can apply to a broader range of beliefs than 
we might initially have thought. The notion of epistemically non-ideal conditions 
developed here allows —or initially appears to allow—the notion of epistemic 
analyticity to do some substantial explanatory work. It becomes a notion we might 
plausibly appeal to in order to explain our knowledge of a great many intuitively a 
priori propositions.  
  
4.6 Conclusion 
The central argument in this chapter has been that Williamson’s counter-examples 
are not decisive. There is still conceptual space to maintain that, when a subject is 
in epistemically ideal conditions, it is true that if she understands an analytic 
proposition like ‘every vixen is a female fox’, then she will assent to it. This way of 
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narrowing the scope of the connection between understanding and assent is not, I 
think, ad hoc. It is clear that such a connection could only conceivably be reliably 
present when one is in the right sort of epistemic context. And I have also provided 
good reasons to think that false theoretical commitments, and perhaps even false 
semantic intuitions, can indeed affect one’s epistemic context. We have good 
theoretical grounds, then, for taking cases like Peter’s to fail to establish that there 
are no links between understanding and assent.  
 Given that we can maintain the thesis that there are constitutive links of a 
sort between understanding and assent, epistemic analyticity remains a viable 
option.  
 And this gives us reason to think that the category of self-evident 
propositions is not an empty category. Epistemically analytic propositions meet the 
criteria for being self-evident.  
   
144 
 
5: Self-Evidence and Self-Knowledge 
 
In the previous chapter I suggested that one way in which a proposition may be 
self-evident is if it is an epistemically analytic proposition: a proposition that is such 
that understanding it warrants the belief that it is true. And this happens, I argued, 
when it is the case that there are constitutive connections between understanding 
the proposition and assenting to it (when in epistemically ideal conditions). This 
type of self-evident proposition, then, is made self-evident in virtue of possessing 
an unusual type of content: a content that generates or entails this sort of 
constitutive connection between understanding and assent. 
 In this chapter, I will argue that there is also a range of propositions that are 
self-evident not in virtue of possessing a special type of content, but rather in virtue 
of us having a special kind of access to them. As I will show, epistemically analytic 
propositions are not the only obvious examples of self-evidence. There are also a 
range of self-ascriptions that bear all the hallmarks of being self-evident.  
 This chapter has two closely interrelated aims. One aim is to offer some 
reasons for thinking that a certain range of self-ascriptions are self-evident. The 
other aim is to show that taking self-knowledge to be a priori is plausible both as an 
account of self-knowledge, and as an account of the a priori. The central contention 
to this effect will be that appealing to the a priori offers an elegant, if surprising, 
solution to the Problem of Self-Knowledge.  
 
5.1 Self-evidence and the Problem of Self-Knowledge 
One good reason to suspect that at least some of the claims we make about our 
own minds are self-evident is that our conversational and epistemic practices 
strongly indicate that this is so. Consider, for example, those thoughts that Burge 
(1996) has famously called ‘cogito-like judgements’: judgements of the form ‘I am 
thinking that p’. Now these are paradigmatic examples of propositions that strike us 
as obviously true when we think them. When I deliberate about what to eat for 
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lunch, for instance, it strikes me as self-evident that I am thinking about what to eat 
for lunch. When I am so deliberating, I take the second-order claim ‘I am thinking 
about what to eat for lunch’ to be just as obvious as the claim ‘nothing can be both 
red and green all over at the same time’. In neither case is the claim in question 
obviously based on any sort of evidence, and in both cases, I treat the proposition 
as beyond any epistemic reproach. Both statements are treated as if they neither 
depend upon nor require evidence.  
 This apparent self-evidence is part of what we might call the Problem of Self-
Knowledge. That is to say, one of the philosophically puzzling features of self-
knowledge is that we do treat a range of self-ascriptions—including cogito-like 
thoughts—as if they are self-evident to those who make them. For it is not obvious 
why we should treat them as self-evident.  
As Elizabeth Fricker puts it, the phenomenon that is to be explained by any 
account of self-knowledge is that self-ascriptions like these are Language-Game 
(henceforth, LG) authoritative, LG-basic, and apparently psychologically non-
inferred (Fricker, 1998, p.  157).  
 What Fricker finds to be the central puzzle about this range of self-
ascriptions is the following. First, we treat people as being special authorities on 
what they are thinking. Unless we have reason to doubt the sanity of the person 
involved, we treat people as being experts about what their beliefs, desires, 
intentions and sensations are. If person a and person b give conflicting reports 
about what a is thinking, then we invariably take a’s word for it over b’s. The 
burden of proof is taken to lie with b in this sort of case. Person b would need to 
provide very strong reasons indeed to persuade us that a is mistaken about what 
she is thinking.  
One familiar scenario in which we would be inclined to side with b over a 
would be if we had reasons to suspect that a is lying. In a totalitarian regime, for 
example, members of the secret police might take the word of an informer (b) over 
the word of a suspect (a) about what the suspect thinks about the government. But 
this is not a counter-example to the claim that a is an expert on what she believes. 
The fact that a would lie about her anti-government beliefs if she did have them 
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does not conflict with the thought that a is in a better position than b to judge the 
content of her own thoughts. That we assume that a is a special authority on her 
own thoughts entails that some range of self-ascriptions are LG-authoritative.  
 A related, but distinct, point is that we do not require people to defend or 
explain self-ascriptions like cogito-like thoughts. If b claims that a harbours anti-
government sentiments, we would be well within our rights to ask b how she knows 
this. Is this based on something b saw a doing, or heard a say? Is this based on 
some form of statistical profiling? However, asking people how they know what 
they themselves believe is not a live conversational option. Asking people to defend 
or explain their cogito-like thoughts, for instance, is a grossly unreasonable request 
by the standards of our epistemic and conversational practices. This is the sense in 
which self-ascriptions like cogito-like thoughts are LG-basic. People are not just 
treated as experts on their own minds; they are treated as experts who are not 
expected to explain or defend their assertions. 
 Finally, the third feature to be explained is that cogito-like thoughts strike us 
as being psychologically direct. They do not appear to us as having been inferred 
from anything else we believe. While we might sometimes arrive very quickly at 
beliefs about other people’s minds, we could, upon reflection, trace the inferential 
pattern we followed. Not so with cogito-like judgements: these appear to us to be 
psychologically non-inferred.  
A quick point on what these features add up to. The most epistemologically 
interesting of these three features is LG-basicness. LG-authority is not by itself an 
uncommon feature. There are many different ways in which one person may be in 
an epistemically privileged position regarding one type of enquiry. Many fields of 
enquiry require specific skills, experience, or background beliefs.  
For instance, suppose that while sitting in the garden in the evening, I spot a 
bird that I take to be a nightingale. Suppose further that this is disputed by my 
companion, an ornithologist, who insists that the bird is a robin. Now for any third 
party who has not seen the bird in question, I take it that the reasonable thing to 
conclude here would be to side with the ornithologist rather than me. I have little 
interest in birds and am poor at telling them apart. In effect, an ornithologist is LG-
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authoritative when it comes to identifying birds: she is taken to be in an 
epistemically privileged position on such topics as a result of her expertise.  
Likewise, there are many other beliefs that are not—or not taken to be—
psychologically inferred from anything else. Arguably, perceptual beliefs are like 
this. While there might be some sort of cognitive transition from sense experience 
to perceptual belief, this transition is not an inference. An inference occurs only 
when the transition in question is a move from one belief to another belief. 
Cognitive transitions like the move from perceptual experience to belief do not 
count as inferences. So the fact that cogito-like thoughts are psychologically non-
inferred is so common as to make it hardly worth commenting on: that 
characteristic is shared by a substantial portion of our beliefs.  
However, LG-basicness is far rarer than it may first appear. The assertions of 
experts, for instance, are not normally LG-basic. An expert witness in a criminal trial 
may legitimately be asked to explain and defend whatever claims she makes. 
Questioning experts is also perfectly appropriate in other contexts. We may 
question experts not only to ensure that their assertions are correct but also out of 
epistemological interest. It would be perfectly appropriate for me to ask the 
ornithologist how she knew the bird was a robin rather than a nightingale, even if I 
do not doubt that she is right about this. I might simply be curious about how she 
knew.  
This latter example also illustrates a related point: that while we standardly 
take perceptual experiences at face value, perceptual judgements are not LG-basic 
either. It is unusual to question people’s perceptual beliefs, but it is not unheard of, 
nor is it always inappropriate. Some people are better at perceptually identifying 
certain things than others. Just as some people might be better than us at telling 
one type of bird from another, some people are better than us at identifying wines 
by taste or by smell, or at identifying a composer by the sound of their music. In all 
of these cases it is perfectly acceptable conversational practice to ask such people 
how they knew it was one type of bird or wine rather than another type, or one 
composer rather than a different composer.  
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We might ask for an explanation out of simple epistemological curiosity, or 
we might do so because we doubt her conclusion. In the court room, we consider it 
perfectly appropriate to thoroughly examine not only the testimony of experts but 
also the testimony of eye-witnesses. The fact that it strikes an eye-witness as 
having been perceptually obvious that the defendant was the person she saw 
fleeing the scene of the crime does not render her belief to this effect beyond 
reproach. We might, perfectly legitimately, ask the witness to produce some sort of 
reason for thinking that the person that she saw fleeing the crime really was the 
defendant rather than someone else. If she fails to provide compelling reasons for 
this, we might well suspect that she might have made an error of misidentification.  
 In even the most rigorous and careful of court-rooms, however, once it was 
satisfactorily established that the witness was not lying, it would remain 
unchallenged whether the witness believes it was the defender who she saw fleeing 
the crime. Her sincerely asserting that to be the case is taken to settle the question.  
 The only clear examples of LG-basic beliefs other than self-ascriptions, 
interestingly, are those very simple conceptual, mathematical or logical beliefs, like 
‘nothing is red and green all over at the same time’, ‘1+1=2’, or ‘all bachelors are 
unmarried men’. Beliefs like this are LG-basic precisely because, for most of us, 
there is nothing to say in response to questions about how we know them. We just 
know that propositions like this are true: we know them simply because they are 
self-evident.1  
So the combination of these three features, I submit, suggests that cogito-
like thoughts are taken to be self-evident for those who think them. That they are 
LG-basic and (believed to be) non-inferred indicates that we treat cogito-like 
thoughts as if they are self-evident: as if they are propositions that are just 
immediately obvious to those that think them.  
                                                        
1
 That is not to say that a logician, epistemologist or a mathematician would not be able to offer a 
substantial explanation of how we know such things; clearly they could. But an epistemologist might 
also offer a substantial explanation of how we know our cogito-like thoughts. These beliefs are LG-
basic because these theory-based explanations are the only types of explanation available. These 
sorts of explanations are not the sort that non-experts can be expected to offer. Our ‘language game’ 
does not insist on people having explanations like these available.  
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 But that they are LG-authoritative suggests that if cogito-like thoughts really 
are self-evident, their self-evidence is to be explained by the type of access the 
subject has to them, rather than, say, appealing to them having the type of content 
that produces understanding-assent links. That a person is thinking that p might be 
self-evident to her but it is not self-evident to an observer, even though the 
observer understands the proposition ‘Person a thinks that p’ perfectly well.  
 
5.2 Vindicating and non-vindicating explanations 
Of course, just because our conversational practices seem to indicate that 
something is the case, it does not follow that it is the case. On the contrary, I take it 
that there are no less than three possible solutions to the Problem of Self-
Knowledge. The first solution is to endorse what Fricker calls a non-vindicating 
explanation of our practices regarding self-knowledge. This account can 
acknowledge that we tend to treat self-ascriptions as if they are LG-authoritative, 
LG-basic and psychologically non-inferred, but will hold that this practice is, as it 
turns out, based upon some misconception on our part.  Commonly, such a view 
will be supported by empirical evidence that, it is claimed, shows that our access to 
our own thoughts is substantially more fallible than we assume. We have, it is 
claimed, no special epistemic access to the contents of our own minds, and our 
practice of acting as if this is the case is based upon an illusion.  
The second solution is to endorse a vindicating but deflationary explanation 
of our practices. On this account, it is perfectly appropriate for us to treat certain 
self-ascriptions in this way. But this is not because people are capable of knowing 
their own cogito-like thoughts in a way that no others can. That we treat them in 
this way has no significant epistemological implications at all: it is merely an 
‘artefact of grammar’ that explains the appropriateness of this practice.  
The standard way of defending such a view is to argue that cogito-like 
thoughts and other related self-attributions (avowals), function very differently in 
our language-game from the way reports function. Essentially, the idea is that there 
is no plausible way of explaining how avowals can be reports of independent states 
of affairs while accounting for the features unique to them—that is, as Crispin 
150 
 
Wright would put it, the fact that they are ‘groundless’ and ‘authoritative’ (Wright 
1998). Reports, it is claimed, follow a different set of grammatical rules from the 
ones followed by avowals, and, consequently, avowals cannot be genuine reports. 
This is a kind of vindicating explanation of our common practices. We are right to 
treat avowals as LG-authoritative, -basic and psychologically non-inferred, 
according to this account, but this is simply because of the way the language-game 
is played. These features of avowals are not to be explained in terms of some 
underlying cognitive ability, but can be understood as mere artefacts of grammar. 
This, it is claimed, is the most basic explanation we can give here—the explanatory 
bedrock is language. 
 Third, and finally, we might endorse a vindicating, non-deflationary account 
of our practices. On this account, it is perfectly appropriate for us to treat self-
ascriptions in the way we do treat them, and it is appropriate because people are 
able to know, in a way that no others can, exactly what they are thinking. This 
account, then, takes the special status of cogito-like thoughts not to be a status that 
is granted by our linguistic mores, but a status that is earned by the believer. That 
we treat self-ascribers as beyond epistemic reproach is a result of a genuine 
cognitive achievement on their part.  
Now, of these three possible solutions, I take it that a deflationary 
vindicating explanation is only worth considering as a last resort. Its plausibility 
hinges crucially on a non-deflationary account being untenable. That is to say, if we 
had at hand a satisfactory explanation of how avowals are the result of the sort of 
‘genuine cognitive achievement’ that is required for knowledge, it would be difficult 
to see how a deflationary account would be in any way appealing. For what possible 
reason would such an account be preferable? As epistemologists, I take it that our 
aim should be to offer a proper epistemological solution to the Problem of Self-
Knowledge. We should only offer a non-epistemological solution if we have reason 
to think we can do no better.  
I also see no reason to be pessimistic about the prospects of the 
‘groundlessness’ and ‘authoritativeness’ of avowals being fully accommodated by 
an epistemological theory. Authoritativeness is not a difficult characteristic to 
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incorporate into an epistemological theory. There are many fields of enquiry that 
admit of experts, people who we consider to be in a better epistemic position than 
the rest of us.  
And to say that self-knowledge is groundless is simply to say that it is basic 
in the terminology I have been using here. Here is Wright’s explanation of what 
groundlessness is: 
The demand that someone produce reasons or corroborating 
evidence for such a claim about themselves—‘How can you tell?’—is 
always inappropriate. There is nothing they might reasonably be 
expected to say. In that sense, there is nothing on which such claims 
are based. (Wright 1998, p. 14) 
 
However, note that on the epistemological account I have put forward, the 
groundlessness of a statement does not indicate that it is not known. Non-
inferential a priori knowledge is groundless in just this way and yet is still a form of 
knowledge. That is to say, I have argued that non-inferential a priori knowledge is 
the knowledge of self-evident propositions, and self-evident propositions are 
groundless propositions. A priori knowledge, on the account I have put forward, 
just is knowledge of, and knowledge epistemically based upon, self-evident 
judgements. As such we already have an epistemology in place that can 
accommodate groundless beliefs. So if it turns out that cogito-like beliefs really are 
groundless (rather than just assumed to be groundless) that would not prevent 
them from counting as knowledge.  
 So I shall set this possible solution to the Problem of Self-Knowledge to one 
side.  
 
5.3 Scepticism about self-knowledge 
In this section I discuss the prospects of a non-vindicating solution. I shall argue, 
first, that empirical research does not support the sort of scepticism about self-
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knowledge required for a non-vindicating solution to the Problem of Self-
Knowledge. And second, that reflection on the implications of such a scepticism 
strongly indicates that it is false.  
A cornerstone in the psychological literature about self-knowledge is Nisbett 
and Wilson’s seminal paper ‘Telling More than We Can Know’ (1977). In that paper, 
Nisbett and Wilson report that studies they conducted indicate that people are 
surprisingly poor at correctly identifying why they make certain choices or why they 
hold certain beliefs. Their general methodology was to put people into situations 
where their choices were being manipulated, and then to ask them to explain their 
choices.  
One scenario was where subjects were asked to pick out the best item of 
clothing from an array of similar-looking items, and then explain why they chose 
the item they did. Now, by happy coincidence, Nisbett and Wilson found that the 
overwhelming majority of the subjects fell prey to a cognitive bias that Nisbett and 
Wilson call ‘The Position Effect’ (Nisbett and Wilson, 1997, p. 243) whereby the 
right-most item is strongly preferred.  
Yet, when asked to explain their choices, the subjects denied that the 
placement of the item had anything to do with their choice. Nisbett and Wilson 
found that subjects would insist that the item was chosen because it appeared to 
be of a higher quality than the others.  
 On the basis of this evidence, Nisbett and Wilson argue that we have little or 
no introspective access to our own higher order ‘cognitive processes’. 
 While these findings are sometimes taken to indicate that we ought to 
adopt a more sceptical approach to people’s self-ascriptions than we currently do, 
it is important to see that these findings do not supply us with any reason at all to 
doubt that self-ascriptions about what we thinking are unreliable, or even fallible at 
all. Nothing here suggests that we are bad at identifying what we prefer. It merely 
suggests that we are bad at identifying why we prefer it. This study lends itself to 
scepticism about our knowledge of the processes that produce our thoughts, not to 
scepticism about self-knowledge generally. 
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 Nisbett and Wilson are well aware of this. Consider their explanation of why 
people are prone to think of themselves as being experts about their own cognitive 
processes, despite this clear evidence to the contrary: 
The individual knows … the focus of his attention at any given point 
in time; he knows what his current sensations are and has what 
almost all psychologists and philosophers would assert to be 
“knowledge” at least quantitatively superior to that of observers 
concerning his emotions, evaluations, and plans. Given that the 
individual does possess a great deal of accurate knowledge and much 
additional “knowledge” that is at least superior to that of any 
observer, it becomes less surprising that people would persist in 
believing that they have, in addition, direct access to their own 
cognitive processes. (Nisbett & Wilson 1977, p. 255) 
 
So, illuminatingly, Nisbett and Wilson account for our mistakenly taking ourselves 
to be authoritative about our own cognitive processes by hypothesising that we 
over-generalize. In their view, people are indeed experts about what their own 
‘emotions, evaluations, and plans’ .The problem is that they think that their 
expertise extends further than it does. They go on to say: 
A related point is that we are often capable of describing 
intermediate results of a series of mental operations in such a way as 
to promote the feeling that we are describing the operations 
themselves. (Nisbett & Wilson 1977, p 255) 
 
So it is important to see that the findings of Nisbett and Wilson do not support a 
wholesale scepticism about self-knowledge. On the contrary, the idea that we do 
enjoy a special, distinctive kind of self-knowledge is posited as an explanation for 
the fact that people are so easily misled into thinking they possess an epistemic 
authority that they do not have.  
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 Alison Gopnik, on the other hand, uses empirical evidence to draw a 
stronger conclusion than Nisbett and Wilson. Gopnik argues, controversially, that 
studies indicate that we do not know our own psychological states differently to 
how we know about the psychological states of others.  
 In the studies in question, psychologists would present a young child with 
some object that appeared to be another sort of object, and then reveal the 
deception. The child would then be asked about what she initially believed the 
object to be. It was found that the children would generally get this wrong. They 
would maintain that they had always believed the object to be the way they 
currently believed it to be.  
 Children improve at such tasks, Gopnik claims, once they started to pick up 
the common folk psychology of their parents and the people around them. This, 
Gopnik argues, supports the view that how we come to know about our own minds 
in the same sort of way to how we come to know the minds of others—by 
interpreting behaviour in light of some theory of how the mind operates, and how 
it is connected to behaviour.  She says: 
Suppose the commonsense and philosophical account of privileged 
first-person beliefs about the mind were correct. Then we should 
predict that, however erroneous children’s views of the psychological 
states of others might be, they would not make similar errors in their 
understanding of their own psychological states. (Gopnik 1993, p. 6) 
 
One concern with this, however, is that Gopnik seems to be taking these results to 
be more conclusive than they really are. For instance, should we really expect, on 
the ‘common-sense’ view, that very young children should not make these sorts of 
errors?  
It is not obvious we should expect this at all. One way of interpreting this 
data would be that what happens when children reach the point where they 
suddenly become much better at both reporting on their own immediately past 
beliefs and on the states of mind of others, is that it is only at this point that they 
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properly understand what a belief is. That is, the reason that they become so much 
better at telling both what they themselves previously believed, and what others 
believe, is that before that point they did not have a clear understanding of what 
type of thing a belief was.  So, the hypothesis goes, the young children used in 
these studies were bad at reporting on their immediately past beliefs because, 
despite Gopnik’s protestations to the contrary, they did not properly understand 
what they were being asked to report on.  
 On that interpretation, the fact that children are bad at these tasks does not 
entail that the ‘common-sense’ view is wrong. Any account of self-knowledge, I 
take it, will restrict itself to applying only to those who understand what beliefs, 
desires, intentions and so on actually are. If we suppose that a person does not 
understand what a belief is, it is hard to see why we should expect her to be able to 
report reliably on anyone’s beliefs, including her own beliefs.  
Furthermore, even if we lay the possibility that the children do not properly 
grasp what a belief is to one side, these cases  still only indicate that children are 
bad at judging what they previously believed, not that they are bad at judging what 
they currently believe. At best, these cases might support a scepticism about 
diachronic self-knowledge. They do not at all support scepticism about synchronic 
self-knowledge: the knowledge of what we are thinking now.  
This point is crucial. If it is only past beliefs that children are poor at 
reporting on, their failure might be a result of misremembering, rather than what 
we might call an introspective failure. It might be—and indeed Gopnik does not 
dispute this—that the children knew very well that they believed the object in 
question was object o at the time when they actually believed that. So none of this 
empirical evidence here suggests that normal adult humans do not know what it is 
that they believe at present. This evidence is far less conclusive than Gopnik makes 
out.  
That is not to say that the results of the studies cited by Nisbett and Wilson 
or Gopnik are not important in their own right: for clearly they are. What they do, 
however, is help us get a clearer idea of where the borders of that range of self-
ascriptions we are authoritative about lie. In other words, research like this can 
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serve as a useful guide as to how far the authority of self-knowledge extends. It 
gives us reason to suspect it does not apply to the people’s reports of the reasons 
their beliefs are based on, and that it might not apply to even our immediately past 
beliefs. This in itself is a significant outcome. But it does not suggest that we should 
be sceptical about synchronic self-knowledge: the knowledge of what our current 
beliefs, desires, intentions, sensations and so forth are.  
And there are powerful reasons to think that any large-scale scepticism 
about synchronic self-knowledge is false. The concern here is that if a sweeping 
scepticism about self-knowledge were true, then would be difficult to make sense 
of how we could be as accurate as we are in our judgements about our own states 
of mind, and in our judgements about the states of mind of other people.  
It is worth stressing that a great deal of what we do requires some level of 
cooperation from the people around us. We frequently have to take into account 
the beliefs, intentions, desires and preferences of those we live or work with, in our 
day-to-day routines. When we make plans to eat at a restaurant, we rely on other’s 
people reports on what they want to eat in deciding which restaurant to go to. 
Doctors rely on the patient’s report of whether she is in pain in making their 
diagnosis. We rely on people’s reports on their religious beliefs in determining 
whether certain conversations would be appropriate. We make long-term plans to 
accommodate the goals and intentions of other people, and we rely on their 
reports of what these intentions are. Knowing what it is that other people think 
plays an indispensible role in our epistemic lives. Without this, we would not be 
able to co-ordinate our actions with those around us. And, crucially, the primary 
method of discovering what it is that other people believe, desire, or intend, is to 
ask them.  
The point here is that scepticism about self-knowledge does not just 
threaten our knowledge of our own minds. It also threatens our knowledge of other 
people’s minds. And this sort of scepticism, I take it, is untenable. If scepticism 
about self-knowledge were true, we should expect our reliance on other people’s 
reports on their own states of mind to be exposed as a poor way to find out what 
they think. Social coordination would surely break down if our primary method of 
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finding out about other people’s states of mind was as unreliable as scepticism 
about self-knowledge would indicate.  
Another way of framing the point as follows: if scepticism about self-
knowledge were true then it follows we are not significantly more reliable guides to 
our own minds than anyone else is. But if that were the case, then it would be very 
difficult to understand how it is that we are able to coordinate with others as 
effectively as we can. What would cry out for explanation is why it is that this type 
of scepticism would not have a clear, observable knock-on effect on our day-to-day 
lives. For every indication is that the assumption that people are reliable guides to 
their own minds is a cornerstone of social coordination.  
The point is that unlike with, say, a global Cartesian scepticism, we should 
expect self-knowledge scepticism to impact on our daily lives. Reflection strongly 
indicates that it should have noticeable effects. The fact that such effects are not 
present, then, is a strong reason to suppose that such a scepticism is not true.   
 
5.4 Immunity from brute error and self-knowledge 
This does not, of course, establish that there is a range of self-ascriptions that are 
self-evident to those who think them. There is conceptual space for a thoroughly 
epistemic solution to the Problem of Self-Knowledge that denies the self-evidence 
of self-ascriptions. For example, one such option would be an ‘inner sense’ view of 
self-knowledge: a view that accounts for our knowledge of our own thoughts by 
positing an introspective faculty that operates in the same way that perceptual 
faculties do.  
 This would account for the fact that self-ascriptions appear psychologically 
non-inferred since perception is likewise non-inferred. A follower of this view might 
account for the LG-authority and -basicness of self-ascriptions by insisting that 
introspection is a particularly reliable faculty. Beliefs generated via introspection 
are far more likely to be true than those arrived at via an inference from the 
person’s behaviour.  
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 But yet, on this view, self-ascriptions would be no more self-evident to us 
than our perceptual beliefs. That is, on this account, self-ascriptions are not 
genuinely groundless in the way ‘nothing is red and green all over at the same time’ 
is groundless. Introspective judgements, on this view, are grounded in my 
introspective experiences: how it introspectively seems to me. It is just that the 
connection between how it introspectively seems to me and how it in fact is, is so 
reliably veridical that we do not bother to question it. ‘How do you know?’ 
questions are out of place not because self-ascriptions are groundless, but because 
the answer is obvious: the self-ascriber knows because she has a highly reliable 
introspective faculty.  
 To put this in context, this view of self-knowledge holds that self-ascriptions 
like ‘I believe that p’, ‘I am thinking about what to eat for lunch’, ‘I intend to ϕ’, etc. 
are not governed by the norm: 
 
(10)  If it is self-evident that p, then you may believe that p without considering 
any further evidence for it 
 
But are instead governed by: 
 
(11)  If it introspectively seems to you that p, then you may believe that p 
 
This inner sense view is an example of what we might call a partially vindicating 
(epistemic) solution to the Problem of Self-Knowledge. That is, it is a genuinely 
epistemic solution, in that it does think that we know our own minds in an 
epistemically special way, but it does not claim that self-ascriptions possess all 
three qualities our practices suggest they have. While self-ascriptions really are 
authoritative and non-inferred, they only appear to be basic. Taking them to be 
genuinely groundless is a mistake, even if it is an excusable one.  
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   While the most influential arguments against this inner sense view are 
those offered by Sydney Shoemaker2, the argument I wish to focus on here is Tyler 
Burge’s.  
The rationale for this is as follows: Shoemaker’s central argument against 
the inner sense view is that there are two conditions (the Causal Condition and the 
Independence Condition) that would have to obtain with regard to our judgements 
about our own thoughts in order for perception to be a useful epistemological 
model for ‘introspection’.  
The idea is that in order for introspection to be operating in anything like 
the way that perception operates, there would have to be a causal connection 
between our first-order mental states and our beliefs about them. If that is not the 
case, then Shoemaker thinks that introspection and perception are not similar 
enough for us to be able to model introspection on perception.  And since causal 
connections and logical connections are mutually exclusive (that is, if the 
connection between x and y is genuinely causal, then it cannot be the case that x 
logically entails y) it follows that it must be logically possible for there to be such 
mental states without us knowing about them, or without there being ‘the 
mechanisms that make such knowledge possible’ (Shoemaker 1994b, p. 271). 
However Shoemaker argues that it is not possible for there to be certain mental 
states without there also being the mechanisms by which we know about this state. 
Even if this argument is successful, however, it is not clear that it 
conclusively establishes that (11) is not the norm that applies to self-ascriptions. 
There is conceptual space, I take it, for a non-perceptual account to insist that 
despite self-knowledge being unlike perceptual in those crucial ways that 
Shoemaker points out, a norm like (11) is still the epistemic norm at play with 
introspection. 
The problem here is that it is not clear what the normative implications are 
of the Causal and Independence Conditions are. Is perception governed by a norm 
like: 
                                                        
2 See Shoemaker 1994a, 1994b, 1994c.  
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(4) If it perceptually seems to you that p, then, all things being equal, you 
may believe that p 
 
because the Independence and Causal Conditions obtain? Would the fact that some 
set of beliefs are governed by a norm that is structurally similar to (4) indicate that 
the Causal and Independence Conditions hold for that set of beliefs? This is an 
interesting and suggestive thought, but I know of no argument in favour of it.   
 Burge, on the other hand, offers more explicit reasons to think that self-
ascriptions are governed by a norm like (10), rather than something like (11).  
 Essentially, the argument is that introspection differs from perception in 
that beliefs acquired via introspection are immune from what Burge calls ‘brute 
error’ (Burge 1988, p. 120). Burge’s point is that it is an integral part of the 
epistemology of perception that it is possible to have brute perceptual errors, 
errors that are not due to ‘any sort of carelessness, malfunction, or irrationality on 
our part’ (Burge 1988, p. 120). He claims: 
The possibility of such errors follows from the fact that no matter 
what one’s cognitive state is like (so, no matter how rational or well-
functioning one is) one’s perceptual states could in individual 
instances fail to be veridical—if physical circumstances were 
sufficiently unfortunate. (Burge 1998, p. 120) 
 
For instance, even when my eyesight is working properly, and I am looking carefully 
at my surroundings, there remains a possibility that my judgements about my 
surroundings are false.  
To employ a familiar example, suppose I am visiting zoo and see what I take 
to be a zebra in one of the cages. Suppose there is nothing wrong with my eyes, I 
am not under the influence of any narcotics or anything that affects my rationality, 
and I look closely at the animal in question before concluding that it is a zebra.  In 
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other words, I have done everything that would normally suffice for my knowing 
that the creature is a zebra. Now if, in this instance, the animal in question is a 
cleverly disguised mule, then what has happened is that I have been led into 
making a brute perceptual error: an error that is not due to ‘any sort of carelessness, 
malfunction, or irrationality’ on my part. My error is to be explained by my having 
been unlucky enough to have attended a zoo that resorts to this sort of trickery, not 
in virtue of any epistemic carelessness or cognitive malfunction on my part.  
The possibility of this sort of brute, unlucky error follows straightforward 
from the fact that how it perceptually seems to me is not factive. While perception 
is remarkably reliable, it is by no means infallible. Even when my perceptual 
faculties are free of any malfunction, it is still entirely possible that how it 
perceptually seems to me is not how it is.  
Burge goes on to argue that self-knowledge is not like this. For some range 
of self-ascriptions, these types of errors are simply not possible.  
This claim, if true, has some interesting implications. A brute error is to be 
contrasted with an error of rationality. Brute errors are those that may occur no 
matter how well the relevant cognitive faculty is operating, or how epistemically 
careful and reasonable one is. If it is not possible for a belief of a certain sort to be 
brute error, then the only remaining possible error is one that is the result of a 
rational failing on the believer’s part. And the relevant notion of rationality here is 
clearly epistemic rationality. As such, claiming that a belief is immune from brute 
error is just to say that one cannot have a mistaken belief of that sort without being 
epistemically irrational.  
 This has straightforward implications for the relevant epistemic norms at 
play. If epistemic irrationality —failure to comply with the applicable epistemic 
norm—is the only way to induce an error in a given type of belief, then it follows 
that the epistemic norms at play are truth-guaranteeing: that is that the norm is 
structured such that its antecedent conditions are factive.  
 In effect, then, what Burge’s claim entails is that self-knowledge is governed 
by an epistemic norm like norm (10). So, if he can offer good reasons to think that 
introspective reports are immune from brute error, then I take it that this would 
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suffice to establish that self-ascriptions like cogito-like thoughts are self-evident to 
those that think them.  
 Now consider how this relates to the Problem of Self-Knowledge as I set it 
up above. I argued that the apparent self-evidence of self-knowledge was a 
substantial part of problem. To say a belief is basic or groundless as well as non-
inferred, I take it, just is to say that the belief in question is self-evident.  
Essentially, then, Burge is arguing for what we might call a fully vindicating 
solution to the Problem of Self-Knowledge. I take the view he defends to be the 
view that self-knowledge really is authoritative, basic and psychologically non-
inferred.  
I shall make one final point about the implications of the claim that self-
knowledge is immune from brute error before moving on to discuss Burge’s 
argument for the claim. Now while it is clear that the claim that self-knowledge is 
immune to brute error entails that direct self-ascriptions are governed by norm (10), 
it might also be thought to be saying more than that. One way of reading Burge’s 
claim about brute error is that the suggestion is that anybody who makes a false, 
direct introspective report is not only irrational but also blameworthy for this 
irrationality.  
 In the first two chapters I indicated that there are various possible ways in 
which a person can fail to comply with a norm like (10) without being epistemically 
blameworthy for that failure. So the suggestion here might be that Burge is arguing 
that self-knowledge admits of no parallel cases: that people are always to be 
blameworthy for their false self-ascriptions when those self-ascriptions are ‘avowed’ 
in the usual non-evidential way. This then would make the claim that self-
knowledge is immune from brute error to be significantly stronger than the claim 
that self-knowledge is governed by norm (10).  
 While this is an interesting and suggestive claim, it is, I think, unmotivated. 
As I will illustrate, Burge’s argument for this immunity from brute error establishes 
only that one cannot be rational when one erroneously avows some attitude or 
intention. This is because the considerations Burge appeals in his argument are 
considerations related to the rational status of our beliefs, and of the inferential 
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relations between them. I interpret Burge as endorsing only the weaker thesis that 
self-knowledge is typically governed by norm (10).  
 Now the argument Burge gives in favour of the claim that self-knowledge is 
immune from brute error, interestingly, appeals to the claim that self-knowledge is 
necessary for a type of reasoning he calls critical reasoning.  
 Critical reasoning is the reasoning we engage with when we consciously 
reflect on our reasons for believing some proposition. Non-critical reasoning is the 
reasoning that occurs when we make an inference from belief a to belief b without 
actually thinking about whether the inference is a good inference, or whether a 
really is a good enough reason to warrant belief in b. Most of our reasoning, I take it, 
is like this. Critical reasoning occurs when we deliberately construct —or evaluate—
something like a philosophical argument or mathematical proof. The reasoning 
involved in debating with another person on any subject is critical reasoning.  
 Now Burge argues that this type of reflective reasoning requires not only 
that we have self-knowledge, but furthermore that self-knowledge be immune 
from brute error. Reflective reasoning would not be possible at all unless self-
knowledge enjoys this immunity. The idea here is that any account of self-
knowledge that denies that certain self-ascriptions are immune from brute error 
entails: 
[A] dissociation between cognitive review and the thoughts reviewed 
that is incompatible with the norms of epistemic reasonability that 
are basic to all critical enquiry, including empirical, mathematical, 
philosophical, and practical enquiry. (Burge 1996, p. 256) 
 
The central thought here is that the way critical reasoning works is that the results 
of any enquiry into my own reasons for believing has an immediate effect on my 
first-order beliefs. 
 Consider the following example: suppose, after walking past my neighbour’s 
house while deep in thought, I find myself believing that my neighbour is not home. 
When a friend looking for my neighbour asks how I know this, I recall that I saw that 
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her car was missing from her driveway when I walked past her house, and offer this 
as my reason for thinking that she is not home. In the very act of providing this 
explanation, however, I suddenly remember that her car was taken to the garage 
this morning and hence that the fact that it is not outside her house is not a good 
reason to believe that she is not home.  
 Note the impact that this simple piece of critical reasoning has on my first-
order beliefs. We would all expect, I take it, that I would immediately stop believing 
that my neighbour is not home in this instance. And this expectation is a rational 
expectation. This point is not merely a point about the causal connections between 
first-order beliefs, and second-order beliefs about them. This is a point about the 
normative connections between first- and second-order beliefs.  It would, I take it, 
be deeply irrational for me to continue to hold the first-order belief that my 
neighbour is not home, when I hold the following second-order beliefs: first, that 
this belief is epistemically dependent on my belief that her car is not in her 
driveway, and, second, that the absence of her car is not a good reason to believe 
she is not home. Having those second-beliefs entails I rationally ought to 
immediately stop believing she is not home. Failure to do so, interestingly, is 
treated like the contravening of an epistemic norm.  
 So the higher-order critical enquiry into my own reasons for believing that 
my neighbour is home generates rational commitments. It entails that I ought to 
modify my first-order belief. 
 Why does this entail that self-ascriptions of the sort involved in critical 
reasoning are immune from brute error?  
To see this, it is worthwhile comparing the way we treat the outcomes of 
our own epistemic reflection on our first-order beliefs, with the way we treat the 
outcomes of other people’s epistemic reflection on our beliefs. The crucial point is 
that the fact that someone else judges that I do not have sufficiently good reasons 
to believe that my neighbour is home does not immediately entail that I ought to 
take steps to modify or find additional reasons for my first-order beliefs. The reason 
for this is straightforward: that somebody thinks my reasons for holding the beliefs I 
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hold are bad does not entail that they really are. It is quite possible that they are 
wrong about what I believe, or about what my reasons for that belief are.  
Yet, interestingly, we treat the fact that I myself have come to think that my 
own reasons are bad reasons as if it actually entails that my reasons really are bad 
reasons. That is to say, the fact that I now think my reasons are bad is treated as 
decisive in a way that someone else’s opinion is not. Treating my own higher-order 
reasons this way is an essential part of what it is to reason critically. As a result, for 
the practice of critical reasoning to be an epistemically legitimate way of acquiring 
and modifying beliefs, it must be the case that we are right to treat my higher-order 
beliefs as decisive in this way. 
Essentially, then, when we reason critically, we presuppose that our 
judgements about the mental states reflected on, and the reasons we have for 
them, are self-evident to us.  
So the thought here is that any theory that denies that higher-order 
judgements of the sort that are involved in reflective, critical reasoning are self-
evident from the first-person perspective would be forced to abandon critical 
reasoning as a legitimate type of reasoning. And this, the reasoning goes, is an 
unacceptably high a theoretical cost.  
Note that Burge has not yet said anything about what makes self-ascriptions 
immune from brute error. All he has done, at this point, is offer reasons to think 
that they must be so immune: on pain of some unpalatable theoretical 
consequences.  
This is an interesting dialectical strategy. The problem we started with here 
was that it was powerfully intuitive that self-knowledge has a number of puzzling 
features. Reflection on our pre-theoretical intuitions and practices suggests a strong, 
widely-held inclination to think of self-knowledge as authoritative, basic and non-
inferred.  
What Burge has done at this point is effectively to raise the stakes. Not only 
is it powerfully intuitive that self-knowledge has these properties, but the 
assumption that they do underpins some of our epistemic practices. If we are to 
deny that self-knowledge has these features, not only do we have to face the 
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unwelcome prospect of cutting very much against the grain of intuition, but we are 
also forced to accept the even more unwelcome consequence that a substantive 
portion of our epistemic practices are entirely misguided.  
This argument is structurally similar to the argument I gave in section three. 
There I argued that a non-vindicating explanation of self-knowledge, an explanation 
that takes us to be misguided in treating self-ascriptions as authoritative, basic and 
non-inferred, would undermine our knowledge of other minds as well, and that this 
was an implication that would be wholly unacceptable. 
Burge’s argument is similar in that he is arguing that the denial that self-
ascriptions are immune from brute error likewise has unacceptable consequences. 
An implication of such a view, he argues, is that it undercuts the rationality of a 
great many of our first-order beliefs. And this he takes to be wholly untenable.  
While this does not itself solve the Problem of Self-Knowledge, it does give a 
clearer idea of where a proper solution must lie. If he is right about this, he has 
established that a fully vindicating explanation is the only acceptable solution on 
offer.  
 
5.5 Epistemological explanations 
Unfortunately, Burge’s actual solution to the Problem of Self-Knowledge is not a 
good one.  
Burge explains this immediate rational link between the outcomes of a 
‘critical enquiry’ and the belief being enquired about as follows: in critical reasoning, 
he claims, the belief under review and the reviewing process itself operate from 
‘the same point of view’ (Burge 1996, p. 257).  
[M]y checking my belief and finding it wanting normally itself 
provides immediate prima facie reason to change it from within the 
perspective of the review. This is because the first – and second-
order perspectives are the same point of view. (Burge 1996, p. 258, 
my emphasis) 
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However, as Tom Stoneham (2004) points out, this explanation is more like a 
restatement of the Problem of Self-Knowledge, than a solution to it. The claim that 
second-order beliefs are from the same point of view as the corresponding first-
order is no less puzzling than the original puzzle an account of self-knowledge is 
supposed to solve. This is because it is difficult to understand what makes the point 
of view of a second-order judgement the same as the corresponding first-order 
belief. Stoneham puts point as follows: 
This is a puzzle, because, on the one hand, their form is not sufficient 
since there can be judgements of the same form which are not so 
epistemically privileged, and on the other their directness is not 
sufficient either because there can be direct judgements of other 
matters … Either they have some other feature, or it is the 
combination of these two features, form and directness, which 
explains how come the judgement is necessarily from the same point 
of view as its subject matter. Until we have such an explanation, the 
account is incomplete. (Stoneham 2004, p. 658) 
 
Stoneham takes the driving question of an account of self-knowledge to be the 
question of ‘how judgments about our own minds made directly and without 
recourse to the evidence could constitute knowledge’ (Stoneham 2004, p. 658). 
Consider the following statements: 
 
(i) When judgements about mental states are made directly and without 
recourse to the evidence, they constitute a special kind of knowledge 
(ii) Judgements about our own minds are made from the same point of view 
as their subject matter 
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Burge is offering (ii) to explain how (i) is possible. The problem here is that (ii) no 
less cries out for explanation than (i) does. More to the point, if we were to 
articulate what exactly was philosophically puzzling about (ii), we would point to 
the many of the very same features that we would appeal to in explaining what 
makes (i) puzzling.  
 On Burge’s view it is possible for people to be ‘dissociated’ from themselves 
in the sense that they make second-order judgements that are not from the same 
perspective as the first-order judgements. A person might, for instance, discover 
that she harbours racist beliefs by realising that she tends to behave differently 
towards people who of different ethnic backgrounds to her.  
 So, the thought is that it is only when second-order judgements are made in 
the usual, direct introspective way that they are from the same point of view as 
their subject matter. The claim is this: 
 
(iii) When judgements about mental states are made directly and without 
recourse to the evidence, they have the same point of view as their 
subject matter 
 
But (iii) is not a clear improvement on (i).  
To claim that second-order judgements have a ‘point of view’ at all is to 
employ a metaphor, and not an especially clear one in this context. Burge 
vehemently denies that perception is a useful model by which to understand self-
knowledge. But yet he appeals to a visual metaphor in his explanation of what 
makes self-knowledge epistemically special. So immediately, it is unclear in what 
way second-order judgements have a ‘point of view’ in the first place.   
So for Burge’s answer to be a satisfactory solution to the Problem of Self-
Knowledge he must make it clearer what exactly is involved in two judgements 
having the same point of view.  Without such an explanation, this is not an 
acceptable solution to the problem. 
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One way of reading this point would be to see it as making a criticism 
analogous to Quine’s famous attack on analyticity. Quine (1951) argues that the 
problem with attempts to explicate analyticity in terms of synonymy, definition, 
interchangeability salva veritate, or semantic rules, is that all those terms are no 
less philosophically puzzling than the term we sought to explain: analyticity. As he 
says at one point: 
Still there really is no progress. Instead of appealing to an 
unexplained word ‘analytic’ we are now appealing to an unexplained 
phrase ‘semantical rule’ … Semantical  rules are distinguishable, 
apparently, only by the fact of appearing  on a page under the 
heading ‘Semantical Rules’; and this heading is itself then 
meaningless. (Quine 1951, p. 34) 
 
On this interpretation, Stoneham is pressing the point that Burge’s claim that 
second-order judgements are from the same point of view as their subject matter is 
likewise ‘no progress’ towards a solution to the Problem of Self-Knowledge. 
However, one important difference is that Stoneham does not take these 
points to support any kind of scepticism about self-knowledge analogous to Quine’s 
scepticism about the analytic/synthetic distinction.  
As I understand the objection, it is not even primarily an objection to the 
claim that self-ascriptions are authoritative, groundless and non-inferred. The claim 
is only that we have no proper explanation of these features. The problem being 
raised is a meta-philosophical problem about the kind of explanation a philosopher, 
or an epistemologist in particular, is supposed to give.  
So on the reading I favour, the issue is that it is not enough for Burge to 
establish that there is a range of second-order beliefs that are immune from brute 
error. In addition to this, he owes us a proper explanation of what it is about these 
beliefs that gives them this special immunity.  
Now I take it that it is not uncommon for philosophers to establish to our 
satisfaction that something is the case without providing a full explanation of how it 
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is the case. Suppose I am defending some philosophical thesis—say, realism about x. 
Now one way I might go about defending this view is by offering a reductio ad 
absurdum argument against anti-realism about x. If my argument convincingly 
establishes that any anti-realist position about x is committed to some deeply 
implausibly consequence, then this argument would successfully show that realism 
about x is true. I would have established that realism is the only tenable position 
available, which is of course an excellent reason for thinking that it is true.  
But this sort of argument does not provide the last word in the philosophical 
discussion of x. Even if we suppose that I have conclusively established that anti-
realism about x logically entails a view that is manifestly false, there would still 
more philosophical work to be done on the topic.  This is because this type of 
argument does not provide us with a substantive realist account of x. All it 
establishes is that we have excellent reasons for thinking that there must be such 
an account to be had.  Just because we are convinced that realism about x is true, it 
does not follow that there is nothing further to be gained by providing a proper 
explanation of what this realism consists in.  
Another way to put this point is that we do not always ask ‘How do you 
know?’ because we doubt that our interlocutor does know some proposition. It is 
perfectly legitimate for me to ask an expert ornithologist how she knows that a bird 
we have both seen is a robin rather than a nightingale. In this scenario, I have no 
doubt whatsoever that she does know this. I am not asking her how she knows 
because I am looking for reasons to think that the bird really is a robin. I take her 
testimony to be more than adequate reason to believe that it is. I am asking her 
how she knows because I am epistemologically curious. What I am interested in is 
what it is about the bird that tipped her off that it was a robin. I want to know what 
the basis of her knowledge is.  
So the suggestion here is that the epistemologist is, or should be, asking the 
general ‘How do we know that p?’ question in a similar sense.3 It is not a question 
                                                        
3
 Though, to be clear, the questions are not asked in exactly the same sense. One important 
difference is that the epistemologist is asking for the general conditions for knowledge of some type. 
When I ask an ornithologist how she knows a bird is a robin, I am not asking for general conditions 
that make knowledge possible, I am asking for her specific reasons for that judgement. (And, as I 
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that can be fully answered by pointing out that we do know that p. We also want to 
know what the basis of this knowledge is, or what this knowledge consists in. We 
do not simply want to know that we do indeed have knowledge of a certain sort. 
We are also curious about what makes this knowledge possible: what it is about 
beliefs of this type that gives them their positive epistemic status.  
And it is this sort of question, arguably, that Stoneham is claiming that Burge 
does not properly answer. The claim that self-ascriptions and their corresponding 
first-order beliefs are from the same perceptive is simply not a good enough answer 
to this sort of question.  
 
5.6 A priority as a solution to the Problem of Self-Knowledge  
What I want to consider now is whether appealing to the a priori would serve as a 
better explanation of the special epistemic status of self-knowledge.  
 What we are considering is the following solution to the Problem of Self-
Knowledge: self-ascriptions have the special features that they do in virtue 
possessing genuinely a priori warrant.  
On this account, we simply take it as a brute fact that self-ascriptions are 
psychologically non-inferred and groundless. What we can stress, however, is these 
features are not obstacles to them constituting knowledge. There are 
psychologically non-inferred a priori judgements. And, on the account of the a priori 
argued for here, psychologically non-inferred a priori judgements are necessarily 
groundless judgements. Psychologically direct a priori judgements are warranted 
simply because they are self-evident: the believer requires no further grounds in 
order to be warranted in believing them.  
Finally, the solution goes, self-ascriptions are authoritative because our 
judgements about our own minds are warranted a priori, whereas other people’s 
judgements about our minds are merely a posteriori. Since the epistemic norms 
                                                                                                                                                            
argued earlier, it does not look like there are those sorts of specific reasons we can point to with 
regard to self-knowledge, so this dissimilarity is an important one.) The similarity is just that both 
questions are asked out of pure intellectual curiosity: they are not interrogative. There is a spirit that 
is common to both questions, if not a sense.  
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governing non-inferred a priori judgements are truth-guaranteeing, the type of 
epistemic warrant we have regarding our own thoughts is stronger than the 
warrant other people have. Treating people as experts on their own minds, then, is 
eminently sensible. By appealing to the a priori, we can fully account for the 
puzzling epistemic features that generate the Problem of Self-Knowledge. 
Now one advantage that this explanation has over an explanation like 
Burge’s is that it is neither metaphorical nor vague. Saying that self-knowledge has 
the special epistemic features that it does in virtue of its being a priori is quite 
different from saying that it has the special features it does in virtue of being from 
the same point of view as the judgements they are about. The latter is a vague 
metaphorical claim of limited explanatory value. But the a priori is a legitimate, 
well-defined epistemological category.  
Claiming that self-knowledge is a priori suggests that we can use the 
paradigmatic cases of direct a priori judgements as a model for self-knowledge. We 
know what it is that we currently believe, intend, or want in just the same way that 
we know that nothing is both green and red all over at the same time. We are 
authoritative about such matter precisely because it is only us who have access to 
our mental states in this way: we are the only ones to whom such judgements are 
self-evident.   
Appealing to the a priori thus provides a model by which we can understand 
how self-knowledge works. It is thus illuminating in a way that appealing to points 
of view is not.  
At this point however, one might object that it is not been properly 
explained what it is that makes self-ascriptions of this sort self-evident from the 
first-person perspective. In virtue of what is this case? Or—in other words—how is 
it possible that we have a priori knowledge of our own thoughts? 
It is true that the account I am peddling does not provide a substantive 
answer to that question. Yet it is, I submit, far from obvious that this is a challenge 
that my account is required to answer.  
I have thus far offered some reasons in favour of thinking that a certain 
range of self-ascriptions—the sort typically involved in critical reasoning—are best 
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understood as being self-evident. They must be so understood on pain of major 
upheaval of our epistemic practices. I have further suggested that this self-evidence 
legitimates the decision to characterise them as belonging to a pre-existing 
epistemic category: the a priori.  
Effectively I have suggested that understanding self-ascriptions as a priori 
removes the epistemological puzzle surrounding self-knowledge. The question ‘how 
could a type of belief be direct and groundless and yet still be knowledge?’ has an 
easy answer: that type of belief could be a priori.  
I take this account to be a sufficiently detailed answer to the general ‘How 
do we know?’ question that epistemology is interested in.  
Now it is important to acknowledge that this account certainly does not 
apply to every item of knowledge of our own minds. This is because self-knowledge 
is not epistemically homogeneous.  
My discussion of self-knowledge thus far has been admittedly narrow. My 
attention has been focussed on what I take to be the central cases of self-
knowledge: cogito-like thoughts and our judgements about our presently held 
beliefs, desires and intentions.  
However there are a number of ways of knowing about ourselves that look 
very different to the way we come to know about our minds in the cases I have 
focussed on. That is, there are ways of acquiring self-knowledge that are not direct, 
non-inferential or authoritative. A clear example of this sort would be our 
knowledge of our own character traits. Knowledge of this sort is typically inferential 
rather than direct. Coming to know whether we are brave or cautious, generous or 
prudent, is something that requires time and experience. It is not something that is 
just immediately obvious to us in the way that the thoughts we are currently 
thinking are obvious to us.  
Roughly speaking, there are two broad categories of self-knowledge: self-
knowledge that is ‘special’ and self-knowledge that is mundane in the sense that it 
is very much like the knowledge we have of other people’s minds. 
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But there are also what we might think of as borderline cases: cases which 
in some ways resemble the special kind of self-knowledge and in other ways 
resemble the mundane kind.  One example of such is our knowledge of the causal 
processes that lead up to the decisions and beliefs we arrive at. As Nisbett and 
Wilson point out, people tend to think of themselves as being in an epistemically 
privileged position with regard to these types of judgement, but there is good 
psychological evidence that suggests that this confidence is misplaced. Such 
judgements are assumed to be authoritative, so they are like ‘special’ self-
knowledge in that sense, but self-ascribers are not genuinely in an epistemically 
privileged position with regard to those judgements. So they are like mundane self-
knowledge in that sense.   
Another good example of a borderline case is the one Crispin Wright finds in 
Jane Austin’s Emma. Wright picks up on a passage where Emma comes to believe 
herself to love Knightley based on how she finds herself reacting to a friend’s 
declaration of love for him. As Wright puts it: 
[N]ow she realises that she strongly desires that he marry no one but 
her, and she arrives at this discovery by way of surprise at the 
strength and colour of her reaction to Harriet’s declaration, and by 
way of a few minutes reflection on that reaction. She is, precisely, 
not moved to the realisation immediately; it dawns on her as 
something she first suspects and then recognizes it as true. It 
explains her reaction to Harriet. (Wright 1998 p. 16) 
 
What this points out is that while Emma is usually very clear (we may assume) 
about what she desires, this is not always the case. Sometimes we might not be 
able to tell, via the usual introspective methods, that we have the desires that we 
do.  
The same is true, I take it, also of intentions and beliefs: while it is often 
perfectly clear to us that we have such mental states when we do, for some of our 
beliefs, desire and intentions, however, even careful introspective scrutiny might 
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fail to reveal them. The second point it raises is that while what we desire is usually 
obvious to us, it is not always.  Sometimes, even states that we are normally 
perfectly authoritative about are unclear to us. 
What I want to suggest is the a priori account of self-knowledge is well 
equipped to deal with a surprisingly wide range of cases like this.  
As my earlier discussions of the a priori pointed out, it is possible for people 
to take certain propositions to be a priori obvious when they are not. In cases like 
this they mistake a non-self-evident proposition for a self-evident one. This mistake 
leads them to—perhaps blamelessly—fail to comply with the relevant epistemic 
norm.  
In chapters two and four I suggested that one way this might happen was if 
the believer in question had developed a recalcitrant intuition in virtue of having 
held some theoretical view for a long time.  How it intellectually seems to us can be 
very strongly influenced by our background theoretical beliefs, opinions, 
inclinations, and so forth. If these intellectual seemings are very strong, we might 
consider it a priori obvious that some claim is true when it really is not. That is to 
say, false background beliefs and theories can place us in a position in which we 
systematically misidentify the antecedent conditions of norm (10).  
Or, to phrase it the way I did in the last chapter, we might say deviant 
philosophical theories, folk theories, unwarranted presumptions, and even 
semantic intuitions can place us in epistemically non-ideal circumstances.  
We are thus well equipped to argue that we can sometimes be likewise in 
epistemically non-ideal conditions with respect to our own minds. For if there can 
be circumstances that prevent us from recognising analytic propositions as true, 
then it is hard to see why we would want to deny that they could be analogous 
circumstances that sometimes prevent us for recognising our own beliefs, desires 
and so on.  
Consider those people who think it is obvious that they chose the rightmost 
item of clothing because it appears to be of higher quality. Now if we take Nisbett 
and Wilson’s explanation of the error seriously then what we can say of them is 
that their folk theory of privileged access has placed them in epistemically non-ideal 
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position: a position where they mistakenly take the cognitive processes resulting in 
their decision to be self-evident when they are not. Their over-generalizing about 
the situations in which they are authoritative has led them to systemically 
misidentify the antecedent conditions of norm (10). When considering the 
processes that led up to a decision, they mistaken take the answer to be self-
evident to them when it is not.  
We could, not implausibly, adopt a similar line with regard to Emma. That is, 
we could insist that she has been placed in an epistemically non-ideal position. 
There are a number of possible explanations to choose from. Perhaps Emma has 
deviant semantic intuitions about love. Or perhaps there is some sort of Freudian 
repression mechanism or self-deception at play. Perhaps Emma has inconsistent 
beliefs or conflicting desires about Knightley. All of these seem to be prima facie 
plausible explanations of how Emma could have been mistaken or unaware of her 
own feelings towards Knightley. And I see no implausibility in the claim that 
conditions like these can—like theoretical beliefs and semantic intuitions—place us 
in an epistemically non-ideal position.   
The point here is that while I have focussed primarily on a narrow range of 
cases of self-knowledge and spent very little time considering the plethora of 
mundane or borderline cases, the account developed here is flexible enough to 
apply also to some of the more complicated borderline cases. While I think it is 
important to recognize that these special, central cases of self-knowledge are not 
entirely representative of self-knowledge as whole, I also think that this account 
developed here does apply to, and make sense of, a wider range of self-ascriptions 
than we might have suspected.  
 
5.7 Self-knowledge as a subset of the a priori   
Thus far I have argued that taking (some) self-knowledge to be a priori is plausible 
as an account of self-knowledge. What I have not yet discussed, however, is 
whether taking our knowledge of our own contingent states of mind to be a priori 
lends itself to a plausible account of the a priori. It is this question I briefly turn to in 
this final section.  
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 I take it that the most fundamental concern is that what I believe, 
experience, desire or intend is contingent, whereas the paradigmatic examples of 
propositions knowable a priori are necessary truths.  
 The intuition that the a priori is knowledge of necessary truths is a central 
one, and can be traced to all the way back to Kant. However, it is not clear how 
seriously we ought to take it, given that Kripke has given widely respected reasons 
to think that there are possible examples contingent propositions that are 
knowable a priori. 
 One line of thought might be that this only works because the propositions 
Kripke had in mind (‘the metre stick is one metre long’)  are very unusual kinds of 
propositions. Despite its contingency, there is still some sort of ‘semantic guarantee’ 
of its truth. Following Gareth Evans, Hawthorne describes cases like this as 
superficially contingent: 
A true sentence is superficially contingent just in case the function 
from possible worlds to truth-values associated with that sentence 
reckons it false at some (non-actual) world. A deeply contingent true 
sentence is one for which there is no semantic guarantee that there 
actually exists some verifying state of affairs. (Hawthorne 2002, p. 
247) 
 
Now a sentence like ‘I believe that p’ is not like ‘the metre stick is one metre long’ 
in that there are no semantic guarantees that it is true in the actual world. It is in 
this way deeply contingent. On what grounds might we deny that we can plausibly 
have a priori knowledge of deeply contingent truths? Hawthorne suggests (but does 
not endorse) the following intuitive argument for this, an argument he reconstructs 
from his reading of Evans: 
Suppose that having understood some sentence s, one does not 
thereby obtain some guarantee of a verifying state of affairs. One will 
in that case find it perfectly conceivable that the actual world enjoys 
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a distribution of objects and properties that falsifies s. But now, it 
seems, one will need to do some empirical investigation to figure out 
whether the actual world is a verifier or a falsifier of s. There thus 
appears to be a straightforward argument against the possibility of 
deeply contingent a priori knowledge. (Hawthorne 2002, p. 248) 
 
This argument does, I take it, capture the reasoning behind the general suspicion 
that only very unusual contingent propositions are knowable a priori. However, as 
Hawthorne notes, this reasoning is only plausible if we already presuppose that self-
knowledge is a posteriori.  
Some writers include introspective knowledge under the term 'a 
priori'. But it would be rather a cheap shot at Evans to so define 'a 
priori' and to then claim that such sentences as 'I have a headache 
now' can express deeply contingent a priori truths. (Hawthorne 2002, 
p. 248) 
 
I am in full agreement that it would be a cheap shot to define ‘a priori’ such that 
self-knowledge counted as a priori and use that as a basis to dispute Evans’ claim. 
However, what I have tried to do here is more than simply stipulate that the a priori 
includes self-knowledge. I have offered grounds for thinking that there are 
substantive epistemological commonalities between paradigmatic cases of a priori 
knowledge and self-knowledge.  
 I take Hawthorne’s impatience with writers who take self-knowledge to 
count as a priori to indicate a suspicion on his part that taking self-knowledge to be 
a priori is just to be pedantic about how we understand the sense in which the a 
priori is ‘independent of experience’: that this way of lining up the distinction 
simply obfuscates any possible philosophically interesting differences between the 
categories.  
Insofar as one offers, as I have done, a rationale for taking self-knowledge to 
be a priori, this suspicion should be allayed.  
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 Furthermore, there is also an advantage for an account of the a priori that 
allows that even deeply contingent propositions may count as a priori. Namely, it 
reinforces the impression that the a priori/a posteriori distinction is fundamentally 
an epistemological distinction: not a modal, semantic, or metaphysical one. We are 
talking about different types of epistemic warrant here, rather than about 
propositions with a different modal status, or which are made true by different 
kinds of features.  
 
5.8 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have argued that we have excellent reasons for thinking that it is 
not only analytic propositions that are self-evident. Interestingly, some propositions 
about our current beliefs, desires, intentions, and so on are also self-evident. I have 
also argued that, in virtue of this self-evidence, self-knowledge is best understood 
as substantively a priori. This presents us with an unconventional but unusually 
neat and clear answer to the Problem of Self-Knowledge.  
If the conclusions of the last two chapters are correct, then self-evidence is 
far from an empty category. Not only is there reason to suspect that those trivially 
true propositions involving bachelors and vixens count as self-evident, but there is 
reason to think that more substantive philosophical claims like the Gettier Claim 
might also plausibly count as self-evident. Moreover, as I have argued in this 
chapter, a great many commonplace claims about our own beliefs, intentions, 
desires and emotions will also count as self-evident. Self-evidence is in fact an 
abundant property: a great many of our beliefs possess it.  
Seeming-Independence, then, cannot be appropriately criticised for its 
reliance on the notion of self-evidence. 
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Conclusion 
 
This concludes the case for Seeming-Independence. In this thesis I have offered 
reasons to think that Seeming-Independence is a potentially highly fruitful, and not 
obviously implausible, account of the a priori. All told, Seeming-Independence 
offers to retain some of the key advantages of the traditional infallibilist account of 
the a priori, while avoiding the major pitfalls of that view.  
 The approach I have taken here has been largely exploratory. The aim of this 
thesis has been to map out an unusual approach to the a priori. What I have tried to 
suggest, in effect, is that Seeming-Independence, taken together with its 
accompanying account of epistemic norms, is worth taking seriously as a broad 
theoretical model. I have not tried to offer a completely filled-in theoretical picture. 
As a result, there remain a number of gaps that would merit further research.  
 The account of normativity I sketch in chapter one for instance, is still in its 
early stages of development, and as a result I have tried to keep my options as open 
as possible with regard to how it is to be understood. I have not argued for nor, I 
hope, illegitimately presupposed any precise view about what the fundamental 
norm of belief is, or even if there is one fundamental norm or more than one. 
Consequently, I also have not made clear exactly how epistemic norms are related 
to the fundamental norm or norms of belief, whatever it or they are.  
 I likewise have not committed myself to a view on precisely what following 
an epistemic norm involves, beyond making a few very general observations about 
the minimum conditions any account of rule-following must include. These are all 
topics that merit further attention.  
 I also have not mounted a thorough defence of epistemic analyticity, nor of 
the a priori account of self-knowledge that I suggest in chapter five. What I have 
claimed is that the initial prospects of both of those theories are good. Neither 
account, I argued, has been shown to be obviously unacceptable. And both carry 
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with them some very welcome explanatory advantages.  Nonetheless, these are 
areas that are deserving of further of closer scrutiny.  
More significantly, however, the general approach I have taken to the a 
priori here could very easily be applied to other epistemological questions.  
One immediate implication of the account of epistemic norms I endorse is 
that it opens up the possibility that some beliefs that we intuitively take to be 
perfectly justified are better understood as unjustified but blameless. I take this to 
be a very useful dialectical option. My discussion of the a priori was very heavily 
dependent upon the availability of that distinction.  
In chapter two, I began my discussion of the a priori by suggesting that a 
range of beliefs that have been almost universally assumed to be properly justified, 
might be merely blameless instead. And as a result, I argued, a long-dismissed 
account of the a priori was worth revisiting.  
Now epistemology in general relies quite extensively on our intuitions about 
when a belief is justified or unjustified, warranted or unwarranted, known or not 
known. An enormous amount of work has been built on such intuitions. Almost all 
of the seminal, game-changing epistemological papers include thought experiments 
designed to draw out intuitions about justification or knowledge.  
The suggestion I have made in this thesis is that we must be very careful 
about relying on such intuitions. General misgivings about the reliability of 
intuitions aside, we have reason to think that they are not fine-grained enough to 
distinguish warranted beliefs from those that are merely blameless.  
This gives us the resources to revisit and resist a number of the thought 
experiments many have assumed to be decisive.  
One such example, touched on in chapter one, is the New Evil Demon 
Problem that Cohen and others have directed against reliabilism. Proponents of this 
problem use Descartes’ original evil demon thought experiment in a novel way. 
They use it to illustrate that reliability is not a necessary condition for epistemic 
justification.  
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They do so precisely by encouraging us to imagine exact duplicates of 
ourselves, like us in every way except that their perceptual beliefs are 
systematically deceived by the interference of a Cartesian evil demon. What the 
thought experiment is intended to establish is not Descartes’ sceptical conclusion, 
but the altogether different view that these doppelgangers are still justified in their 
perceptual beliefs despite the fact that their perceptual faculties are highly 
unreliable.  
Now, as I remarked in chapter one, this conclusion is by no means 
compulsory. The account of normativity developed here allows us to offer a 
plausible explanation of why it seems so plausible that our doppelgangers are 
justified, while simultaneously denying the intuition.  
This account of epistemic norms, then, promises to be an extremely useful 
conceptual resource, which admits of a great many potential applications within 
epistemology as a whole.  
Seeming-Independence also offers some new and potentially useful 
dialectical options in meta-epistemological discussions.  
Seeming-Independence could, I think, potentially provide a rationale for a 
unified foundationalist theory of epistemic warrant. While the account developed 
here was not intended as such, it would nonetheless be congenial to such a theory.  
Historically, foundationalism has tended to take either one or the other of 
the following two types of belief to be foundational. Empiricist foundationalist 
theories take beliefs about our own mental states, particularly beliefs about our 
own sensory experiences, as the foundations upon which the rest of our beliefs are 
built. And, traditionally, rationalist foundationalists take that axiomatic role to be 
played by our non-inferred a priori beliefs, the sorts of conceptual, logical and 
mathematical beliefs that strike us as undeniable or ‘obvious’.  
As it happens, those are precisely the sorts of beliefs I have focussed upon 
here. And my treatment of these beliefs also in many respects mirrors the 
treatment they have received from classic foundationalists. I have argued that 
beliefs like these enjoy an infallible kind of epistemic warrant—which is precisely 
183 
 
the quality that classical foundationalists like Descartes claimed it was necessary for 
foundational beliefs to have.  
So the account I offer here might plausibly be taken to be broadly consistent 
with a foundationalist approach. However, this account offers foundationalists a 
new explanatory advantage. I have argued that both our beliefs about our own 
minds and our beliefs about logical, conceptual, and mathematical truths are a 
priori. They belong, in my view, in the same epistemological category, and they do 
so precisely because both are infallibly justified in the sense that I have specified 
here.  
As a result, the account I offer here could provide a rationale for any 
foundationalist who wished to insist that both these sorts of beliefs can play the 
same foundational epistemological role.  
What is advantageous about this is that, on the standard foundationalist 
view, beliefs about our own minds have little in common with mathematical, 
conceptual and logical beliefs, other than that they both play a foundational role. 
This would naturally raise the question: ‘what is it about these sets of beliefs that 
allows both of them to play that role?’  
The account offered here makes this question much easier for a 
foundationalist to answer. They may both play this foundational role, one might 
insist, precisely because they have the same type of epistemic warrant: a priori 
warrant.  
So, interestingly, Seeming-Independence, along with its accompanying 
account of epistemic normativity, could potentially be useful for any philosophers 
wishing to mount a meta-epistemological defence of foundationalism. It thus not 
only opens up new dialectical options by which to revisit and resist epistemological 
counter-examples, but it opens up new avenues of discussion in the debate 
between foundationalism and coherentism.  
It is, I conclude, potentially a very useful epistemological approach, that 
admits of a range of possible applications.  
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